Collective bargaining, wage setting and downward adjustments in the continental European labour market: evidence from Portugal by Vilares, Hugo Filipe Henriques de Almeida Esteves
The London School of Economics and Political Science
Collective Bargaining, Wage Setting and Downward
Adjustments in the Continental European Labour
Market: Evidence from Portugal
Hugo Filipe Henriques de Almeida Esteves Vilares
A thesis submitted to the Department of Economics




I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the PhD degree of the London
School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have
clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried
out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided
that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior
written consent.
I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of
any third party.
I declare that my thesis consists of approximately 60,100 words.
Statement of Conjoint Work
I confirm that Chapter 1 was jointly co-authored with John T. Addison and Pedro Por-
tugal, and I contributed 50% of this work. A version of this chapter has been published
in the British Journal of Industrial Relations, Volume 55 Issue 3, September 2017, pages
551-576.
I confirm that Chapter 2 was jointly co-authored with John T. Addison and Pedro Por-
tugal, and I contributed 50% of this work.
I confirm that Chapter 3 was jointly co-authored with Hugo Reis, and I contributed 80%
of this work.
Without great solitude, no serious work is possible.
Picasso
1
Statement of inclusion of previous work
I confirm that work on Chapter 1 began prior to my enrollment in the PhD. The research
paper has not been submitted for any prior degree.
Statement of Financial, Logistical and Technical Support
This manuscript benefited from the patronage of several institutions, other than London
School of Economics. Without their support this journey would have never proceeded.
Here I acknowledge their precise contributions.
Financial Support:
• Economic and Social Research Council provided financial support for the 2015-
2019 period, through the PhD studentship grant number #1642247;
• Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia provided financial support for the 2020-
2021 period, through the PhD studentship grant number #2020.04812.BD;
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Abstract
With the Great Recession as enduring scenery, this journey dwells in widening the acumen
on Continental European Labour Markets, particularly during sizable downturns. The
yacht, the Portuguese case, is one of its representative designs. The course departs with the
specific mannerisms of wage setting institutions, where the first leg reasons the dynamics of
collective bargaining in distressed periods, and the second focuses on the influence of trade
unions in this wage setting protocol. Then, we have a regatta for an empirical structural
analysis of the dynamics of the wage setting and its resilience under significant distress.
The last straw deals with the interaction between the labour market institutions and
firm liquidity; and its influence on the dynamics of wages and unemployment throughout
recessionary periods. At the final harbour, we have drawn a consistent sketch of our
yacht’s blueprints, and hopefully of those alike. As the zenith of the journey, we have
broaden the knowledge about its conduct on rough waters.
JEL Codes: A31, C14, C21, C23, C25, C51, C55, C61, C62, C63, C68, C78, E17, E21,
E22, E23, E24, E61, E64, J23, J24, J31, J33, J41, J51, J52, J53, J63, J64




Labour market institutions provide the framework by which labour relationships are gov-
erned, postulates the scope of contract adjustments, particularly relevant during down-
turns, and they set the rules and conduct by which grievances are to be settled. Critically,
not all labour markets are alike, and their differences are not inconsequential.
This thesis canvass the Continental European Labour Markets, particularly those of the
Southern European and from French based origin, by resorting to the Portuguese case
- one of its representative designs. Those markets are structured in a centralized way,
where collective bargaining assumes a primal role. The architecture of contracts are bar-
gained between unions and employer’s associations at sector or industry level, with firm
and worker left with the ability to bargain over marginal improvements on the collectively
bargained preset. Jointly with a comprehensive labour code, this preset effectively con-
stitutes the core of the worker’s contract, prescribing labour conditions, hours of work,
rules of absences and holidays. Particularly in permanent contracts, which are the dom-
inant type, its clauses determines restrictive conditionality to dismissal and stipulates an
increasing severance compensation in its occurrence. It further conditions pay, with col-
lective bargaining prescribing a detailed wage floor table, and often minimum values of
wage supplements, that maps each job assignment. In fact, as overall principle, pay is
considered an acquired right which shall not be reduced.
In the first chapter, I overview the presence of unions in the market and the dynamics of
collective bargaining throughout the Great Recession, inspecting how a severe downturn
affects the ability of unions and employer’s associations to bargain. Instead of a shift
of the institutional paradigm, the reduced frequency of collective bargaining agreements
and extension revisions is attributed to downward nominal wage rigidity in low-inflation
regimes. In severe temporary hardship, the regular conduct is merely stalled, not changed,
with the sides temporarily freezing contract revisions. Unions acknowledge that nominal
improvements on current contracts are not feasible through bargaining, and firms realize
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contracts are largely legally protected against nominal wage cuts.
Despite its resilience, the institutional setting has witness substantial structural changes.
Noteworthy, trade unions have recorded an intense erosion of membership, while keeping
its perks in the apparatus of collective bargaining. These dynamics raise the question
about the ability of trade unions to influence wages, and subsequently about the impor-
tance to consider its presence in modelling the way wages are defined. Have they become
an inconsequential pro forma? Have collective bargaining became a specter whose prescrip-
tions do not bind or constraint? The second chapter intends to analyse those pertaining
questions. It examines the association between union membership and wages, measures
the union density wage gap, and attributes such gap to the heterogeneity of worker, firm,
and job-title or ‘occupational’ characteristics. Even with almost universal representation,
unions are found to casually increase wages as they increase workplace and/or sector mem-
bership, until the majority of the workforce is unionized - a clear sign that unions remain
relevant beyond its mere statutory presence.
This evidence raised the challenge addressed in the third chapter, namely how can we
describe the way wages are set in this type of markets, while acknowledging and taking
advantage of its institutional framework? Consequently, the chapter proposes a structural
model capable to be empirically implemented to estimate bargaining powers of the actors
in the negotiations, the link between the value of the worker-firm relationship and the
worker’s wages, the passthrough of changes in collectively bargained wages and changes in
actual worker’s wages, the worth of worker and firm characteristics in explaining the wage
dispersion, and the extend to which higher quality workers match with higher productive
firms. The findings obtained in a consistent framework conform with the literature, and
provides a sound perspective to understand the wage setting protocol in these markets.
Structurally, I witness a secular deterioration of worker’s bargaining powers at the top
and the middle of the wage distribution, while at the bottom I recorded a broad stability,
in a process that should not be oblivious to the union membership erosion. In distressed
times, the bargaining powers are remarkably stable, signalling a significant wage setting
resilience. Thus, the eventual adjustment of real wages occur fundamentally due to the
changes in the value of real outside options and of the real value of the productivity
generated by the current worker-firm match, and not because the worker obtains less from
the labour relationship.
With the wage setting defined and overviewed, the fourth chapter incorporates its findings
and studies the ability of the labour market to cope with downturns of varying magni-
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tudes, in the context of a macroeconomic model with consumers possessing heterogeneous
wealth and productivity. There, consumers work and save to insure themselves against
unemployment. The contracts are either temporary or permanent, with the latter imply-
ing displacement costs when they breakdown. The wages can not be nominally reduced,
and firms enter in financial distress whenever their leverage reaches substantially high
levels. Such distress makes firms more likely to succumb due to the pull-off of financial
institutions, leading to a costly process of destruction of inter-temporally viable jobs.
By the end of this thesis, a comprehensive and consistent overview of the labour market
has been performed, particularly during distressed periods. While the institutions adjust
to downturns by temporarily shutting down, the pre-crisis agreements are by rule not over-
turned. Consequently, the potential realignment of real wages to new market conditions
is constrained by the impossibility of nominal wage reductions, thus taking place at the
rhythm that inflation allows. This constraint consumes firm liquidity. If such rhythm,
jointly with permanent worker’s (mostly) voluntary exits, as involuntary becomes very
costly, the cut down on hiring, and the dismissal of often the few existing temporary
workers are not sufficient to avoid the firm’s liquidity exhaustion, a catastrophic job de-
struction takes place, led by firms exiting the market, often through bankruptcy. That
has been the tale of the Great Recession in some countries which at least partially justifies
the Great Unemployment Divergence witnessed in Continental Europe in those times.
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Chapter I
Unions and Collective Bargaining in the Wake of
the Great Recession: Evidence from Portugal
John T. Addison, Moore School of Business, University of South Carolina and
Durham University Business School
Pedro Portugal, Bank of Portugal and Nova SBE
Hugo de Almeida Vilares, LSE and Centre for Economic Performance
Abstract
Against the backdrop of its industrial relations architecture, characteristic of the ‘south-
ern European group’ and intimately linked to the recommendations of the Troika, this
chapter examines four key aspects of Portuguese collective bargaining. First, it provides
definitive estimates of private sector union density for that nation. Second, it models the
determinants of union density at firm level. Third, it yields estimates of the union wage
gap for different ranges of union density. The final issue examined is contract coverage.
The received notion that the pronounced reduction in the number of industry-wide agree-
ments and extension ordinances of late is to be equated with a fall in coverage is shown
to be a chimera, the number of workers covered by new and existing agreements remain-
ing largely unaffected by the economic crisis. The reduced frequency of new agreements




Portugal is one of a number of countries within the Euro zone to have experienced a major
external balance problem, leading to financial support by the Troika (the European Com-
mission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) in return
for the joint therapy of fiscal consolidation and structural reforms. Portugal’s external
problem may be seen as the outcome of a competitiveness crisis stemming from a decade
of misalignment between (rising) wages and (lagging) productivity growth. (For a full
diagnosis, see Blanchard (2007)). One mechanism underlying this misalignment was the
country’s wage setting architecture that failed to deliver the necessary responsiveness of
wages to their underlying determinants. This failure was exacerbated by the conjunc-
tion of a low inflation regime with severe nominal wage rigidity, resulting in burdensome
employment losses (Carneiro et al. (2014)).
Now the role of collective bargaining systems in achieving efficiency – to be equated with
the ability of the economy to maintain a low average unemployment rate and to limit
fluctuations in the unemployment rate in response to economic shocks – has been the
topic of considerable policy interest in recent years (see Addison et al. (2014)), and in
this regard the Portuguese model has been allied to labour market rigidity and heightened
reliance on quantity adjustment. But Portugal does not stand alone: it is not atypical of
the group of southern European nations in terms of its industrial relations infrastructure
and in particular high degree of collective bargaining coverage and social dialogue, albeit
accompanied by union fragmentation, lack of articulation in collective bargaining, and ma-
terial informality in the labour market. An additional commonality has been the historical
importance of the favor laboris principle, which in the Portuguese case has traditionally
meant that successor collective agreements can only improve on the terms of the imme-
diate past agreement. More generally, Portugal is representative of continental European
nations – indeed in the vanguard – in respect of its extension (of collective agreement)
procedures, employment protection legislation, and decline in union density from its peak
circa 1980.
In consequence, Portugal was one of three southern (and other) European nations placed
under the scrutiny of the Troika and pressured to push through material reforms to its
collective bargaining system (inter al.) in the wake of their economic difficulties/sovereign
debt crises. As we shall see, the quid pro quo for financial assistance included sharp curbs
on extension agreements that were perceived to produce downward wage rigidity – for
example, Martins (2014) argues that extension ordinances promote nominal wage rigidity
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through the setting of around 30,000 wage floors – and greater unemployment.
Notwithstanding the importance of the great recession and Troika policies to contemporary
industrial relations in Portugal, therefore, is important to discuss the pre-existing architec-
ture of collective bargaining to understand the behavioural shift sought by the Troika and
also to properly address the nature of the so-called crisis in collective bargaining which is
widely perceived to be more acute for southern European nations in general and Portugal
in particular than elsewhere in Europe (see, for example, Cruces et al. (2015)). To this
end, we have first to describe the bargaining framework in Portugal and its evolution both
before and in response to the economic crisis. This will enable us to address the function-
ality of the wage bargaining system and to speak of a standstill rather than an overt crisis
in collective bargaining.
Having outlined the bargaining framework, measurement of overall union density is a key
component of any discussion of there being a developing crisis in collective bargaining.
Unfortunately, countries often lack official statistics on union density. Portugal is one
such country. The consequence is that prior estimates of private-sector union density
for that nation are little more than informed guesstimates. Fortunately, a solution to
this problem has recently become available with the availability of the Relatório Único,
or Single Report, conducted by the Office for Strategy and Planning (in the Ministry
of Employment, Solidarity and Social Security). That is, we can now derive accurate
estimates of union density. We provide the first estimates for Portugal using these new
data for the years 2010 through 2013. Even if there has certainly occurred a steady
erosion in union density since 1980, we report broad stability over this four-year period
with average density a little over 10 per cent. For its part, collective agreement coverage
approximates 90 per cent over the same interval. The extension phenomenon that helps
explain this disparity between density and coverage will be addressed throughout the
chapter.
Again using the Relatório Único, and following on the provision of economy-wide statistics
on density, our cet. par. analysis then examines the determinants of density at firm level.
Among other things, we report that union density is highest in those sectors and activities
sheltered from product market competition. More generally, it is firms with higher union
density that are observed to drive the bargaining process.
The next part of our analysis presents a stylized version of a recent investigation into the
union premium (see Addison et al. (2021)). That study explores a high-dimensional fixed
effects regression model and then offers a smoothed nonlinear function relating wages to
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union density at firm level. Our modification simply collapses that nonlinear relationship
into five union density intervals. We find evidence that our measure of the union wage
gap is sharply increasing in firm density. Changes in the premium are investigated as a
further check on the stability of the collective bargaining system.
Returning to the theme of European crisis management, the chief structural reforms sought
by the Troika included greater decentralization of collective bargaining, derogations from
industry agreements at workplace level, close attention to what countries can afford in
setting national minimum wages (i.e. linking increases to broad competitiveness and effi-
ciency audits), and cutting back on extension agreements. In its dealings with the agency
in 2011, as documented in the next section, the Portuguese government agreed to a num-
ber of such measures. Most notably from the perspective of the present chapter, extension
agreements were initially frozen and the procedures for such extension subsequently reset
by the government. Additionally, any increase in the nation-wide minimum wage was
meant to be made conditional on economic and labour market developments.
The data seemingly suggest that the government measures on extension agreements have
had a distinct chilling effect on collective bargaining. Thus, the number of new agreements
has fallen dramatically and with them the number of extension ordinances. It is just a
short step to argue – as have a number of influential observers – that Portuguese collective
bargaining is in crisis mode. But we choose instead to focus on the fact that, although new
agreements have stalled, coverage under existing agreements (and operational extensions)
has remained basically unchanged. Furthermore, since new agreements cannot generally
be less favourable to employees than the agreements they succeed, the decline in new
agreements is less to be construed as structural (i.e. a crisis in collective bargaining) than
as indicative of the difficulty in securing increases in nominal wages (that are admittedly
less likely to be extended) in a deflationary environment. Vulgo: real wages (or wage
costs) are not declining enough. In short, we interpret fewer agreements and extensions
as associated with downward nominal wage rigidity combined with a severe recession
rather than the ‘upward nominal wage rigidity’ experienced in more normal times.1 This
interpretation does not mean that the Portuguese collective bargaining system is fit for
purpose or for that matter to deny that structural changes are in the offing.
The outline of the chapter is as follows. First, we review the structure of Portuguese
collective bargaining. Second, we describe the main datasets used in this inquiry and the
1Upward nominal wage rigidity refers to the notion that in normal times many firms are oblidged to
increase the wages of their workers either through the extension of collective wage agreements or hikes in
the minimum wage (see Martins et al. (2017)).
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base elements involved in modelling the determinants of union density and the wage gap.
Third, we present some introductory descriptives followed by the main findings of the
chapter. A summary concludes.
2 The Bargaining Framework
Portuguese law makes provision for three types of collective bargaining at national, re-
gional, and local level, although it is the case that contemporary wage setting has been
dominated by the widespread use of administrative instruments such as government ex-
tensions of agreements entered into by the bargaining parties. First, there is a modicum of
firm-level bargaining signed by an individual company and one or more unions, resulting in
so-called Acordos de Empresa (or AEs) that are important in the oil sector and transport
and communications. Somewhat more important in terms of direct impact are collective
agreements signed by several employers that are not part of an employers’ association and
one or more trade unions, known as Acordos Colectivos de Trabalho (or ACTs), that are
significant in the financial sector and utilities. However, it is industry-level/branch or sec-
toral agreements, so-called Contratos Colectivos de Trabalho (CCTs), negotiated between
one of more employers’ associations and one or more unions, that predominate. As a re-
sult, CCTs in conjunction with extension agreements that are very largely based on them
(the other option is to extend ACTs) explain levels of collective bargaining coverage in
the order of 90 per cent of workers despite a marked decline in union density that extends
back over 30 years (see Visser (2015)) and that we now estimate for the private sector at
around 10 per cent. The vast majority of agreements are signed by unions linked to the two
major union confederations: the CGPT-IN or General Confederation of Portuguese Work-
ers (Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses - Intersindical Nacional), and the
UGT or General Workers’ Union (União Geral de Trabalhores). The gaps in coverage
are largely in personal and other services, and in public administration where, despite
centralized negotiations between the government and the trade unions, wages are decided
upon unilaterally by the government. The wages of employees in publicly-controlled com-
panies, such as public transportation and the postal service, are collectively bargained in
the normal way.
The industry-level or sectoral agreements may cover a range of industry-specific occupa-
tions but as the system does not rule out parallelism or overlapping collective agreements
a single enterprise may be covered by two or more agreements depending on the union
affiliation of the workers (although as a practical matter the content of most of the agree-
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ments is similar, the respective tables of wages tending to be the same). The situation
may be further stratified if the firm in question straddles more than one line of economic
activity, thereby belonging to one or more employer associations. As a result of fragmenta-
tion, therefore, several agreements may coexist for the same region, occupation, and firm.
Horizontal or occupation-based agreements are also possible, although they are infrequent
largely because the law gives precedence to vertical sectoral agreements many of which are
signed by a large number of primary unions that may include occupation-based unions.
Portuguese collective agreements are at once both extensive and general. They are exten-
sive insofar as they cover many categories of worker. They are general in that they set
only minimum conditions of which the most important is the base level monthly wage.
Other terms and conditions most frequently covered are working time, night work, over-
time, shift rates, and additional social benefits (see Addison et al. (2021)). The focus is
upon wage floors rather than anticipated wage growth that in some centralized bargaining
regimes such as Sweden have been incorporated directly into sectoral agreements. In a
typical year, about 300 agreements are in place, determining around 30,000 wage floors
for the corresponding job titles or professional categories (Categorias Profissionais), one
consequence of which is that employers in principle have freedom of manoeuvre to tailor
remuneration to their prevailing economic circumstances.2
Until recently, it has been the case that Portuguese collective agreements remain in place
until a new agreement is signed. This important feature of collective agreements is statu-
tory, as in Spain, whereas in Italy it is established by collective agreement. Coupled with
the favor laboris principle that new agreements should yield more favourable conditions
that those they are replacing,3 this provision has meant that collective agreements have
tended to be revised regularly only insofar as wages are concerned, their other terms and
conditions often being left untouched for many years. Recent changes in the labour code
mean that collective agreements can now expire if they are not renewed. Although more
sweeping changes had been envisaged under the labour code of 2003, the status quo ante
until late 2014 was as follows. Collective agreements expired five years after they had last
been agreed, or five years after one of the parties had indicated its intention to renegotiate
their terms and conditions. That said, the collective agreement would continue to apply
for at least 18 months after this, to allow negotiations to take place. Indeed, either of the
parties had a period of 12 months during which to request the appointment of an arbi-
2On the determinants of the contractual wage and the wage cushion, or difference between actual wages
and the contractual wage set for each worker category, see Cardoso and Portugal (2005).
3For changes in the law on the suspension of the norms of collective agreements and of labour contracts
as well as the terms of the suspension of collective bargaining in situations of company crisis, see Ramalho
(2014) and Martins (2014a), respectively.
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trator to draw up new terms and conditions. New rules for the extended validity period
(sobrevigência) of collective agreements came into force on 1 September 2014, under the
seventh amendment to the 2009 labour code. Specifically, the expiry period was reduced
from five years to three years, and the period of continuation upon expiry reduced from 18
months to 12 months. In addition, whenever there is an interruption of negotiations, in-
cluding conciliation, mediation or voluntary arbitration for more than 30 days, the period
of ‘survival’ is suspended and the period of negotiation with suspension cannot exceed 18
months.4
The most potent mechanism shaping the formation of wages has traditionally been the
systematic generalization via extension ordinances or Portarias de Extensão of industry-
wide agreements (and occasionally ACTs) by the Ministry of Employment, following a
request from either or both of the parties to the agreement.5 The upshot of this near
automatic procedure is that even agreements reached by trade unions and employers’
associations with very low representation have had a strong impact in setting wage floors,
with roughly 70 to 80 per cent of the labour force benefiting from collective agreements
without being members of the signatory organizations. Finally, in the absence of one of the
representatives, or in the presence of strategic delays in negotiations/refusals to negotiate,
the Ministry of Employment can regulate the sector directly through an Ordinance of
Working Conditions, or Portarias de Condições de Trabalho.6 The extension mechanism
in conjunction with the large number of job titles set down in the typical sectoral agreement
together explain the 30,000 (informal) minimum wages identified in Martins (2014) analysis
of the employment and wage bill consequences of collective bargaining extensions referred
to earlier. Observe that among the firmament of European extension arrangements, or
4Since contracts can now lapse or lose their validity, it is of interest to determine the vintage of
Portuguese contracts. For the year 2009, the frequency and per cent of all workers with contracts of up to
10 years in length were as follows:











In other words, some 8.71% of all workers were employed under contracts that were more than 10 years
old.
5Voluntary extensions are also common, while employers who sign an agreement with a trade union(s)
usually extend its application to the entire workforce, irrespective of the worker’s union status.
6An arbitration process, either mandatory or voluntary, may be set in motion to unfreeze ‘blockages’.
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their functional equivalents, those in Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Italy have traditionally
been among the most far reaching (see Visser (2013): Table 4).
In addition to the extension procedure, wage floors are also set under national minimum
wage machinery, set up in 1974. The minimum wage can exceed that set under sectoral
bargaining. This guaranteed monthly minimum wage (Retribuição Mı́nima Mensal Garan-
tida or RMMG) was virtually stagnant in real terms between 2002 and 2006, leading to an
agreement between the social partners (government, the trade union confederations, and
the employers’ confederation) in 2006 allowing for an increase of almost 30 per cent, to
be phased in over five years and setting a medium-term target value €500 by 2011. It has
been estimated that the share of minimum wage earners among full-time workers aged 18
to 61 years rose dramatically from 6.7 per cent of total employment in 2006 to 16.6 per
cent in 2010 (Carneiro et al.’s (2012)).
Both systems of minimum wages – nation-wide and collectively bargained/extended –
were disrupted by the economic crisis of 2011/12. As part of the Memorandum of Un-
derstanding7 concluded between the Portuguese government and Troika in May 2011 it
was agreed among other things that the procedures for extending collective agreements
would be changed, even prior to which the government committed to restrict the exten-
sion of collective agreements.8 In October 2012 the government announced new criteria
for the administrative extension of collective agreements taking into account the repre-
sentativeness of the negotiating organizations and the implication of such extension for
non-affiliated firms. Most importantly, agreements could only be extended if at least one
union and one employers’ organization requested it and the wider signatory organizations
employed more than one-half of the employees in the relevant industry. However, in June
2014 this Resolution was modified: by way of dilution, extensions were exempted from
the 50 per cent rule if more than 30 per cent of firms affiliated to the employer association
consisted of micro, small, and medium-sized companies (employing up to 250 employees).
As far as the national minimum wage was concerned, the Memorandum proposed to make
any increase in the minimum wage conditional on economic and labour market develop-
ments. The minimum wage was duly frozen and in 2012 and 2013 it stood at the level of
2011 (viz. €485). It was not uprated to €505 – a little above the medium-term target –
until October 2014. However, with effect from January 1, 2016, the minimum wage was
raised to €530.
7The terms of the Memorandum are available at https://infoeuropa.eurocid.pt/registo/000046743/.
8Other changes under the Memorandum included revisions to the unemployment insurance system in
terms of the level and duration of benefits, a dimunition in employment protection via a reduction in
severance payments and the relaxation of the protection against individual dismissals, and an expansion
of flexible working time arrangements in the form of working time accounts at individual and plant level.
24
The economic crisis and the response of the public authorities to it are credited with some
fairly dramatic changes in Portuguese collective bargaining. In particular, the decline in
the number of Portuguese collective agreements and worker coverage have been the subject
of several critical European Observatory of Working Life reports (e.g. EurWORK (2014)),
while the topic of so-called radical decentralization affecting all crisis EU nations and
leading to the “destruction of national collective bargaining systems” has been identified
as a key paradigm shift by Schulten (2013).
Nevertheless, in addition to the reversals noted above, there has been little evolution
in atypical collective agreements, by which is meant the ability of works councils and
other representative bodies of workers at plant level to conclude collective agreements
at the workplace. The current legal position is that works councils can negotiate at
this level in firms with a minimum of 150 employees but only in circumstances where
this is authorized by the trade union. The latter provision reflects the constitutional
provision that competence to conclude collective agreements is the exclusive preserve of
the trade unions. Reform proposals favoring so-called Acordo Geral de Empresa that can
be signed independently of the trade union had to be abandoned in the face of strong
union opposition in the Standing Council for Social Concertation (Comissão Permanente
da Concertação Social or CPCS).9
3 The Datasets
The main dataset used in the present inquiry is the Relatório Único for the four years
2010 through 2013. The data are collected through a mandatory questionnaire to every
establishment with at least one wage earner, and the survey is conducted by the Office for
Strategy and Planning in the Ministry of Employment, Solidarity and Social Security. The
Relatório Único replicates its precursor the Quadros de Pessoal (Personnel Tables) other
than in one important respect. The new dataset for the first time contains a question
on unionism. Specifically, the union question contained in the survey, and asked of the
manager respondent, is as follows: “Indicate the number of workers for whom you have
knowledge of their membership in a union (because they are union officials, because you
9Space constraints preclude other than passing reference to the process of social concertation/social
dialogue. Suffice to say here that although the last pact establishing reference values for nation-wide wage
increases was in 1996, a number of agreements have been reached in the tripartite CPCS since 1996 of
which 2006 social accord on minimum wages is a practical example. Moreover, many of the proposals in
the Memorandum relied heavily on another tripartite agreement in March 2011, while some subsequent
labour market new reforms had a basis in another such agreement in January 2012. By the same token,
modern concertation has been practised without the participation of the largest trade union.
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deduct membership dues from their salary, or because the worker informed you about
his/her membership so as to determine which particular collective regulation is applicable
to their case).” This information allows the researcher to measure the union density of the
firm, rather than establish the union membership or otherwise of individual workers. It is
likely to provide a more objective and consistent measure of unionism than union sources
because of the pecuniary and legal underpinning of the survey question – the only source
of understatement arising where the employee wishes to hide his or her union affiliation
from the employer. We note parenthetically that there is a large gap between the figures
provided by the unions and the union density estimates of the government.10
Data are given on each establishment (its location, economic activity, employment, num-
ber of temporary employees, legal structure, and sales) and for each of its employees (their
gender, age, education, skill, occupation, tenure, earnings, and work schedule). The earn-
ings data are both detailed and accurate. The information pertains to the gross wage
for normal hours of pay (or base wage) together with both regular and irregular benefits,
overtime pay and hours, and wage bargaining mechanism/type of contract. The full-wage,
or total compensation, is the wage variable used in estimating the union wage gap or pre-
mium. The accuracy of this information is assured by its administrative nature and the
fact that by law the wage and all other information in the survey has to be made publicly
available at the establishment.
The restrictions imposed on the raw dataset were as follows. First, we limited our analysis
to full-time workers in mainland Portugal. Part-timers are excluded primarily because
trade unions and employers bargain over full-time wages. Furthermore, their inclusion
would require us explicitly to model the labour supply decision over the number of hours
worked. Second, we excluded workers from agriculture, forestry, and fishing as well as
those in public administration whose wages are not collectively bargained. Third, indi-
viduals aged under 16 years and above 65 years at survey date were excluded.11 The
final restriction was that the worker’s monthly wage had to be at least 80 per cent of
the mandatory minimum wage, which here corresponds to the lowest admissible wage
for apprentices. Our final sample for the density computations comprises some 612,336
year-firm observations, which correspond to some 301,724 firms matched by identifying
number, representing 2,758,197 individuals matched by identifying number, gender, and
year of birth, and 48,913 jobs matched by code of the collective agreement occupational
10See http://www.worker-participation.eu/National-Industrial-Relations/Countries/Portugal/Trade-
Unions.
11The former individuals are those in reserved professions, such as theatre and sports activities, other-
wise exempted from the legal minimum working age, while the latter individuals constitute another special
group of those above retirement age.
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category. Computation of the union wage premium will also use data from the Relatório
Único , the sample now comprising 2,697,114 workers, 298,185 firms, and 48,222 job-titles.
However, our analysis of downward nominal wage rigidity in high and low inflation regimes,
in which we effect comparisons between matched samples of workers across the years 1985,
2009, and 2013, will perforce draw on the Quadros de Pessoal for the former two years.
The third principal dataset used in this inquiry lists all new agreements and extensions
of collective agreements between January 2008 and December 2014, and is maintained by
the Ministry of Economics from the texts of both the individual collective agreements and
extension orders. We take Martins (2014) estimates based on these data as indicators of
the flow of collective agreements, and update and supplement this information with data
from union and official sources, respectively the UGT (2014) and BTE (2015) (Boletim do
Trabalho e Emprego), on the flow of agreements and extension ordinances. These data will
be juxtaposed against stock data from the Relatório Único (and the Quadros de Pessoal)
to examine the validity of the assertion that profound changes in the numbers of extensions
and new agreements imply sharp falls in coverage.
4 Modelling
We address in turn the models used to estimate union density and the union wage gap. The
context of both constructs are expanded upon in section 6. Given that the remaining com-
ponents of our analysis are based on simple tabulations of collective agreements/extensions
and presentation of nominal wage change distributions, they too are not addressed here.
To estimate the determinants of firm unionism we deploy a count regression model and,
in recognition that many firms in the sample do not have any unionized workers (287,056
firms, or 95.1 per cent of the total), we elect to use a zero inflated count model. More
specifically, since the non-zero observations may be over-dispersed, we use a zero inflated
negative binomial model (ZINB) after Lee et al. (2001).
The zero inflated negative binomial model can be written:
Pr(y|x) =

ρ+ (1− ρ)e−λ(x,u) for y = 0
(1− ρ) e
−λ(x,u)λ(x,y)y
y! for y ≥ 1
, (I.1)
where y denotes the count of the expected number of union workers at the firm, x are
the covariates influencing unionization, u is an error term, and ρ ∈ [0, 1] is a zero-inflated
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parameter obtained through a simple logit parameterization:
ρ = e
τ
1 + eτ . (I.2)
Observed data often display empirical variances larger than their means, implying the
existence of an “overdispersion” problem. This may reflect the existence of firm unobserved
heterogeneity. The problem can be circumvented by adding the random variable u to the
vector of explanatory variables. This will allow for the expected value to differ from the
variance. But conditional on the error u, y follows a Poisson distribution. If we assume
that u follows a gamma distribution, then the unconditional distribution of y is a negative
binomial. In other words, λ(x, u) = ex′β+log(u), with u following a gamma distribution, and
where E(u|x) = 1 and V ar(u|x) = 1/δ. Furthermore, we included an artificial covariate,
logN , reflecting the size of the workforce to account for exposure to the “risk” of being
unionized. That is, λ(x, u) = ex′β+log(N)+log(u), where N is number of workers in the
firm. Proceeding this way, the specification lends itself to a convenient interpretation as
a fractional regression model.
The dependent variable in the model is the number of unionized workers at the firm.
The independent variables in the model are (average) worker characteristics and firm
characteristics. The former comprise a continuous measure in age, and the proportions
of females, foreign nationals, and individuals in various educational categories. The firm
characteristics are the share of public equity, and dummies for establishment size (6),
industry (30) and time because of our use of all waves of the Relatório Único.
Our second model links union density to the union wage gap. It takes into account
the results given by Addison et al. (2021) showing that it is unwise to assume that
union density impacts linearly on (log) wages. That study seeks to decompose the union
wage gap in terms of the contributions of worker, firm, and job title heterogeneity in the
framework of a high-dimensional fixed-effects regression model. Its main finding is that
the wage gap largely reflects the allocation of workers to firms with distinct wage policies
due to the heterogenous presence of unions at firm/sector level rather than unobserved
worker quality or differences among job titles, and we will take this interpretation as the
main driving force behind the union wage gap. Observe that the union wage gap in this
model – that is, prior to the decomposition exercise – gives the cet. par. average difference
in wages at a given firm resulting from the specific union density rate of that firm via a
two-stage estimation. Essentially the first step of the procedure is a wage regression with
standard controls but a separate fixed effect corresponding to each level of union density in
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the database. That is, there is a different wage intercept capturing the impact of the firm’s
particular density rate on a worker’s compensation. In a second step, a kernel regression
is used to smooth these fixed effects. The outcome of this exercise shows that the impact
of union density is highly nonlinear. Specifically, it is miniscule up to 20 per cent density
but increases steeply thereafter, reaching a maximum at around 70 per cent density. As
an approximation to the flexible functional form of the full model, the worker earnings
function that we deploy here substitutes four union dummies (and the omitted category)
for the 4,828 individual union fixed effects. Our estimating equation is thus specified as:





ft + εift (I.3)
where log(wift) is the log of monthly gross compensation for the individual worker i in
firm f at year t and, in addition to the union dummies, xift is a vector of explanatory
variables and εift denotes an idiosyncratic error term.
The four union density dummies (udkft) are as follows: greater than zero but less than
or equal to 25 per cent, greater than 25 per cent but less than or equal to 50 per cent,
greater than 50 per cent but less than or equal to 75 per cent; and greater than 75 per
cent. The base controls to be used at the level of the worker are age, age squared, tenure,
tenure squared and dummy variables for gender, and education level; for the firm, they
are industry and size dummies. In addition, there are time dummies.
5 Introductory Descriptives
We preface our cet. par. findings and estimates of the stock of workers covered by
collective bargaining instruments with some aggregate statistics on union density and
mostly secondary flow data on worker coverage by collective agreement. Table 1 provides
three sets of estimates of trade union density covering the period 1980 to 2013. The first
are taken from Blanchflower and Bryson (2003) and point to a sharp reduction (a little
under 50 per cent) in membership over the final two decades of the last century. The next
set of estimates are broadly comparable in construction and are taken from the OECD
(2015). They now show a much reduced rate of decline over the first decade of the present
century and even a slight uptick as of 2012. As noted earlier, our own estimates shown
in the last row of the table rely on administrative data from the Relatório Único – rather
than union sources – and exclude the public sector if not public enterprises. Perhaps
more important than the difference between our data and those of the OECD, only partly
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Table I.1: Trade Union Density in Portugal, 1980-2013
Year Study













Notes: (a) Values extracted on 4 March 2015 from OECD.StatExtracts (available at
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=UN DEN); (b) Computed from the Re-
latório Único 2010 - 2013.
occasioned by this exclusion,12 is the broad stability of private sector union density over
the last four years for which the data are available. That is, union density held at a little
above 10 per cent in the face of economic crisis and retrenchment.
Table 2 plots the flow of collective agreements and their coverage from 2008 to 2014. This
is where the real drama unfolds. Between 2008 and 2013 there occurred a precipitous fall
in the number of new sectoral agreements (84.3%), multi-company agreements (33.3%),
and single-firm agreements (49.5%), albeit with indications of an uptick in the coverage
of all types of new agreement as well as some churning in agreement type in 2014. On
aggregate, the number of workers covered by new collective agreements fell from 1,894,846
to 242, 676 (or by 87.2%) between 2008 and 2013, followed by a very modest increase
of 1.5 per cent in the combined flows in 2014. The last column of the table reveals an
even more dramatic fall off in the number of extension agreements of 93.1 (90.1) per
cent between 2008 and 2013 (2014). The table does not give the number of workers
affected by these extension agreements as the authorities do not collect information on the
number of affiliated workers in each signatory union and the universe of workers potentially
covered by a given bargained instrument of collective bargaining. As a result, the available
information simply reports the workers covered by each instrument independently of its
origin, either by affiliation or extension.
12Data provided by Visser (2015), while mostly consistent with OECD data in the years following 2000,
if not before then, suggest lower density rates of 18.3 and 18.5 per cent in 2011 and 2012, respectively.
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Table I.2: The Flow of Collective Agreements by Type, and Extensions, 2008-2014
Year Type of Collective Agreement Extension
Sectoral Multi-Employer Company Agreements Total (PEs)
(CCTs) (ACTs) (AEs)
2008 172 27 97 296 131
(1,778,216) (47,232) (69,398) (1,894,846)
2009 142 22 87 251 103
(1,299,371) (59,902) (37,952) (1,397,225)
2010 141 25 64 230 113
(1,309,267) (64,455) (33,344) (1,407,066)
2011 93 22 55 170 17
(1,160,080) (52,737) (24,102) (1,236,919)
2012 36 9 40 85 12
(291,068) (26,645) (9,009) (327,662)
2013 27 18 49 94 9
(242,676)
2014 49 23 80 152 13
(246,388)
Notes: Numbers of collective agreements, and workers covered (in parentheses). Earlier
values are reported by Dias and da Conceição Cerdeira (2011); and, for slightly different
values, see EurWORK (2014). The data contained in the last two rows of the table are
consistent with but not strictly comparable to those reported by Martins (2014). Sources:
Martins (2014) for the years 2008-2012; UGT’s (2014) (2014, Figures 2 and 4) for 2013-
2014; BTE (2015) for extension ordinances.
The latter data have been interpreted as indicating a major rupture of the industrial
relations system in Portugal that has excluded large numbers of workers from collective
agreements. But the popular notion that the Portuguese reforms have resulted in a major
overall reduction in the coverage of collective agreements is to confuse flows with stocks,
namely the number of workers covered by new agreements and extension orders and those
covered by existing agreements and ordinances. In short, Table 2, dealing with flows, has
to be considered alongside stock data. To anticipate our subsequent findings, we shall
report that the number of workers covered by collective agreements has, in common with
union density, evinced broad stability in recent years and that there is little evidence in
the flow data to herald the disappearance of collective bargaining.
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6 Main Findings on Union Density, the Wage Gap, and
Stock Data on Coverage
Table 3 presents the regression estimates from the negative binomial model discussed in
section 4. Observe firstly the positive relationship between average age and the fraction
of unionized workers in the firm, indicating the increased propensity on the part of the
worker to become unionized with age. The negative association between membership and
nationality (here the share of foreign workers) is also familiar. Less anticipated is positive
association between the share of females in the firm and union density, although it is only
marginally significant. (The coefficient estimate of 0.0710 means that increasing the share
of females by 10 percentage points increases union density by 0.07 per cent.) Evidently,
traditional gender-based supply and demand have become moot with the increased labour
market exposure of females. For its part education is strongly associated with union
membership: the relationship is near monotonic, the omitted category being those with
no schooling.
Perhaps the clearest association of all is the monotonic relation between firm size and
union membership, most likely reflecting scale economies to unions in the supply of union
services, as well as potential collective voice benefits. Note, too, the sharply higher mem-
bership rates in companies with greater public equity. It is frequently argued that the ‘dis-
persed’ nature of property rights in such circumstances together with implicit guidelines
on collective bargaining operating in public administration (not included in the sample),
where government assumes the position of employer, provides encouragement to higher
union density in publicly-owned firms.
Finally, among the sectoral dummies (not separately identified in the table), the cases of
Finance and Insurance Services and Transportation and Storage Services are important.
The former branch is the sole private sector industry where the labour unions offer a sys-
tem of private healthcare benefits to workers.13 The latter industry is well known for its
inelastic demand, small share of labour costs in total costs, and pervasive featherbedding.
Other important sectors are Oil Refined Products and Electricity and Water, oligopolistic
sectors with an historical prominence of public equity, which despite its erosion under
successive privatization schemes likely has legacy effects on collective bargaining arrange-
ments.
13Note the analogy here with modern cross-country union studies linking the presence of a Ghent
system to the growth in union density and its attenuation – as a result of the emergence of independent
unemployment insurance funds providing such insurance without requiring union membership – to the
decline in union membership/density; see, respectively, Schnabel (2013); Böckerman and Uusitalo (2006).
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Table I.3: Determinants of Union Density in Portugal. Dependent Variable: Number of
Unionized Employees at the Firm
Variable Coefficient (s.e)
Average age (in decades) 0.374***
(0.0152)
Proportion of females 0.0710*
(0.0379)
Proportion of foreigners -0.544***
(0.107)
Proportion of workers with elementary schooling 0.738***
(0.0665)
Proportion of workers with preparatory schooling 0.708***
(0.0589)
Proportion of workers with completed high school 0.774***
(0.0654)
Proportion of workers with college degree 0.893***
(0.0719)
Proportion of public equity in the firm 1.086***
(0.0703)
Firm with 10 to 49 employees 0.943***
(0.0215)
Firm with 50 to 99 employees 1.820***
(0.0306)
Firm with 100 to 499 employees 2.219***
(0.0288)
Firm with 500 to 999 employees 2.431***
(0.0631)
Firm with 1,000 to 4,999 employees 2.615***
(0.0668)











No. of observations 612,336
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical signif-
icance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. Source: Relatório Único
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Table I.4: Estimated Union Wage Gap (%) for Different Levels of Unionization
Specification Firm density rate
1 - 25% 25 - 50% 50 - 75% 75 - 100%
Without controls 17.59 28.29 63.66 61.11
Controls for (1) 12.31 16.34 38.00 34.00
Controls for (1)+(2) 4.41 6.66 20.27 14.95
Controls for (1)+(2)+(3) 6.61 7.74 21.07 15.26
(Distribution of unionized workers) (61.67%) (15.84%) (9.97%) (12.53%)
Notes: The following coding is used: (1) worker’s characteristics; (2) firm characteristics;
and (3) occupations. Source: Relatório Único.
We turn next to the association between union density and the union wage gap, using the
modified (first-stage) procedure described earlier, in which four density dummies substitute
for individual union fixed effects in each worker’s wage equation. Table 4 summarizes the
model in presenting regression coefficients for the density dummies ([>0%, ≤25%]; [>25%,
≤ 50%]; (>50%, ≤75%]; and [>75%,∞)), the omitted dummy being union density = 0%.
Results from four separate specifications are reported. The first contains just the union
density dummies; the second adds a set of worker controls; the third adds firm controls;
and the fourth includes a single additional control for occupation. It will be recalled that
in addition to the occupational control, the worker controls consist of age and age squared,
tenure and tenure squared, and dummy variables for gender and educational level while
the firm arguments are industry and size dummies.
As can be seen from Table 4, once density climbs above one-quarter of the firm’s workforce,
the union premium is sizeable and survives the incorporation of worker, firm, and occu-
pational controls. For example, absent controls, in those workplaces where more than 75
per cent of the workforce is unionized the average value of the premium is 61.11 per cent.
With the addition of worker and firm controls, the corresponding values are less at 34.0
and 14.95 per cent, respectively, indicating that union workers are more highly educated
and the importance of a firm’s location and size. Finally, adding in occupation controls
causes a no appreciable change in the premium, indicating that for this dataset at least
the controversy over the inclusion of the occupational controls in augmented Mincerian
wage equations is perhaps overdrawn.
These estimates of the union premium for Portugal are really rather substantial. First
of all, they exceed findings based on individual wage and membership data reported for
Britain and even the United States. For example, Blanchflower and Bryson (2003) cross-
country estimates point to a union wage gap for Portugal of 19.6 per cent in 1998/99, well
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before the onset of economic crisis. This is not to downplay the difficulties involved in es-
timating the union premium, such as misclassification and selection biases in conventional
studies using membership data or to minimize the problems arising in comparing esti-
mates in which the unit of observation is typically the individual rather than as here the
firm. Indeed, where most workers are covered by collective agreements focusing on union
membership effects is not particularly valuable and investigation of union wage effects
should instead address the question of the effects of collective bargaining arrangements
on wages. This emphasis is perhaps clearest in case of German research where studies
have investigated the impact of collective agreements on the hourly wage of an average
worker employed in an average firm, distinguished between individual worker coverage
and firm-level shares of covered employees, sought to estimate the causal effect of sectoral
collective bargaining on the wage structure, and provided selectivity-adjusted estimates
controlling for the nonrandom selection of workers with unobservable skills into the various
contractual regimes (see the summary in Addison et al. (2014)). But there is nothing in
this literature to suggest that contemporaneous estimates of the Portuguese wage gap are
other than very substantial.
Recently, however, some plant-based estimates of the union wage gap more in the spirit
of those provided here have been reported for the United States. In particular, DiNardo
and Lee (2004) use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the effects of being in a
unionized environment relative to a nonunionized environment, using the narrow margin
between union success and failure in representation elections. Evidence of a discontinuous
relationship between the vote share and wages is deemed to be the true effect of union-
ization by eliminating any confounding election and omitted variable biases. DiNardo
and Lee find small and mostly negative union effects – the largest positive wage effect
within two standard errors of the point estimate being just 0.014. As a practical matter,
however, this methodology captures only union effects at the margin. This is made clear
in an events study analysis by Lee and Mas (2012) of the effect of new unionization on
publicy-traded firms’ equity values, 1961-1999. The authors use a long panel – of up to 4
years before and after the representation election – of high frequency data on stock market
returns. This events study analysis reveals substantial losses in a firm’s market value fol-
lowing a union election of $40,500 per unionized worker, which value can be equated with
a union premium of around 10 per cent. In addition to addressing the issue of how equity
values respond to certification elections, Lee and Mas also estimate events study models
for elections with varying degrees of union support. Their results indicate a clear negative
association between abnormal returns and vote share. Although there is no discernible
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discontinuity at the 50 per cent union vote threshold, a greater than 60 per cent share
for example is associated with negative cumulative average returns in the range 20-30 per
cent while a formal discontinuity estimate of union victory is indistinguishable from zero,
allowing these findings to be reconciled with the DiNardo-Lee result without vindicating
the regression discontinuity design. The conclusion is that our estimates for Portugal are
consistent with but continue to exceed U.S. plant-based estimates based on material union
victories in representation elections. Second, our results are obtained in a framework that
recognizes, as have other studies (e.g. Bryson (2014)), that wage gains are a function of
localized bargaining power. But in Portugal there is an additional wrinkle, namely the
substantial disparity between the number of unionized workers and the number of workers
covered by collective agreements. This disparity varies significantly among industries and
sizes of firm. In this context, the generalized use of extension ordinances that extend to
the entire sector agreements reached between unions and employer federations with weak
or very weak representation is especially problematic. Such unions and employers’ federa-
tions will likely represent larger firms and better paid workers. These, then, are the likely
leaders in the wage updating exercise and the process one of cartelization. And in cir-
cumstances where the use of extension regulations serves to erode representation through
time, the problem of a misalignment between bargained wages and wages that are feasible
is compounded and reflected in higher unemployment. Finally, when adverse economic
conditions impede further increase in wages, given low inflation and the need for real wage
realignment, and without an ability to pass through wage revisions to the entire sector,
the result is bargaining standstill.
As a secondary exercise we estimated the average union wage gap regression model sep-
arately for each year of the 2010-2013 sample period. We failed to detect that the union
premium had changed with the severity of the recession, irrespective of the union density
interval considered. If anything, the results pointed to a slight increase in the union wage
gap over time. While this outcome might suggest that nominal wage rigidity may be
stronger in higher union density firms, the more general reading would be that inertia of
the wage structure plays a dominant role and that the crisis has yet to produce a major
shift in the impact of collective bargaining.
This narrative returns us to the issue of coverage. In Table 2 we reported the dramatic
fall-off in new agreements and new extension ordinances after 2010, drawing on Martins
(2014) inter al. Other observers have misleadingly concluded from these data that the
changes since 2008 have left a little over 1.5 million workers without coverage and that the
decline in collective bargaining has reached crisis point. (EurWORK (2014)). In Table 5,
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Table I.5: Workers covered by an Instrument of Collective Bargaining in Portugal







Sources: Quadros de Pessoal, 2008-2009; Relatório Único, 2010-2013.
using data from the Relatório Único for 2010-2013 and from the Quadros de Pessoal for
2008-2009, we report that the number of workers covered by an existing or new instrument
of collective bargaining – either the collective agreement or the extension ordinance based
on it – has declined more modestly from 90.5 per cent of all workers in 2008 to 89.2 per
cent of all workers in 2013.
Figure I.1: The Stock of Collective Agreements by Type, 2008 - 2013
Notes: Percentage values indicate the employment coverage share of each respective in-
strument/all instruments. Figures in parentheses indicate the number of each respective
instrument/all instruments. Figures at base of each column in brackets above year in-
dicate the total numbers of workers covered in thousands.Sources: Quadros de Pessoal,
2008-2009; Relatório Único, 2010-2013.
We supplement the material in Table 5 with information on the component instruments
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in Figure 1 which also gives information on the total number of workers affected. By
way of clarification, the category referred to as ‘other’ picks up the other non-bargained
instruments such as Regulations of Working Conditions and arbitration where the Ministry
of Employment, or an independent third party, regulates the sector directly and not just
orders that simply enlarge the franchise of a bargained instrument. Clearly, the bulk of
extension agreements are assigned here to branch agreements or CCTs. The most notable
feature of Figure 1 is the broad-based stability in the coverage of the various types of
agreements over the sample period. The contrast with the information contained in Table
2 is sharp. That said, the number of covered workers does appear to have fallen by 562,578
or a little over 20 per cent from 2008 to 2013. Although not contesting that there has
been a decline – if not the cataclysmic fall suggested by an incorrect reading of Table 2 –
we would caution that some of decline has to do with the changeover from the Quadros
de Pessoal to the Relatório Único in 2010.
The bottom line with respect to coverage is that reports of the death of Portuguese collec-
tive bargaining have greatly been exaggerated by outside observers. This interpretation is
underscored by the subsequent dilution of the restrictions on extension agreements, noted
earlier, and an uptick in their number from 13 in 2014 to 36 in the first 10 months of 2015.
We next proceed to offer a different explanation for the decline in new agreements and
extension ordinances.
7 Collective Bargaining Coverage once More (or Downward
Nominal Wage Rigidity in High and Low Inflation Regimes)
The notable feature of wage setting in recent years, and in particular at the end of our
sample period, is the evidence of extreme nominal wage rigidity. This outcome is the
result of a conflation of severe economic contraction and a low rate of inflation. In these
circumstances, a revealing exercise is to contrast the nominal wage change distribution in
2013 with that of 1985 when another interval of economic recession was accompanied by
high inflation. We will also identify another recession year – 2009 – that was accompanied
by lower inflation to establish whether there is anything anomalous about 2013. The
respective wage change distributions (of job stayers) for 1985, 2009, and 2013 are provided
in panels (a), (b), and (c) of Figure 2. In each case the inflation rate is given by the solid
vertical line.14
14We focus here on the base wage since this measure is more closely related to the theoretical notion of
a negotiated wage rate. Furthermore, it is less subjected to measurement error than other components of
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Figure I.2: Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity in High and Low Inflation Regimes
Sources: Quadros de Pessoal, 2008-2009; Relatório Único, 2010-2013.
Beginning with panel (a) of the figure, it can be seen that a tiny proportion (1.4%) of
workers faced nominal wage cuts and a somewhat larger share (4.4%) of workers experi-
enced a wage freeze. Although a large majority of workers had nominal wage increases
(94.3%), only 18.4 per cent of workers enjoyed real wage increases; the latter being those
individuals located in the wage change distribution to the right of the inflation rate (30%)
identified by the vertical line. The share of workers located to the right of the vertical line
at zero per cent wage change and to the left of the vertical line corresponding to 30 per cent
wage change/inflation of 74 per cent, that is, the fraction of worker with nominal wage
increases and real wage decreases, provides a rough indication of real wage contractual
flexibility facilitated by a high inflation rate. On net, the average decline in real wages
was 5.7 per cent in 1985 which was contemporaneous with the stagnation in GDP (0%
growth). Concurrently, the unemployment rate was stable at 8.5 per cent.
The drama of contemporary wage adjustment is illustrated in panel (c) of the figure. The
wage change distribution nearly collapses at zero per cent nominal wage change. Fully
74.5 per cent of workers had nominal wage freezes – an outcome without parallel in other
labour remuneration.
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developed nations – and 21.4 per cent nominal wage gains. Only 3.6 per cent of workers
experienced real wage cuts: because the inflation rate was negative, even the small share
of workers with nominal wage cuts (4.1 per cent) modestly exceeded the proportion with
real wage cuts (3.6%). Overall, real wages rose by 1.2 per cent on average in 2013, while
GDP declined by 2.7 per cent. Meantime, the unemployment rate increased somewhat
from 15.5 per cent to 16.2 per cent.
There is no indication that these contemporary developments for 2013 are anomalous
in low inflation (actually, deflationary) regimes. Panel (b) of Figure 2 illustrates the
corresponding situation in 2009 when the inflation rate was -1.5 per cent as compared
with -0.3 per cent in 2013. As can be seen, with higher deflation, almost all workers now
enjoyed a real wage increase (97.9 per cent), despite the large fraction of nominal wage
freezes (36.5%). Nominal wage cuts were experienced by just 2.5 per cent of workers, some
of whom nevertheless saw an increase in real wages. The overall increase in real wages
was 4.8 per cent. Meantime, unemployment rose from 7.6 per cent to 9.4 per cent, while
GDP declined by 3.2 per cent.
In low inflation regimes, the margin for downward real wage adjustment that would not
imply nominal wage cuts is highly circumscribed.15 The problem of real wage adjustment
is of course exacerbated in deflationary times since even material cuts in nominal wages
may be consistent with real wage increases. In both sets of circumstances, a large fraction
of workers may be expected to experience nominal wage freezes, which is what we observe
in Portugal. Apart from this perfect storm, as it were, other reasons why nominal wages
have been frozen have been discussed earlier. They reflect the mechanisms that generate
automatic nominal wages increases, namely a sharp decline in new collective agreements,
the legal limits placed on the extension of such agreements, and a freeze on minimum wage
hikes. In short, contemporary Portugal is properly characterized by aggravated nominal
wage rigidity. The consequences are presumably to be felt in the future. They include job
destruction since the incidence of wage freezes is associated with lower hiring rates and
more intensive firm closures (see Carneiro et al. (2014)), and pent-up wage deflation (or
repressed deflation) because firms that are forced to avoid nominal wage cuts will tend to
delay future wage increases.16
15We might also note the situation in 2012 when inflation was a modest 2.1 per cent and hence closer
to the 2013 (and 2009) situation than that of 1985. Here, roughly the same share of workers experienced
wage freezes as in 2013 (76%) although fully 86 per cent of workers now experienced real wage decreases,
much as in 1985. This was an interval of rapidly rising unemployment (up from 12.7% in 2011 to 15.5%
in 2012) and sharply lower GDP (-3%).
16According to Nunes (2016), in 2013 the level of wage freezes in the Portuguese labour market prevented
real wages from declining by 6 to 7 per cent.
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It could be argued that downward nominal wage rigidity may act as a mechanism that,
during an economic recession, would smooth income and consumption fluctuations and
thereby attenuating the impact of the slowdown on the economy. In the absence of a
structural macroeconomic model, however, it is not possible to properly disentangle this
stabilization effect from the labour demand effect mentioned above. Be as it may, the
dramatic decline of employment during the Portuguese adjustment program seems to
suggest that the wage rigidity channel played a very significant role driving job destruction.
8 Conclusions
This inquiry has uncovered what to many will be some surprising facts about collective
bargaining in Portugal. This is largely the result of our being able to use a new dataset that
contains reliable data on union membership in the private sector. We provide not merely
the first accurate estimates of union density in Portugal, 2010-2012, but also demonstrate
evidence of a sizeable density-related union premium in an industrial relations regime of
near-universal coverage. As with other such estimates, however, causality remains an issue
because unions may locate in firms with more generous compensation policies or that are
more ‘permeable’ to union wage demands.
Finally, using the same dataset, despite an unambiguous shift in bargaining momentum
that has led to far fewer collective agreements and extensions in the wake of the economic
crisis, we report that coverage by collective agreement is largely unaffected once one ac-
counts for the stock of existing contracts. Although the bargaining milieu has changed, we
argue that this is best seen as a consequence of a low inflation regime in conjunction with
a severe economic downturn. Whereas in the past the wage setting system was largely
driven by what has been termed ‘upward nominal wage rigidity’, the present environment
is one in which downward nominal wage rigidity has become truly binding.
In short, we have yet to observe a sea-change in Portuguese collective bargaining practice.
This is of course not to deny that since the 1990s and during the years preceding the
economic crisis there have been changes in the law and industrial relations in Portugal,
or that further changes have been made since then in response to the euro crisis with
the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding. Indeed, we have addressed
number of these changes. Rather, our point would be that the effect of these changes have
been exaggerated by certain influential observers in their diagnosis of the deregulation
in the institutional framework. We refer here in particular to the claim that restrictions
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on the life of expired collective agreements and the extension principle have involved a
significant reduction in the number of workers benefiting from and covered by collective
agreements. This assertion is to confuse changes in flows with changes in stocks. That
said, the decreases in employment that are implied by maintenance of the status quo may
be expected increasingly to impact union density, in which circumstance free riding may
become more of an issue to unions than heretofore, leading them to be less supportive of the
extension mechanism and to focus instead on those groups for whom the unemployment
risk is already attenuated. Assuming that unions are able to push for higher wages,
therefore, serious declines in coverage may ultimately result.
In the interstices, the main lesson to be carried over from the Portuguese experience
charted here to other European economies is that low inflation regimes are likely to lead
not only to less frequent wage changes but also to inadequate real wage adjustments
if the latter imply nominal wage cuts. Although observers have pointed to a pattern
of ‘unilateral state interference’ in these circumstances (Molina (2014)), a more positive
approach might be a policy of fiscal devaluation. That is, a reduction in social security
contributions financed through higher consumption taxes may provide a practical way of
adjusting labour costs in the short run without a continued haemorrhaging of employment.
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of Worker, Firm, and Job-Title Heterogeneity
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Abstract
We examine the association between union density and wages in Portugal where just
10 percent of all workers are union members but nine-tenths of them are covered by
collective agreements. Using a unique dataset on workers, firms, and collective bargaining
agreements, we examine the union density wage gap in total monthly wages and its sources
- namely, worker, firm, and job-title or ‘occupational’ heterogeneity - using the Gelbach
decomposition. The most important source of the mark-up associated with union density
is the firm fixed effect, reflecting the differing wage policies of more and less unionized
workplaces, which explains two-thirds of the wage gap. Next in importance is the job-title
fixed effect, capturing occupational heterogeneity across industries. It makes up one-third
of the gap, the inference being that the unobserved skills of workers contribute at most only
trivially to the union density wage gap. In a separate analysis based on disaggregations
of the total wage, it is also found that employers can in part offset the impact of the
bargaining power of unions on wages through firm-specific wage arrangements in the form
of the wage cushion. Finally, union density is shown to be associated with a modest
reduction in wage inequality as the union wage gap is highest among low-wage workers.
This result is driven by the job-title fixed effect, low-wage workers benefiting more from
being placed in higher paying ‘occupations.’
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1 Introduction
In this chapter we examine the association between union density and wages in Portugal
and the role played by worker, firm, and job-title heterogeneity in that relationship. Both
are interesting if challenging questions. Thus, for example, in continental Europe, the
architecture of wage bargaining systems typically leads to bargaining coverage rates that
exceed union density rates, and often by a considerable margin. The pervasive presence
of extension mechanisms that generalize union wage agreements throughout industry is
responsible for this asymmetry. One might easily be led to conclude in these circumstances
that unions have an indistinguishable effect on wages across firms. Vulgo: how can a union
premium arise when all workers are covered?
Clearly union membership has a different meaning in continental Europe than in the
United States. In the first place, the union contract does not determine the wages of
covered workers, but rather the wage floor for specific job titles. Actual wages may differ
from bargained wages. Moreover, being a union member in Europe is less likely to cor-
respond to a discrete event associated with strong union power via a (successful) union
representation election at the firm, as is the case for the United States. That said, union
density rates at the firm or contractual level may still convey relevant information regard-
ing the strength of unions, union power elevating the worker share of the firm’s economic
rents in all theoretical models of collective bargaining. Indeed, union density may even
prove a more adequate measure of the degree of dispersion in union power than in the
United States. The case for measuring union power is further underscored by the existence
different layers of wage negotiations in continental European nations.
With respect to what lies behind the union wage gap, a second interesting feature of
the chapter is that it quantifies the importance of sorting in unionized labor markets.
In particular, we examine the allocation of heterogeneous union workers across firms with
heterogeneous wage policies and granular job-titles that are differently remunerated. That
is, we seek answers to the following questions. Is union density systematically related to
heterogeneous firm wage policies? Do we consistently observe more higher-paying job-
titles (or more generous promotion policies) in more highly unionized firms? Do union-
ized workers possess unobserved characteristics that make them more productive? While
clearly very much in the spirit of the contemporary interest in the process of allocation of
heterogeneous workers to firms, this examination of the manner in which union members
are assigned to firms and detailed ‘occupations’ has to our knowledge never before been
examined in the union literature.
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The innovations contained in the chapter are as follows. Having obtained conventional
linear regression estimates of the union wage gap, we then decompose the union density
effect for total monthly wages using a high-dimensional fixed effects wage regression model.
Specifically, using the Gelbach (2016) procedure, we exploit the omitted variable bias
formula to decompose the union density rate regression coefficient estimate into its worker
heterogeneity, firm heterogeneity, and job-title heterogeneity components. We extend the
procedure by replacing the single union density coefficient estimate by a smooth nonlinear
function characterization of the union effect. We then seek to peer more closely inside the
mechanisms of wage setting, distinguishing between the bargained wage determined at
sectoral level and the wage cushion, where the latter is defined as the difference between
the bargained wage and total wages. The wage cushion is made up of the payment at
firm level of a base wage above the bargained wage (which is widely held to offset the
impact of union power on the latter) and various supplements received by the worker
in the form of overtime/shift pay and fringes not related to working time. Finally, to
the best of our knowledge, we estimate for the first time a three-way high-dimensional
quantile regression model, using the Machado and Santos Silva (2018) method of moments
estimator to address the impact of union power on wage inequality and, no less important,
its component sources.
Our main findings with respect to total wages are fivefold. First, the union wage gap is
around 16 log points on average. Second, the effect of union density is not linear. Some
critical mass of union density - around 30 percent - is required to have any material influ-
ence on wages, while beyond some level (approximating 70 percent) further increases in
union density detract from the peak premium. Third, the union wage gap would change
profoundly were workers randomly assigned to firms and job titles; that is, firm heterogene-
ity accounts for two-thirds of the gap. Job-title heterogeneity, whereby unionized workers
are assigned to higher paying job titles in the compensation tables of collective agreements,
accounts for the remaining one third, so that compensation for their unobserved ability
plays a negligible role in determining the premium enjoyed by union workers. Fourth, the
impact of union density on wage dispersion though modest is inequality reducing. Thus,
workers in the 10th percentile record a higher wage gap than their counterparts in the
90th percentile (17.2 and 15.0 log points, respectively). After taking into account sorting
and worker heterogeneity, it emerges from our extension of the Gelbach procedure that the
wage compressing effect of union density mainly stems from low-wage workers benefiting
more from being placed (or promoted) into higher paying job titles than high-wage work-
ers. Finally, returning to the overall picture, we conclude with all necessary caution that
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the union wage gap is likely to be between 6 and 16 log points. We base this interpreta-
tion on the notion that job-title fixed effects largely capture the effect of trade unions. A
postscript from our work on the wage cushion is that in sectors where unions are weaker,
relatively low bargained wages offer scope for compensatory adjustment at firm level.
2 The Bargaining Framework
Collective bargaining in Portugal occurs mainly at the sectoral or industry level, where
wage ordinances only set wage floors. Further, although in a strict sense these union
negotiated wage agreements only formally bind the members of the employer’s association
and the affiliated workers of the signatory trade union(s), there is in practice a widespread
and well anticipated practice of legal extensions that dramatically broaden the incidence
of the agreements. The upshot of this near automatic procedure is that every firm within
the sector in which the agreement is extended, and every worker within those firms, are
no less covered than the original signatories themselves.1
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This decoupling of coverage and membership, both within and between firms, translates
into levels of collective bargaining coverage in the order of 90 percent of workers at a time
1Individual companies and one or more unions may sign firm-level agreements, known as Acordos de
Empresa (or AEs), which represent a better-paying alternative to the nearest-neighbor sectoral agreement.
Their prevalence is limited to less than 5 percent of the private sector workforce, and their existence is
mostly related to idiosyncrasies in the firms’ shareholder structures. A similarly modest proportion of
workers is covered by agreements established between a group of firms and one or more unions under
Acordos Colectivos de Trabalho (or ACTs).
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when union density is around 10 percent. That is, around 80 percent of the labor force
have benefited from collective agreements without being members of a trade union. It
further explains the finding that around 62 percent of workers are in firms with zero union
density. And among those in firms with positive union density, its distribution is highly
skewed toward low values. As shown in the histogram of Figure 1, close to two-fifths of
these observations record less than 10 percent density.2
Figure II.2: Collective Agreement Size, Average Total Wage at Collective Agreement
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Source: Relatório Único, 2010-2013.
As a result, while individual membership of unions and employers’ associations becomes
inconsequential for collective bargaining agreement coverage purposes, it does not follow
that membership is inconsequential. It is unlikely that a union representing 2 percent of
the workers in an industry will have the same success as a union representing 40 percent
of the workers, even if both contracts record 100 percent coverage. In other words, het-
erogeneity in union power (as proxied by union density) should after all be reflected in
wage differentials. This is indeed the indication of Figure 2 showing that union density
rates comove with wages. In summary, union membership in continental Europe is best
seen as a continuous process measuring union power rather than a discrete event always
identifying high union densities.
In a more granular setting, the strength of unions can be expressed in negotiations con-
2The average union density rates changed from 10.3 percent in 2010, to 9.7 percent in 2011 and 2012,
and to 9.9 percent in 2013. During the 2010-2013 period, the between component of the union density
variance is 0.0416 and for the within component is 0.0057. More generally, for analysis of the effect of
union decline on wage inequality see inter al., DiNardo et al. (1996), Card et al. (2004), and Farber et al.
(2021).
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Table II.1: The Hospitality Sector Collective Agreement, 2017
Rank Job Description Minimum Monthly
Base Wage
(in Euros)
13 General Manager 1,515
12 Board Assistant; Commercial Manager; Service Manager; 1,240
Human Resources Manager; Technical Manager
11 Head of Department; Head of Division; 1,018
Head of Services; Nutrition Technician 1st Class
10 Head of Section (office); Head of Sales; Inspector; 898
Board Secretariat officer; Nutrition Technician 2nd Class
9 Administrative; Head of Cafeteria; Head of Purchases; 808
Head of Kitchen; Head of Pastries; Head of Storage;
Head of Dinning Room; Inspector of Sales
8 Cashier; Head of Preparation Room; Controller; 771
Cook of 1st Class; Sub-Head of Dinning Room;
Administrative Assistant; Pastry Cook; Sales Technician
7 Driver of Heavy Vehicles; Storage Keeper; Polyvalent Worker 716
6 Driver of Non-heavy Vehicles; Administrative 700
Assistant 2nd Class; Pastry Cook 2nd Class; Sub-Head
of Dinning Room 2nd Class; Sales Representative
5 Cook 2nd Class; Controller of Balcony; Controller of Bar; 629
Controller of Storage and packing; Admin. Assistant 3rd Class
4 Head of Copa; Cook of 3rd Class; Packing Worker; Storage Worker 582.50
3 Controller Cashier; Storage Worker; Bar Worker; 570
Balcony Worker 1st Class; Distribution Handler;
2 Balcony Worker 2nd Class; Admin. Intern; Hospitality Assistant 562
1 Driver Assistant; Distribution Assistant; Barman 557
Intern (1 year); Cook Intern (1 year);
Pastry Intern (1 year); Cleaning Worker; Dining room Employer
Notes: Table extracted from the Sectoral agreement of April 22, 2017, between AHRESP
(the Association (of Employers) in Hotels, Restaurants and Similar) and SITESE (the
Union of Workers and Technicians of Services, Commerce and Hospitality). Source: Bo-
letim do Trabalho e Emprego, 2017.
ducted at the industry level mainly through the determination of industry wide wage
floors, or bargained wages, for specified job titles (“categorias profissionais”); the defini-
tion of job titles themselves over which wage floors are negotiated; and the promotion rules
that automatically place workers into higher job titles. The partitioning of the workforce
into these occupational categories, whose specificity is sufficient to justify bargaining over,
takes into consideration the complexity of the tasks involved, the hierarchical standing
of the worker, and the demands of the associated working conditions. In a typical year,
the firmament of 300 sectoral or industry level agreements, each containing fully specified
tables of job titles, constitutes the core outcome of collective bargaining.3 Some 30,000 dif-
3For a detailed review of recent developments in collective bargaining and extension arrangements in
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ferent job titles/bargained wages are prescribed market wide. Table 1 illustrates by means
of a representative agreement with its associated complement of job titles and bargained
wages.4
While exhaustive, these sectoral wage tables neither fully determine wages nor completely
define their application to individual workers. At firm level, the power of trade unions
may be manifested in higher compliance with collective wage agreements; in negotiated
wages exceeding those agreed at the industry level; in more favorable promotion rules;
and by new or more generous productivity or tenure related premia. Consequently, firms
frequently pay more than bargained wages, particularly larger and more unionized firms.
In sum, wage negotiations at firm level are expected to generate wage gains above and
beyond those obtained at industry level. Indeed, this is the suggestion of Figure 3 which
shows that firm level union density rates impact differently in firms of different sizes. More
concretely, union wage effects are higher among larger firms.
Figure II.3: Heatmap of Union Density, Firm Size, and Average Real Total Wages (in
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Source: Relatório Único, 2010-2013.
3 The Datasets
The data sources used in this exercise are the Quadros de Pessoal (Personnel Tables), from
its inception in 1986 until 2009, and the successor Relatório Único (Single Report) from
Portugal, see Hijzen and Martins (2016), Addison et al. (2017), and Card and Cardoso (2021).
4Appendix Table 1 provides some details on the largest 15 collective agreements, including the number
of job titles specified per agreement and the average union density of the constituent firms.
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2010-2013.5 For our purposes, each longitudinal matched employer-employee-contract-job
title database is identical other than in one main respect: the follow-up survey contains
data on the union density of the firm that for the first time permit accurate estimates of
union density to be obtained. We will therefore not distinguish between the two other
than to address the major, albeit temporary, innovation in the successor survey, and to
note that while the union wage gap can only be computed using the Relatório Único, both
surveys are instrumental in computing the conditional decomposition of estimates of the
union wage gap in to its component firm, worker, and job-title fixed effects.
The surveys are mandatory in nature and are administered by the Ministry of Employment
and Social Security on an annual basis for all establishments with at least one wage earner.
All workers employed by the firm in the reference month (March of each year until 1993,
October thereafter) are reported, although civil servants and workers in domestic service
are not covered while the coverage of agriculture is necessarily uneven because of the
importance of the informal sector/low share of wage earners in this sector. In short, the
entire population of private-sector firms in manufacturing and services with wage earners
is covered. Further, by virtue of their mandatory nature, the high response rate in the
surveys ensures that problems commonly associated with panel data such as panel attrition
are much attenuated. Confidence in the coverage and reliability of the surveys is further
underscored by the requirement that the data be made publicly available at the place of
work.
The databases report the location, industry, employment, sales, ownership, and legal
basis of the establishment/firm. Worker information includes gender, age, skill, broad
occupation, schooling completed, starting date with the firm, earnings, and working hours.
In addition, the surveys also record the collective bargaining arrangement and the specific
job title held by the worker defined in the collective agreement.6 As noted earlier, this
job classification variable goes beyond a fine definition of occupations to encompass the
complexity of the task performed, the skill level of the job, the required labor market
experience, and the hierarchical standing of the worker. The wage variable records the
worker’s gross monthly earnings (the actual or total wage as of the survey month ), which
sum is split into the following four components: the base wage (i.e. the gross pay for
5For the years 1990 and 2001 the Quadros de Pessoal survey was not administered. Although the
union question is ongoing, data on union density in the Relatório Único have not been made available to
researchers since 2013.
6Those workers not covered by any collective agreement are coded as such (i.e. “non-covered workers”).
Such workers often have higher paying individual contracts. A significant portion of them are in the IT
industries. In Appendix Table 2 it is shown that the inclusion of such workers does not impact significantly
the regression coefficient estimate for the union density in the base model. Estimation of the full model is,
of course, not possible for “non-covered workers.”
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normal hours of work), overtime pay, and regularly and irregularly paid supplements.
Normal monthly hours worked and overtime hours are also reported.
The following restrictions were placed on the data. First, the analysis was confined to full-
time employed workers in receipt of what was contractually defined for the survey reporting
month. Second, workers from the agriculture, fisheries, and energy products/extraction
sectors were excluded. Third, workers aged less than 18 years and greater than 65 years
were excised, as also were those whose monthly wages were less than 80 percent of the
mandatory minimum wage, corresponding to the lowest admissible wage for apprentices.
Finally, observations not belonging to the largest connected group were dropped, amount-
ing to some 1 percent of the total number of observations.7
This brings us to the distinguishing feature of the successor survey - the Relatório Único -
namely that it allows us to construct a measure of union density at firm level. Specifically,
the survey asks of the manager respondent: Indicate the number of workers for whom you
have knowledge of their membership in a union (because they are union officials, because
you deduct membership dues from their salary, or because the worker informed you about
his/her membership so as to determine which particular collective regulation is applicable
to their case). The sum total of such workers - whose personal union status is unknown,
thereby precluding use of an individual union membership variable - divided by the number
of workers employed by the firm provides our measure of union density.
Overall, the joint dataset includes 36,616,379 observations of worker-year pairs, of which
6,218,777 are from the Relatório Único. The joint dataset has a basis in the records of
6,042,315 workers matched by identifying social security number, 652,487 firms matched by
identifying number, and 132,908 job-titles matched by the code of the collective agreement
occupational category. Appendix Table 3 provides the descriptive statistics for observa-
tions from both the Quadros de Pessoal and the Relatório Único.
4 Modelling
We next describe the procedures used: firstly, to estimate the union wage gap; and,
secondly, to account for the component contributions of firm compensation policies, worker
ability, and detailed occupational premiums via the estimation of firm, worker, and job-
7A connected group links the job title and the firm to the rest of the group such that all the fixed
effects are connected. Restricting the analysis to this subset of the data ensures that the estimates of the
fixed effects are comparable (see Guimarães and Portugal (2010)).
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title fixed effects, respectively.
4.1 Estimation of the Union Wage Gap
We begin with a standard Mincerian wage equation, augmented to include union density,
as follows:
wit = x′itβ0 + δ0t + γ0UF (i,t) + ε0it , (II.1)
where wit is the natural logarithm of worker i monthly compensation at year t, x′it is
a vector of observed characteristics of the worker and his/her employer, β0 is a vector
of coefficients for the observed characteristics of workers and firms, UF (i,t) is the level of
union density of employer F in year t, γ0 is the coefficient associated with the level of
union density, δ0t are calendar year fixed effects included to capture the macroeconomic
environment (business cycle), and ε0it is an error term, assumed to be uncorrelated with
the covariates. The explanatory variables (or observed characteristics) of workers and firms
are age, age squared, seniority, seniority squared, and dummies for gender, education, firm
size, and industry.8
To allow for a non-proportional impact of union density on wages we will consider both
parametric and non-parametric approaches. The parametric version employs a third-
degree polynomial in union density:
wit = x′itβ0 + δ0t + γ01UF (i,t) + γ02U
2
F (i,t) + γ03U3F (i,t) + ε0it . (II.2)
In the non-parametric version, the impact of union density is captured by the presence of
fixed effects ψ0uF (i,t) (one for each different level of union density U):
wit = x′itβ0 + δ0t + ψ0uF (i,t) + ε0it . (II.3)
Information contained in the union fixed effects while necessarily complete is rather noisy
and “staccato.” Thus, in a second step, we will estimate a kernel regression linking the
estimates of the union density fixed effects and actual union density at firm level, as
8The subscript 0 denotes the base regression model specification.
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follows:
ψ̂u = K(U) + υu, (II.4)
where ψ̂u is the union density fixed effect estimate obtained from the first step, U is the
prevailing union density of the firm, υu is the disturbance term, and K is a standard
Epanechnikov kernel function (Silverman (1986)).
The estimation of local weighted union wage gaps, as well as the third-degree polynomial
specification, result in smoothed estimates of a union wage gap curve in actual earnings.
To facilitate interpretation of the results, a convenient normalization in the nonparametric
case requires that the fixed effect in the absence of workplace unionism be set equal to zero.
No further restrictions are implied by this assumption as the union wage gap represents
the relative difference in wages for workers at firms with different levels of union density,
controlling for the observed characteristics of workers and firms.
4.2 Estimation of the Sources of the Union Wage Gap
Given the estimate of the union wage gap it is useful to decompose this outcome measure
into its constituent mechanisms; that is, to identify the contributions of worker, firm, and
job-title time-invariant heterogeneity. To this end, we adapt the conditional decomposition
of Gelbach (2016).
For the full-specification model, we include in equation (3) the sources of time-invariant
heterogeneity, namely the worker fixed effect (α1i), the firm fixed effect (λ1F (i,t)), and the
job-title fixed effect (θ1J(i,t)), exploiting the methodology first introduced in Carneiro et al.
(2012). The model thus becomes:9
wit = x′itβ1 + δ1t + γ1UF (i,t) + α1i + λ1F (i,t) + θ1J(i,t) + ε1it . (II.5)
In general the identification of the worker, firm, and job title fixed effects is assured by the
restriction that the sample identifies the largest connected set. A connected set is defined
when at least one element of a worker, firm, and job title combination links the rest of
the group (Abowd et al. (1999)). The largest connected group represents more than 99
9The subscript 1 denotes the full model specification.
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percent of the sample.
At this stage, we calculate the independent contribution of each fixed effect to the union
wage gap. For this purpose we adapt the methodology developed in Gelbach (2016),
which appeals to the omitted variables bias formula to compute a detailed decomposition.
Departing from a baseline specification to which covariates are added, Gelbach’s procedure
allows us to compute the contribution of each new covariate to the change in the estimate
of the coefficient of the variable under scrutiny. In our case, it allows us to unambiguously
disentangle the contribution of each excluded variable (each fixed effect) to the variation
of the coefficient estimate(s) of the union density variable(s).
To better understand our decomposition exercise it is useful to present the benchmark wage
regression equation, emphasising the union effects, in the following matrix formulation:
W = Xβ0 + Uγ0 + ε0, (II.6)
where W stands for vector of wages, X denotes the matrix of control variables, including
the year dummies, β0 is a vector of regression coefficients, U collects the union density
variable(s), γ0 represents the union wage gap, and ε is the vector containing the error
terms.
Making use of the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell theorem, we can express the OLS estimate of γ0
by running a regression of W on U after partialing out the effect of X on both variables.
That is,
γ̂0 = (U′MXU)−1U′MXW, (II.7)
where, MX = I −X(X ′X)−1X ′ is the residual-maker, or “annihilator” matrix.
More compactly, we can write:
γ̂0 = AXW, (II.8)
and introduce the definition of the matrix AX = (U′MXU)−1U′MX , which will be in-
strumental in the application of the omitted variable bias formula. In general, if we
pre-multiply any variable by AX we will always obtain the corresponding regression coef-
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ficient estimate of the union density variable, after controlling for the variables included
in X.
We now define the the full regression model, where we incorporate the worker effects
(identified via the matrix D), the firm effects (identified via F), and the job-title effects
(identified via J). The estimated full regression can be now expressed as:
W = Xβ̂1 + Uγ̂1 + Dα̂1 + Fλ̂1 + Jθ̂1 + ε̂1, (II.9)
where α̂1, λ̂1, and θ̂1 denote the worker, firm, and job-title fixed effects, respectively.
At this stage, we build on the approach suggested by Gelbach (2016), which makes use
of the OLS omitted variable bias formula, to decompose the union wage gap in terms of
individual self-selection in unionized firms (the worker component) and sorting across firms
with different wage policies and differently remunerated job titles. This can be achieved
by multiplying both terms of the full regression by AX, leading to:
γ̂0 − γ̂1 = AXDα̂1 + AXFλ̂1 + AXJθ̂1 = τ̂α1 + τ̂λ1 + τ̂θ1 (II.10)
as, by construction, AXε̂1 = 0.
Equation (10) yields an exact, unambiguous and conditional decomposition of the union
wage gap. The interpretation of this equation is that we can split the wage gap into
three components: a worker component (τ̂α1), a firm component(τ̂λ1), and a job-title
component (τ̂θ1). In practice, all we need to do is to run a regression for each type of
fixed effect on all regressors of the benchmark regression (X and U) and extract the union
regression coefficient estimates.
Mutatis mutandis, we can apply the same principle of the Gelbach decomposition to the
union wage gap curve given in equation (2) and to the union fixed effect specification in
equation (3). In the latter, the difference between the union density fixed effects of the
full and base models can be decomposed into three fixed effects:
ψ̂0u − ψ̂1u = AXuDα̂1u + AXuFλ̂1u + AXuJθ̂1u = τ̂αu + τ̂λu + τ̂θu , (II.11)
where the subscript u is used to emphasize that we are decomposing the changes in the
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union density fixed effects. In practice, and as before, the decomposition is achieved by
estimating three auxiliary regressions in which the worker, firm, and job-title fixed effects
become the dependent variables and the regressors match those of equation (3). Then, by
smoothing these estimates via a kernel function, we can provide a graphical representation
of the components of the union wage gap.
Before turning to our empirical results, however, we should resist the notion that the union
density fixed effect is simply to be equated with a firm fixed effect. Even if union density
were not to change over time, the union density fixed effect is to be seen as subsumed in
the firm fixed effect in the same way that the gender fixed effect is subsumed in the worker
fixed effect. Contrary to intuition, this fact does not preempt the decomposition of the
union density effect along its worker, firm, and job-title dimensions for the same reason
that the gender effect can be disentangled along the worker, firm, and job-title dimensions
(Cardoso et al. (2016)).10 A clear indication that the dominant role of the firm is not
mechanically implied by the fact that the union density variable is computed at the firm
level will be given by the decomposition exercise below.
5 Main Findings
5.1 The Union Wage Gap Curve for Monthly Wages
In Portugal evidence of sizable wage differentials associated with a firm’s degree of union-
ization is unmistakable, even though nearly every worker benefits from union bargaining.
For example, the heuristic distributions of the logarithm of total hourly wages shown
in Figure 4 display meaningful differences in both shape and mean when unionized and
non-unionized workplaces are considered.11
These stylized facts are confirmed by our benchmark results presented in Table 2 which
chart the impact of union density on wages after having controlled for the full set of
observed worker and firm characteristics, as described in section 4. For the linear specifi-
cation given in the first column of the table, the estimated union wage gap is 17.6 percent
[(e0.1619−1)×100]; a sizable union wage differential that is either on a par with or exceeds
U.S. estimates.12 This wage gap is to be interpreted in the following way: it represents the
10Cardoso et al. (2016) extend the Gelbach procedure and prove that it is applicable even in settings
where the omitted variables are fixed effects and the coefficient under scrutiny refers to a variable (viz.
gender) that is subsumed in one of the fixed effects.
11The values of zero and greater than zero were chosen because of the large majority of covered firms
without union members.
12See the early studies of Blanchflower and Bryson (2003), and Hirsch (2004); and, especially, the more
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wage difference between two observationally identical workers, one of whom is employed
in a fully unionized firm and the other in an otherwise identical non-unionized firm.
The preceding methodology implies that the value of the union wage gap for each point
in the continuum of union density is determined by and conforms to a linear relationship.
However, an important issue is whether the marginal change in the union wage gap is in
fact the same when a newly unionized worker joins a union-free workforce as opposed to a
situation in which, say, a plurality of workers is already organized. In seeking to estimate
a union wage gap without assuming constant marginal effects throughout, we shall follow
the two procedures described earlier to estimate the union wage gap curve.
These estimates are shown in Figure 5. Clearly, the linear approach is misleading; in
particular, unions need some critical mass (of unionized workers) in order to materially
influence wages. Panel A of the figure is based on a third-degree polynomial function
and indicates that union density attains statistical significance at around 30 percent,
with a maximum wage gap of 17 log points being achieved once union density reaches
approximately 70 percent (see also the first three rows of the second column of Table
2). Panel B of the figure, which gives the more flexible kernel smoother, shows that
although the polynomial is a sensible parsimonious approximation to the wage gap curve
it understates the peak premium (now in excess of 24 log points) and overstates the decline
in the premium thereafter.
recent plant-level studies of Frandsen (2012) and Lee and Mas (2012).
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Table II.2: Determinants of Union Density in Portugal. Dependent Variable: Number
of Unionized Employees at the Firm
Variable Linear Polynomial
Specification Specification
Union density 0.1619 −0.3844
(0.0244) (0.1474)
Union density squared - 1.9030
(0.5533)
Union density cubed - −1.4390
(0.4290)
Worker’s age 0.0281 0.0282
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Worker’s age squared −0.0002 −0.0002
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Tenure of the worker 0.0156 0.0156
(0.0005) (0.0005)




Primary school 0.0548 0.0550
(0.0058) (0.0056)
Basic school 0.1586 0.1581
(0.0062) (0.0060)
Elementary school 0.2670 0.2662
(0.0068) (0.0065)
Secondary school 0.4269 0.4249
(0.0091) (0.0086)
Post-secondary school 0.5569 0.5550
(0.0140) (0.0139)
University attendance 0.8143 0.8128
(0.0117) (0.0111)
College degree 0.9025 0.8995
(0.0104) (0.0099)
Firms with 50 to 99 employees 0.1316 0.1372
(0.0041) (0.0042)
Firms with 100 to 499 employees 0.1708 0.1817
(0.0066) (0.0069)
Firms with 500 to 999 employees 0.1929 0.2043
(0.0190) (0.0190)
Firms with 1000 to 4999 employees 0.1561 0.1700
(0.0203) (0.0202)
Firms with more than 5000 employees 0.1171 0.1400
(0.0478) (0.0475)
R2 0.4847 0.4859
Notes: Dependent variable: total monthly wages (in logs). The controls also include 25
sector of activity dummies, and 3 year dummies. The number of observations is 6,218,777.
Robust firm clustered standard errors are in parentheses: all coefficients are statistically
significant at the 0.01 confidence level. Source: Relatório Único, 2010-2013.
The explanation for the robust evidence on the importance of union density to wage
setting has to do with the intensive margin of representation. The mere realization that
a bargaining instrument covers a given worker does not seem to shed sufficient light on
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Notes: The base model includes as regressors a quadratic term in age, a quadratic term in
tenure, schooling dummies (7), a gender dummy, firm size dummies (5), year dummies (3),
and sector dummies (25). Robust clustered firm-year standard errors were used. In Panel
A, the 95 percent confidence interval is indicated. Source: Relatório Único, 2010-2013.
the properties of an agreement, namely the specific environment in which it was agreed.
Moreover, wage setting is not identical for every covered worker, and firms do not have a
homogeneous approach to compensation policies, irrespective of union presence, either at
firm or sectoral level.
The importance of considering the intensive margin is also implicit in the shape of our
union wage gap curves. A plausible explanation for the configuration of the fitted curves
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relies on the idea that the bargaining power of a union is a function of its ability to credibly
threaten the employer through a withdrawal of labor (e.g. Farber (1986)). It is reasonable
to assume that unions need some minimum complement of unionized workers to effectively
impose costs on the employer in the event of a failure to agree. With a preponderance of
the workforce organized, the capability to impose a total shutdown is implied, such that
further increases in union density are not to be equated with higher union wage premia.
5.2 The Sources of the Union Wage Gap for Total Monthly Wages
The union wage gap coefficient estimates for total earnings provide an average differential
between the wages of two observationally identical workers in two observationally identical
firms with distinct levels of unionization. What are the potential sources of this sizable
union wage gap? As leading contenders, we next consider the contributions of heterogene-
ity in the compensation policies of firms, the rules governing how the workforce is assigned
to the compensation tables of the collective agreement, and the allocation of workers of
different unobserved ability.
In principle, the conditional influence of unions on earnings compensation can arise from
other sources than these. However, to anticipate one of our key findings, we report that
after accounting for firm, job-title, and worker fixed effects the portion of the union wage
gap remaining to be explained is vestigial. This is the case for both the linear approach and
the fitted union wage gap curve. In decomposing the union wage gap, therefore, our focus
will be upon the contributions of each of these three sources of unobserved heterogeneity.
In what follows, the major difference between the two (decomposition) approaches resides
in the flexibility of the estimates, namely the improved estimation offered by the union
wage gap curve over the restrictive linear approach.
Job title refers to the worker’s assigned role at the firm, as explicitly defined in the collective
sectoral agreement governing the employment relationship. This defined “occupation”
most importantly determines a floor for the base wage that a worker is legally entitled to
receive. Note that the base wage set at sectoral level (which we call the bargained wage)
does not necessarily equal the actual base wage paid by the firm. Indeed, a majority of
firms pay more than the bargained wage. The difference between the base wage and the
base wage floor or bargained wage is essentially determined at the discretion of the firm.
Thus, the job-title fixed effect summarizes the influence of the compensation floor defined
for each worker. Each job title is collective agreement specific, such that two workers
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performing the same task and having the same responsibilities covered by different collec-
tive bargaining arrangements will be assigned different job titles. Overall, in a given year
there are around 30,000 collective agreement/occupational category combinations to which
workers are assigned. The inclusion of job-title fixed effects may be viewed as building
upon a first generation Mincerian wage equation that recognizes only a broad definition
of job descriptions.
Panel A of Figure 6 shows the empirical distribution of the job-title fixed effects, contrast-
ing workers in ‘union’ firms with their counterparts in ‘nonunion’ firms. For the former,
the distribution of job-title fixed effects is visibly displaced to the right. The implication
is that better-paid job titles tend to be more heavily populated by workers of unionized
firms (after taking into account firm and worker heterogeneity).
For its part, the firm fixed effect captures the (constant) wage policy of the firm, including
the relative standing of the firm’s wage tables, after having controlled the placement of
workers into the distinct job categories presented in such tables which fully captures the
previously discussed job-title fixed effect. Firms with generous compensation policies will
exhibit positive firm fixed effects, while firms with compensation policies close to the
bargained wage will generate negative fixed effects. In Panel B of Figure 6 we contrast the
distribution of the firm fixed effects for workers in union and nonunion firms.13 Clearly,
unionized workers disproportionately populate high-paying firms.
Finally, the empirical distribution of the worker fixed-effects is presented in Panel C of
Figure 6. The worker fixed effects capture the influence of the constant characteristics of
individuals on their wages. They are essentially a proxy for the portable human capital
(or productivity) of the worker. The pattern revealed is one in which more unionized firms
seemingly employ relatively more skilled individuals. This outcome can be the result of
observed characteristics (such as schooling or gender) or unobserved factors (ability), and
we shall subsequently address the specific role of the latter.
Table 3 presents the results of the Gelbach decomposition for the linear specification.14 The
coefficient estimate contained in the first column of the table simply recalls the estimated
union wage gap (of 16.2 log points) obtained from equation (1) and reported earlier in
Table 2. The estimated union wage gap, after the inclusion of the three high dimensional
fixed effects (equation (5)), is no longer statistically significant and is given in the second
13Observe, however, that in this comparison the influence of variables such as industry or firm size is still
subsumed in the firm fixed effect. The subsequent Gelbach decomposition will enable us to filter out the
impact of the firm fixed effect on the wage gap from the variable included in the benchmark specification.
14In Appendix Table 4 we present the decomposition results for alternative sets of observable controls.
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Table II.3: The Conditional Decomposition of the OLS Estimation of the Union Wage
Gap for Total Monthly Wages
Variables Base Model Full Model Gelbach
(γ0) (γ1) Decomposition
Union Wage Gap 0.1619*** −0.0029 −
(0.0244) (0.0086)
τα1 (Worker FE) − − −0.0026
(0.0055)
τθ1 (Job-title FE) − − 0.0571***
(0.0198)
τλ1 (Firm FE) − − 0.1103***
(0.0134)
R2 0.5373 0.8801
Notes: Decomposition based on Gelbach (2016). Robust firm clustered standard errors
are in parentheses: *** denotes statistical significance at the 0.01 level. The base model
includes as regressors a quadratic term in age, a quadratic term in tenure, schooling
dummies (7), a gender dummy, firm size dummies (5), and sector dummies (25). The
number of observations is 36,616,379. Sources: Quadros de Pessoal 1986-2009; Relatório
Único, 2010-2013.
column of the table (-0.3 log points). To attenuate the bias arising from the incidental
parameter problem in the estimation of high-dimensional fixed effect regression models,
we employ the full sample, 1986-2013. To guarantee that the results are comparable with
those provided in Table 2, we interact all the explanatory variables with a time dummy
identifying the period before and after 2010.15
The third column provides the contribution of each fixed effect to the change in the esti-
mated union wage gap (equation (10)).16 The differences in firms’ compensation policies
explain a large fraction of the union wage gap. After accounting for the observable char-
acteristics of the worker and the firm, the constant unobserved characteristics of workers,
and the process of job-title placement, the worker compensation policies of firms are re-
sponsible for 11 log points of the union wage gap of some 16.2 log points. Put differently, if
every worker was faced with a neutral stance of his or her firm regarding its compensation
policies, the union wage gap would be reduced by about 68 percent. Next, consistent with
15Notice that the use of these interaction terms, in the case of the base model, guarantees that the
regression coefficient estimates for the 2010-2013 period are exactly the same as those given in Table 2.
16In practice, as presented before, the application of the Gelbach decomposition in the current frame-
work amounts to running three auxiliary OLS regressions identical to equation (1), but where the dependent
variable is successively replaced by the corresponding estimated fixed effects. By construction, this decom-
position is both exact (being the sum of the contributions corresponding to the difference between the two
union wage gap estimates) and unambiguous.
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the evidence provided in Panel A of Figure 6, we find that the allocation of workers into
job titles - either directly, or indirectly through promotion decisions - contributes 5.7 log
points (or another 35 percent) of the estimated union wage gap. Implicitly, therefore,
trade unions achieve real success in either creating or in placing their members into higher
paying job categories.17
Turning to the worker dimension, and after accounting for observable traits as well as
their sorting into firms and job-titles, it can be seen that individuals working in a fully-
unionized firm receive compensation for their permanent unobserved characteristics that
is estimated to be just 0.3 log points lower than in the case of a non-unionized firm. But to
all intents and purposes there are no statistically significant differences between unionized
and non-unionized workers in terms of (unobserved) ability.
In the pooled OLS estimation, the sources of identification of the union wage effect have
both a cross-section and a time-varying dimension. The cross-section or between-effect
arises simply from the comparison of wages of workers with different average union den-
sity rates. In the following decomposition exercise, we will explore the three sources of
this cross-sectional variation: worker heterogeneity, firm heterogeneity, and job-title het-
erogeneity. This objective is achieved via the inclusion of their corresponding fixed (hence,
cross-sectional) effects. The time-varying effects stem from two obvious sources: workers
moving across firms with different union densities, and workers remaining in firms with
changing union densities. The inclusion of a worker fixed effect necessarily removes the
cross-sectional variation. The inclusion of the firm fixed effect precludes any variation
arising from worker movement to other firms. The inclusion of the job-title fixed effect
will restrict the source of wage variation to that which is not accounted by job-title moves.
Thus, in our full model, identification of the union wage gap comes solely from the wage
effects of changing union density rates, net (i.e. after accounting for) of job-title changes.
Not surprisingly, therefore, the union wage gap is close to zero in the full model. The
advantage of the full model, however, is that it allows us to obtain an unambiguous de-
composition of the sources of heterogeneity and, by implication, to measure the relative
importance of unobserved skills and sorting across firms and job-titles as drivers of the
union wage premium.
Estimates of the Gelbach decomposition of the union wage gap curve obtained from the
kernel regression (equations (3) and (11)) are depicted in Figure 7. The figure broadly
17In Appendix Table 5 we use the ESCO occupation definition instead of job-title. Not surprisingly,
the contribution of occupation fixed effects is much attenuated (1.6 log points), suggesting that the infor-
mational content of the job-title fixed effects is more relevant in associating union density with wages.
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confirms the principal result of the linear approach, namely the leading roles reserved for
job titles and the compensation policies of firms (viz. the job-title and firm fixed effects).
The flexibility of this approach indicates that the major source of non-linearity stems from
the job-title component. The figure also provides a more informative picture of the sources
of the union wage gap. In particular, the assignment of workers to job titles reveals that
there is a zone or a relevant region of union densities (roughly between 50 and 85 percent)
where its contribution to the wage gap is elevated, reaching almost 12.5 log points. Worker
unobserved heterogeneity once again plays no role, irrespective of union density. Note,
finally, that the part of the union wage gap remaining after having allowed for the three
high-dimensional fixed effects, and identified in the figure as the ‘within component,’ is
essentially zero up to 70 percent density after which it increases to only a little over 2 log
points at 100 percent density.
5.3 On the Endogeneity of Union Membership
The main purpose of this study is to investigate what lies behind the union wage gap
rather than claiming a causal interpretation of the union density regression coefficient.
Nevertheless, a number of endogeneity issues do need to be addressed. A widespread con-
cern is that of individual self-selection into union status (Lee (1978); Card et al. (2020)).
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It may well be the case that more skilled workers disproportionately select into unioniza-
tion, and in so doing drive the union wage gap. This concern can be directly assessed
within the framework of our decomposition exercise. Thus, there is no indication that
union members have unobserved characteristics that render them more productive, given
the very weak (near null) impact of the worker fixed effect on the union wage gap.
Another potential source of ambiguity is the possibility that trade unions tend to organize
in industries and firms where economic rents are higher. In this case, we face a problem of
reverse causality. Although we certainly cannot rule out this possibility, we can nonetheless
determine an upper-bound for this source of endogeneity. Specifically, the contribution
of the firm fixed effect to the union wage gap - of around two-thirds of the union wage
gap - is our upper-bound for the reverse effect. In other words, the indication that higher
union density rates coincide with more generous firm wage policies may arise from ‘pure’
causal effects (unions pushing for higher wages) or from the tendency of trade unions to
be organizationally stronger in those activities where economic rents are higher.
According to our methodology, the remaining one third of the union wage gap is driven by
the finding that union members are more likely to occupy better-paid job titles. This effect
corresponds to the impact of job-title fixed effects on the union wage gap. Because the
wage floors for the job titles (i.e. bargained wages) and promotion policies are negotiated
by the trade unions, this channel of wage determination is inherently linked to the actions
and power of unions. In this sense, we would argue that the association between higher
union density rates and better paid job titles can convincingly be regarded as causal. With
some caution, therefore, we summarize this discussion by suggesting that the causal effect
of union density on wages is likely to be contained within a 6 to 16 log points range.
Taking this source of causality one step further, one can think of the job-title fixed effect(s)
as a suitable instrumental variable for union density. Using this set-up, the first-stage re-
gression for union density will include the covariates of the full model. In the second stage,
the coefficient estimate of predicted union density is exactly identified by the presence of
job title in the first stage. On the basis of this alternative IV approach at least, it tran-
spires that the two-stage coefficient estimate of the union density variable is a sturdier
0.126, or 12.6 log points (see Appendix Table 6).
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6 Inside the Mechanisms of Wage Setting
In a complementary exercise, so as to better understand the role of trade unions in Por-
tugal, it is instructive to decompose total wages into two parts: the bargained wage and
a wage mark-up (Π). So the total wage is given by:








where µ corresponds to the mark-up in relative terms. Through a straightforward loga-
rithm transformation, one obtains:
lnWTotal = lnWBargained + ln(1 + µ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wage cushion
. (II.13)
The bargained wage is the base wage floor as defined in the relevant collective agreement
for the worker job title. For its part, the wage cushion corresponds to the difference
between the total compensation and the bargained wage. As information on bargained
wages is not contained in the dataset, we follow the methodology proposed in Cardoso
and Portugal (2005), and define the bargained wage as the mode of the actual base wage
within each year and job-title.18 The wage cushion has two components. The first is
simply the difference between the actual base wage and the bargained wage, as firms often
pay a base wage above the bargained wage. The second component is the sum of the wage
supplements received by the worker, to include seniority-indexed pay, overtime, fringe
benefits such as the daily meals allowance, and irregularly paid components.
We shall estimate two separate wage regressions, one for the (log) bargained wage and the
other for the (log) wage cushion, where the wage cushion is expressed in relative terms.
A useful way to look at the bargained wage regression is to think of an artificial exercise
in which all workers collect the enacted wage floor, corresponding to their job titles, as
signed in the applicable collective bargaining, and no more. On this basis, and as shown
in Table 4, the union wage gap would amount to 28.36 log points.
At first glance, this may seem a puzzling result, as the union wage gap for total monthly
wages is only 16.19 log points, while that for the wage cushion is negative at -12.18
18Having documented contractual wages in three industries employing around 10 percent of full-time
workers in manufacturing and services, these authors show that the mode of the wage distribution of the
base wage for each worker category within each collective agreement matches quite well the mandatory
floors for each job-title at collective bargaining level.
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Table II.4: Estimation of the Union Wage Gap for Total Monthly Wages, the Bargained
Wage, and the Wage Cushion
Dependent variable Base Model R2
Total Compensation 0.1619 0.5373
(0.0244)
Bargained Wage 0.2836 0.5095
(0.0283)
Wage Cushion −0.1218 0.0994
(0.0184)
Notes: Robust firm clustered standard errors are in parentheses: all coefficients are sta-
tistically significance at 0.01 confidence level. The base model includes as regressors a
quadratic term in age, a quadratic term in tenure, schooling dummies (7), a gender
dummy, firm size dummies (5), and sector dummies (25). The number of observations
is 36,616,379. Sources: Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2009; Relatório Único, 2010-2013.
log points. Similar results are obtained when union wage gap curves are estimated, as
demonstrated in Figure 8. Here the union wage gap curve for the bargained wage attains
levels of more than 30 log points when the large majority of the workforce is unionized,
while the corresponding curve of the wage cushion declines up to around -12 log points.
What is going on here is that the union wage gap for total compensation hides the opposing
effects of the two wage components.
The sizable union wage gap of the bargained wage is not surprising, as unions naturally
seek to lock in a significant share of their gains through the mandatory dispositions of
collective agreements. Thus, where collective agreements are signed in sectors with highly
unionized firms, signifying enhanced union bargaining power, unions may be expected to
succeed in securing higher base wage floors (bargained wages). Our results in the form
of a negative union gap for the wage cushion do indeed suggest that the wage cushion is
deployed by firms to attenuate the bargained wage gap. It follows that the union wage
gap for total compensation is lower than that for the bargained wage. This compression
may result from either lower wage supplements or by smaller drift between the actual base
wage and the bargained wage floor. In other words, in high union density environments,
union success in raising the bargained wage limits the ability of firms to pay base wages in
excess of bargained wages. In branches where trade unions are weaker, however, relatively
low bargained wages offer scope for local improvement.
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Figure II.8: The Union Wage Gap Curve for Total Monthly Wages, the Bargained Wage,
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7 A Glimpse into the Impact of Unions on Wage Inequality
In this section we take advantage of conditional quantile regression methods to explore
the effect of union density on the entire wage distribution. The usefulness of conditional
quantile regression to study the impact of unionization was first demonstrated by Gary
Chamberlain in his influential address to the 1990 Word Congress of the Econometric
Society. To the best of our knowledge, only the method of moments quantile regression
estimator (MM-QR), recently proposed by Machado and Santos Silva (2018), is able to
accommodate multiple high-dimensional fixed effects that can affect the whole distribution
instead of just a location shift. Accordingly, we will use this estimator to analyze the
impact of union density on wage inequality. A critical advantage of the estimator is that
it is based on the OLS solutions to two high-dimensional fixed effects regression equations,
one corresponding to the location function and the other to the scale function. Apart from
its ease of implementation, the MM-QR estimator lends itself in a straightforward way to
the decomposition of the bias arising from the omission of the high-dimensional effects.
We will first specify the conditional quantile regression version for a model without fixed
effects:
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Qw(τ |(xit) = αl + x′itβ
l + σ(αs + z′itβ
s)q(τ), (II.14)
where Qw(τ |(xit) denotes the conditional quantile of w corresponding to percentile τ . z
is a vector of transformed covariates x. σ identifies the scale function. αl and βl, and αs
and βs, correspond to the intercept and regression coefficients in the location and scale
functions, respectively. q(τ) is simply F−1(τ).
The full model can be written:
Qw(τ |(xit) = αli + λlf + θlj + x′itβ
l + σ(αsi + λsf + θsj + z′itβ
s)q(τ), (II.15)
where αli (αsi ), λlf (λsf ), and θlj (θlj) are the worker, firm, and job-title fixed effects in the
location (scale) function, respectively.
Considering that z = x and that σ(.) is the identity function, the model simplifies to:
Qw(τ |(xit) = [αli + αsi q(τ)] + [λlf + λsfq(τ)] + [θlj + θsjq(τ ] + x′it[β
l + βsq(τ)]. (II.16)
Estimation of this model can be achieved in four simple steps.
(1) Obtain the parameters of the location function minimizing the sum of the squares of
the residuals from the model:
w = αli + λlf + θlj + x′itβ
l + εl, (II.17)
using, for example, the algorithm of Guimarães and Portugal (2010). This procedure
corresponds exactly to the OLS solution which was estimated before;
(2) Compute the estimation residuals from this model, R̂it, and calculate ˆ|Rit|;
(3) Obtain the parameters of the scale function minimizing the sum of the squares of the
residuals from the model:
ˆ|Rit| = αsi + λsf + θsj + x′itβ
s + εs; (II.18)
(4) Obtain q(τ) as the τ -th sample quantile from a standardized residual R̂it/( ˆ|Rit|).
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γτ (Union Wage Gap) 0.1720 0.1632 0.1498
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0034)
Full Model
γτ (Union Wage Gap) -0.0052 -0.0031 -0.0003
(0.1941) (0.0996) (0.1288)
Decomposition
Worker FE 0.0001 -0.0024 -0.0056
Job-title FE 0.0710 0.0610 0.0476
Firm FE 0.1136 0.1068 0.1006
Residual -0.0076 0.0009 0.0004
Notes: The base model includes as regressors a quadratic term in age, a quadratic term
in tenure, schooling dummies (10), a gender dummy, firm size dummies (5), and sector
dummies (25). All regression coefficients in the base model are statistically significant at
the 0.01 confidence level. The regression coefficients in the full model are not statistically
different from zero. The contributions of the fixed effects add the location and scale the
components. The number of observations is 36,616,379. Source: Quadros de Pessoal
1986-2009; Relatório Único, 2010-2013.
Results for the location-scale representation of the quantile regression model are given in
Table 5. The first line of the table presents the union coefficient estimates corresponding to
the base specification for the 10th, 50th, and the 90th percentiles.19 The impact of union
density at the conditional mean and at the conditional median are virtually identical
(16.2 log points for the mean and 16.3 log points for the median). Low-wage workers (say
those in the 10th percentile) record a higher union wage gap (17.2 log points). For their
part, high-wage workers (those in the 90th percentile) have a somewhat lower wage gap
(15.0 log points) than the median wage worker. It appears that union membership mildly
compresses the wage distribution by improving the wages of low-wage workers more than
those of high-wage workers.
The full model specification, in which we take into account unobserved worker heterogene-
ity and sorting across firms with distinct wage policies and job titles is given in the second
line of the table. Consistent with the previous linear regression model results is the sug-
gestion that the union wage gap is close to zero across all three percentiles. Nevertheless,
worker, firm, and job-title heterogeneity fully account for the union wage gap in the base
model. Moreover, the three high-dimensional fixed effects account for the dispersion in
19The Stata procedure mmqreg provided by Santos Silva was used to obtain the method of moments
quantile regression estimates.
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the union coefficient estimates. In the same vein, we can extend the Gelbach procedure
used before to decompose the change in the quantile regression estimates coefficient esti-
mates (from the base model to the full model). It is clear that we can apply the Gelbach
decomposition to both the location and the scale functions. For the location function, the
procedure is exactly the same (and, in turn, produces exactly the same results) as that
followed in section 5.2. For the scale function, we obtain the contribution of each fixed
effect again using the omitted variable bias formula and multiply it by q(τ) in order to
differentiate them by percentile. There is, of course, a fourth (residual) component arising
from the nonlinear change in |R̂it| when we move from the base model to the full model.
Three indications emerge from the decomposition exercise given in Table 5. First, the
contribution of of high-dimensional fixed effects is largely driven by the location function,
which can be seen by comparing Table 5 with Table 3. Second, the wage compressing effect
of union density is concentrated in the job-title dimension. Low-wage workers benefit more
from being placed (or promoted) into higher paying job titles than do high-wage workers.
Finally, the residual component of the decomposition is small, or even negligible, at higher
percentiles.
8 Conclusions
This chapter has shown that in a regime of near-universal collective bargaining coverage
one may nevertheless discern pronounced union wage gaps due to the heterogeneous influ-
ence of unions in covered settings. Our baseline estimates of the union density wage gap
for total monthly wages top out at approximately 24 log points. Wage gaps are not propor-
tional to union density. Rather, some critical mass (circa 30 percent density) is required
to materially influence wages, while beyond some level (70 percent) further increases in
union density detract from the peak premium.
Having obtained these sizable values of union wage gaps based on estimates of average
wage differentials between the wages of two observationally identical workers in two ob-
servationally identical firms with distinct levels of unionization, we turned to consider the
potential sources of the gaps. Our fixed-effects model included in addition to worker and
firm fixed effects a job-title or finely drawn occupational fixed-effect. We then applied
Gelbach’s (2016) decomposition which allows for the quantification of the share of the
union wage gap accounted for by each of these three fixed effects. That is, we sought to
account for the separate contributions to the union wage gap of the targeted wage policies
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of firms (i.e. versus a neutral stance which would imply that unionized workers are ran-
domly assigned to firms); of differential rules, both direct and indirect, whereby unionized
workers are assigned to higher paying job titles in the compensation tables of collective
agreements; and of the manner of the allocation of workers of different unobserved ability
to firms. The wage policies of firms were found to account for approximately two-thirds of
the union wage gap in monthly wages, a profound change over a situation in which work-
ers are randomly assigned to firms. Also of importance was the allocation of unionized
workers into better paying job titles. This source contributed another one-third of the
union wage gap. Accordingly, compensation for unobserved ability played little or no role
in determining the premium enjoyed by union workers even if, as was demonstrated, their
observed heterogeneity would patently produce a higher wage gap were it not controlled
for.
We also distinguished between the components of total earnings to gain a fuller under-
standing of the role of trade unions. Specifically, we split total earnings into the bargained
wage and the wage cushion. The bargained wage establishes the rate for the highly detailed
job classifications or job titles that are contained in each collective bargaining agreement
and sets a floor to the base wage obtaining at firm level. For its part, the wage cushion
is the gap between the bargained wage and the actual base wage determined at firm level
plus the difference between the latter and total earnings. We found that the size of the
union wage gap is considerably larger for the bargained wage than for total earnings -
peaking at more than 30 log points once some three-quarters of the workforce is unionized
- and is actually negative for the wage cushion given its specification as the logarithmic
ratio of actual earnings to the bargained wage. In other words, the union wage gap would
be much higher (and wage dispersion lower) were all workers remunerated according to
the bargained wage. The disparity between the premia attaching to the bargained wage
and total earnings, and the negative gap for the wage cushion, reflect firm-specific ar-
rangements that partly offset collective bargaining. In those sectors where trade unions
are weaker, the relatively low bargained wages offer scope for local adjustments as when
employers experience market opportunities or face constraints.
In a final contribution we sought to determine union impact on wage inequality, using con-
ditional quantile regressions. Here, we used an approach that can accommodate multiple
high-dimensional fixed effects, using the methods of moments quantile regression estimator
to explore the impact of union density on the whole wage distribution. Estimation of the
baseline model suggested that union membership mildly narrowed the wage distribution.
For the full model containing the three fixed effects, application of the Gelbach procedure
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indicated that the narrowing effect of union density previously noted was concentrated
in the job-title dimension where low wage workers benefited more from being placed or
promoted into higher-paying job titles than other groups.
In sum, the present treatment can report progress along several dimensions. It uses an in-
novative procedure to determine the union density premium in circumstances, again by no
means unique to Portugal, where almost all workers are covered by a collective agreement
but few are union members. It offers a unique attribution of the union wage gap to three
types of heterogeneity that ‘explain’ almost all wage variation. These high-dimensional
fixed effects were also directly incorporated in a new application investigating the effect of
union density on the wage distribution. They also contributed to our discussion of endo-
geneity, leading us to conclude that the causal effect of union density on wages likely fell
within a 6 to 16 log points range. For the future, more work is clearly needed on the firm
fixed effect. Reflecting recent developments in the literature, a logical extension would be
to examine the contribution of firm monopsony power and the countervailing influence of
union density.
77
References of Chapter 2
John M. Abowd, Francis Kramarz, and David N. Margolis. High Wage Workers and High
Wage Firms. Econometrica, 67(2):251–333, 1999.
John T Addison, Pedro Portugal, and Hugo Vilares. Unions and Collective Bargaining in
the Wake of the Great Recession: Evidence from Portugal. British Journal of Industrial
Relations, 55(3):551–576, 2017.
David Blanchflower and Alex Bryson. Changes over Time in Union Relative Wage Effects
in the UK and the USA Revisited. In Addison John T., Claus Schnabel (eds.), Inter-
national Handbook of Trade Unions,, pages 197–245, Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar
Publishing Ltd, 2003.
David Card and Ana Rute Cardoso. ‘Wage Flexibility under Sectoral Bargaining’. NBER
Working Paper No. 28695, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge MA.,
April 2021.
David Card, Thomas Lemieux, and W. Craig Riddell. Unions and Wage Inequality.
Journal of Labor Research, 25(4):519–562, 2004.
David Card, Thomas Lemieux, and W. Craig Riddell. Unions and Wage Inequality: The
Roles of Gender, Skill and Public Sector Employment. Canadian Journal of Economics,
53(1):140–173, 2020.
Ana Rute Cardoso and Pedro Portugal. Contractual Wages and the Wage Cushion under
Different Bargaining Settings. Journal of Labor Economics, 23(4):875–902, 2005.
Ana Rute Cardoso, Paulo Guimarães, and Pedro Portugal. What Drives the Gender Wage
Gap? A Look at the Role of Firm and Job-title Heterogeneity. Oxford Economic Papers,
68(2):506–524, 2016.
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Chapter III
A Saga of Wage Resilience: Like a Bridge over
Troubled Water
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Hugo Reis, Bank of Portugal and Católica SBE
Abstract
This chapter proposes a dynamic search and matching model adjusted to the Southern
European and French based labour markets, where collective bargaining assumes a key
role. Using the Portuguese employer-employee matched data for the last two decades,
and its institutionally defined categories of workers, we reach a consistent and unified
framework where we estimate an average worker bargaining power of 20%; an elasticity of
quasi-rents of 0.062; an average passthrough of bargained wages of 44.8%; and a degree
of assortative matching of 44.1%. These findings conform with the literature developed
in each of these dimensions. Throughout the period, we witness a secular deterioration of
worker’s bargaining powers at the top and the middle of the wage distribution, while in
the bottom we recorded a broad stability. Throughout the Great Recession, these findings
are remarkably stable, signalling a significant wage setting resilience. Accordingly, the
considerable real wage distribution adjustment throughout the downturn was led by job
and firm flows, and for the staying workers through the valuation of the quasi-rents of the
worker-firm match and of the worker’s outside options.
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1 Introduction
This chapter addresses two closely related questions. First, how can the microeconomic
wage setting mechanism be structurally described and empirically estimated for a Southern
European and French based labour market? Second, how does the resulting bargaining
powers evolved overtime, and particularly throughout the Great Recession?
Wage setting mechanisms, and in particular the evolution of bargaining powers, have
received a significant recent interest due to its pervasive implications to macroeconomic
dynamics. Since the 1980s, a significant strand of papers focusing in the U.S. have recorded
substantial increases in corporate profitability and firm markup trends, while the labour
share has been in consistent decline. Gutiérrez and Philippon (2017), Farhi and Gourio
(2018) and De Loecker et al. (2020) have linked these trends to the rise of market power,
focusing in the rise of monopoly (or monopsony) power, but concurrent developments have
broaden the perspective. Krueger (2018) influentially noted in his 2018 Jackson Hole ad-
dress, that the evolution of labour market practices have not only enhanced monopsony
power, but has significantly weaken worker bargaining powers. Following his line, Stans-
bury and Summers (2020) provides a significant case for a relevant (if not leading) role
of bargaining power trends in explaining those macroeconomic dynamics, and Lombardi
et al. (2020) has theoretically linked a weakening of worker’s bargaining powers with an
abatement of inflation dynamics and an amplification of employment adjustments over the
business cycle.
In a related literature, the wage setting and bargaining powers are also particularly rele-
vant in the context of an imperfectly competitive labour market due to its role on wage
inequality. Since the 1980s, cross sectional data unveiled a significant increasing trend of
wage inequality in the United States.1 Then, the skill biased technological change was
coined as the leading cause (see Krueger (1993), Berman et al. (1994) and Acemoglu
(2002)). Later, in a more microeconomic perspective, Autor et al. (2003) influentially
highlighted job polarization, due to the idiosyncratic share of automatable work across
occupations (see Acemoglu and Autor (2011) for a recent overview). However, from the
outset of the debate, several developed economies like France, Japan or Germany were not
displaying the same wage inequality trend, leading several authors to focus on the role of
‘institutions’ (Freeman and Katz (1995)).2 Amidst those, different degrees of unionization,
1For the U.S., Katz and Murphy (1992), Levy and Murnane (1992) Bound and Johnson (1992) corre-
spond to a sample of studies that decisively contributed to the consensus.
2A strand of the literature has focused on top income inequality (see Piketty and Saez (2003)), and
more recently, in the context of the Great Recession, confirmed markedly different trends along those
geographical lines (see Piketty and Saez (2013)).
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wage setting structures and minimum wage policies lead the most studied.3
In Southern European and French based labour markets, while each country’s labour
market has institutional idiosyncrasies, the blueprint is largely analogous, and derived
from few common ancestral roots (see Botero et al. (2004)). A brief wage setting syn-
opsis would present a strong union coverage despite lower membership rates, significant
employment protection, and centralized sector wage bargaining as its institutional cor-
nerstones. Accordingly, among the existing labour markets, we select Portugal for our
empirical implementation due to three convenient reasons. Firstly, as reinforced by Visser
(2016), Boeri and van Ours (2013) and Card and Cardoso (2021), Portugal is in most wage
setting mechanisms a representative of the Southern European and French based labour
markets. Secondly, the country was particularly hit by the Great Recession. Finally,
we have access to high quality data about the characteristics of the privately employed
workers, including detailed information on wages, and of the balance sheet and income
statement of firms.4
This chapter makes four contributions. First, it develops a dynamic search and matching
model, which presents a wage setting mechanism accounting for the most relevant South-
ern European and French based labour market institutions. Second, this chapter explores
the role of those institutions by resorting to the collective bargaining administrative rank-
ing of workers, which allow us to identify the value of outside options and the value of
quasi-rents, while relying on a significantly parsimonious parameter dimensionality when
compared with a typical high dimensional fixed effect wage regression. It does not rely on
worker mobility patterns across firms, or in general on firm effects. Third, differently from
most of the rent-sharing literate we do not need to directly rely on firm-side measures of
quasi-rents or value added (see Card et al. (2018) for an overview of these approaches),
and we will abstain from following a substantive structural perspective as we will not spec-
ify a production function.5 Fourth, this framework translates into a unified and consistent
empirical setting capable to estimate time-varying bargaining powers, quasi-rents’ elastic-
ities, collective bargaining pass-through in wages, wage variance decompositions, and the
degree of assortative matching in the economy, which lie within the ranges of the recent
developments in those literatures.
Our proposed model entails: (i) firms composed by a hierarchical occupational struc-
3See DiNardo et al. (1996), Lee (1999), Card and DiNardo (2002), Dickens and Manning (2004) and
Autor et al. (2008) for evidence on the influence of these institutional settings on wage inequality.
4See appendix A1 for a detailed description of the dataset used in this study.
5See Mortensen et al. (2010) and Bagger et al. (2014) for representative examples of a more structural
approach, with a fully specified production function.
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ture; (ii) worker-firm multi-layered high dimensional heterogeneity; (iii) the possibility of
on-job-search in the classic Roy (1951) model approach; (iv) existence of binding firing
taxes as in Boeri (2011); and (v) the adoption of the intra-firm bargaining apparatus of
Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) and Stole and Zwiebel (1996b), unfolding between firms and
a representative union, which however is unable to cause an hold-up problem in case of
a bargaining breakdown, as considered in Dobbelaere and Luttens (2016). Altogether,
the core modelling infrastructure was crafted in the intersection between Acemoglu and
Hawkins (2014), Cahuc et al. (2008), Mortensen (2009), and under small twists in the
assumption framework it becomes isomorphic to them.6
The empirical implementation of the resulting wage equation resorts to the collective bar-
gaining administrative ranking, which is consistently produced for decades, covering di-
rectly around 85 percent of the labour contracts, without any opt-out possibility. As noted
by Schulten (2016) and Card and Cardoso (2021), rather than a Portuguese idiosyncrasy
the existence of these rankings is a Southern European and French based labour markets’
cornerstone, which can be equally seen in countries like Belgium, France, Italy, Nether-
lands and Spain. This ranking corresponds to the core of the legal framework of the labour
relationships, defining strictly the job descriptions, the clauses of the contracts, and the
bargained tables of wage floors.7 In detail, the ranking is composed of a granular system
of around 30,000 institutionally defined sector-occupation ranks of the workers. We esti-
mate the wage floors compatible with such ranking, and we follow the model’s postulate
that those coincide with the union and firm belief about the valuation of the workers’
outside options, which incidentally do not depend on the employing firm alone.8 Further,
those ranks also provide a framework to identify the type of workers, and thus enhance
the identification of the marginal products of the match.
Our use of collective bargaining rankings to estimate outside options consists in an alter-
native to recent developments in this literature. Caldwell and Harmon (2019) uses past
co-workers job movements as a measure of the value of the social network of the worker,
Schubert et al. (2020) resorts to the analysis of worker’s job histories, and Caldwell and
Danieli (2020) implements a sufficient statistic that assesses the supply of jobs in the area
6Lise et al. (2016) is in several theoretical aspects close in spirit to the exercise we propose, but focused
on the U.S. economy and henceforth without the theoretical and empirical contribution of the European
institutional setting. Tschopp (2017) also mostly abstracts the institutional setting, but implements an
empirical strategy to identify key parameters in a search and matching model that in spirit is close to ours,
however with less degrees of heterogeneity.
7See Cardoso and Portugal (2005), Martins (2014), Addison et al. (2017), and Card and Cardoso
(2021) for further detail about the referred ranking.
8For Italy, Card et al. (2014) uses bargained wages to precisely control for outside options in a rent-
sharing analysis, but does so at sector level, without the degree of granularity presented here.
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and the worker’s flexibility to take them. In a broader perspective, the proper use of rank-
ings of workers and/or firms has received great attention in the mincerian wage equation
estimation. Bonhomme et al. (2017), Bonhomme et al. (2019) and Lentz et al. (2018)
resort to a two-step algorithm where in the first step either firms or workers (or both) are
classified in categories by using a k-means clustering algorithm; Sorkin (2018) resorts to a
replica of the Google’s PageRank algorithm to rank firms based on revealed preference, and
thus identify the value of compensating differentials; and Hagedorn et al. (2017) presents
the classical Kemeny-Young rank aggregation algorithm as a way to rank workers and then
firms based on the worker’s ranking.9 Our approach, instead of resorting to indirect mea-
sures to estimate the value of outside options or statistical algorithms to identify types of
workers or firms, relies on firms and unions being capable to assess the worker’s worth in
the market, which translates into a credible and consistent administrative ranking.
In the last two decades, the wage setting mechanism synchronized a notable stability of
workers’ bargaining positions at the bottom of the wage distribution, with a perennial ero-
sion at the middle and the top. On average, we estimate the worker’s bargaining powers at
20 percent for the entire economy, with higher levels for managers, and very identical val-
ues for the remainder of the workforce. Those translate into some responsiveness of wages
to exogenous shocks in the level of the quasi-rents of the labour relationship, concretely
with an average estimated elasticity of 0.062, within the 0.05-0.15 most referred interval
in the literature (see Card et al. (2018)). Likewise, we find levels of positive assortative
matching on the range 38-48 percent, and an average passthrough of changes in bargained
wages into changes of total wages of around 44.8 percent, in line with Card and Cardoso
(2021). In respect to wage dispersion, the workplace heterogeneity justifies around 60
percent of the overall wage dispersion, conforming with an imperfectly competitive labour
market perspective, while the outside option effectively contributes for a compression of
wages relatively to the implied productivity distribution.
The structural slow paced erosion of bargaining powers at the top and middle of the skill
distribution, unveil potential future productivity hazards, particularly if amplified by a
considerable progressive income taxation. With compressed wage differentials across skill
groups and the increasing orthogonality between wages and firm productivity levels, which
naturally arises when the worker has a lower take on the quasi-rents of the match, the
matching efficiency in the economy may be degraded, the incentives for training may be
dulled, and the alignment of worker and firm incentives may be laxed.
9See Kemeny (1959) for the first treatment of this algorithm.
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The macroeconomic context of our analysis has been particularly turbulent in a significant
part of the sample, when the Great Recession emerged. Within the recessionary shock, for
those that were capable to remain employed throughout the rough waters, the wage setting
laid out a sound bridge, displayed through a significant resilience of bargaining powers,
which contained the propagation of the sluggish macroeconomic outlooks to temporary
and moderate real wage losses, arising from the fall of outside option real values and real
quasi-rents of the match.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main features of the considered
labour market and the way those are subsequently introduced in the model. Section 3
presents the dynamic search and matching model proposed in the chapter, and section
4 presents a straightforward way to empirically estimate the resulting wage equation.
Section 5 presents the empirical results of the model, the estimates of the level of firm-
worker sorting in the economy, of the elasticity of wages to the quasi-rents and of the
average passthrough of bargained wages. It further analyses the variance of wages in the
proposed wage setting perspective. Section 6 discusses the resilience of the wage setting
mechanisms in the wake of the Great Recession. Section 7 concludes.
2 Wage Setting and Labour Market Institutions
The cross-country comparison of labour market institutions literature, classically featur-
ing an U.S. - Europe comparison,10 has developed around countries’ institutional clusters.
Indicatively, Boeri (2011) partitions Europe in a Continental cluster, a Southern Euro-
pean cluster, a Nordic cluster, and an Anglo-Saxon cluster. Alternatively, Botero et al.
(2004) presents a partition of taxonomies based on ancestry, grouping labour markets in
the French, German, Anglo-Saxon and Socialist systems. Given our modelling emphasis in
the wage setting process, we follow a mixed version of those taxonomies, with our analysis
being particularly suitable for Southern European and French based systems. Noteworthy,
as presented in figure 1, a primer assessment of recent trends of wage inequality presents di-
vergent paths among OECD countries, with this particular cluster decoupling from others
by displaying a reduction of wage inequality.
10See Nickell and Layard (1999), Bertola (1999), Blau and Kahn (1999), Boeri (2011) for chapters of
the Handbook of Labour Economics featuring a classical analysis.
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Figure III.1: Inequality of Gross Earnings of Full-Time Dependent Employees
Source: OECD.
2.1 Institutional Setting and its Dynamics
As presented in table 1, the wage setting has been considerably more centralized and/or
coordinated with a leading role of trade unions in the continental European labour mar-
kets than in their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. The former is dominated by industry, sector
or even national level agreements, whereas the latter unfolds recurrently at firm or even
plant level (see Boeri and van Ours (2013)). While such structural institutional differences
could have little influence in market outcomes, the literature has strongly suggested oth-
erwise, with these asymmetries suspected to play a role in explaining the degree of wage
compression across economies.11
In the last decades, the OECD indicators on labour market institutions and regulations
points to a detrimental evolution to workers, as presented in the synthetic indicator of
Lombardi et al. (2020) in figure 2. While in the Anglo-Saxon markets we have witnessed
a co-movement of de-unionization and the fall in collective bargaining coverage, rendering
a greater subsidiary role of unions in the wage setting mechanism, that is not the case in
the continental European labour markets, where despite the strong fall in membership,
union coverage remains remarkably high.12 As claimed by Booth (2014), this persistence
justifies the importance of modelling the behaviour of trade unions when, in general, one
11The suggestion of different degrees of trade union influencing the wage setting and wage compression
has been established in Freeman (1980), Blau and Kahn (1996), Aidt and Tzannatos (2002) and Card et al.
(2003), among others.
12See Blanchflower (1996), Blanchflower and Bryson (2004), Bryson et al. (2011), and Visser (2016)
which document this process. In the Anglo-Saxon case, several papers, among which DiNardo et al. (1996),
Fortin and Lemieux (1997), Firpo et al. (2009), Frandsen (2012) and Farber et al. (2018) correspond to a
sample, have studied the relationship between the fall in membership and collective bargaining coverage
and the increase in wage inequality.
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Table III.1: Average Collective Bargaining Indicators by Decade
Countries: Level of Bargaining Union Union Single Employer
Bargaining Centralization Density (%) Coverage (%) Bargaining (%)
2000’s 2010’s 2000’s 2010’s 2000’s 2010’s 2000’s 2010’s 2000’s 2010’s
Portugal 3 3 2.8 2.6 18.4 17.4 80.5 75.5 3 5
Spain 3 3 2.52 2.17 19.3 18.9 70.9 70.5 7.5 5.9
France 3 3 2.4 2.3 10.7 10.9 98 94.2 3.6 3.8
Italy 3 3 2.59 2.41 33.6 35.5 80 80 - -
Germany 3 3 2.2 2.2 21.7 17.7 65 57.1 8.5 8.1
Austria 3 3 2.29 2.28 33.3 27.6 78.5 78.5 3 3
Netherlands 3.4 3 2.59 2.19 20.4 18.2 82 83.1 10.1 7.6
Belgium 4.5 4.6 4.09 4.14 54.9 53.6 94.6 92 10 -
Denmark 3 3 2.34 2.3 70.4 67.4 77 79.3 22 -
Sweden 3 3 2.49 2.39 74.5 67 92 89.6 8.3 5.6
Norway 3.2 3 2.57 2.39 54.3 52.3 73.7 71 - -
Finland 3.65 3.67 3.06 3.06 69.2 63.45 86.2 89.6 9 9
Switzerland 3 3 2.49 2.39 74.5 67 91.9 89.6 8.3 5.6
Greece 3.9 2.4 3.6 1.3 27.75 21.07 100 57.1 8.2 15
Poland 1 1 0.96 0.9 17.1 16.9 20.9 17.9 15.4 14.8
Czech Republic 2 2 1.8 1.8 23 13.3 27.9 33.1 27.9 33.1
United Kingdom 1 1 1 1 28.6 24.9 34.6 28.3 29.4 27.5
Ireland 4.6 1 4.05 0.99 33.8 27.2 42.1 34 32.4 -
United States 1 1 1 1 12.2 10.7 13.4 11.9 - -
Notes: Level of bargaining takes the values: (5) central or cross-industry level bargaining;
(4) alternating between central and industry bargaining; (3) sector or industry bargaining;
(2) sector or company bargaining; (1) company bargaining. Bargaining Centralization is
a measure created by ICTWSS, ranging between 1 and 5, with 5 being the highest level
of centralization. Source: ICTWSS, version 6.1, 1960-2018.
assesses the wage setting in these economies.13 Moreover, employment protection remains
relevant in those latitudes (See OECD (2016) for a data overview).
2.2 Modelling the Labour Market Institutional Setting
In our framework we account for a significant employment protection and a preeminent
union presence both in bargaining wages and ensuring the enforcement of implicit clauses of
contracts, in the spirit of Hogan (2001). Consequently, our model considers the firm defines
employment, and then with the right-to-manage union bargain sequentially the contract
of every worker first at sector/industry level through an employer’s association, and then
at local level. Further, the modelled union has universal coverage, but lacks the ability
to force a full lockdown of production when a bargaining process breaks down. Instead,
13See Pissarides (1986) for the first inclusion of unions in a search and matching framework, and Bauer
and Lingens (2010) and Dobbelaere and Luttens (2016) for recent treatments with an approach closer to
ours. Finally, also see Abowd and Lemieux (1993) for a classical and mainstream treatment, and Krusell
and Rudanko (2016) which revisits the question in the context of a defined frictional labour market in a
macroeconomic perspective.
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Figure III.2: Synthetic Indicator of Worker’s Bargaining Powers
Note: Each line represents their synthetic indicator of the worker’s bargaining power, by
using the first principal components of several indicators, including union density, union
coverage, employment protection indexes, and coverage of collective agreements.
Source: Lombardi et al. (2020)
we assume the Dobbelaere and Luttens (2016) gradual collective bargaining structure.14
If negotiations break down, the parties reach stalemate until one of the workers in that
contract leaves the firm without any firing tax being levied. Then, both sides restart
bargaining every contract aiming at unlocking the stalemate, with the process unfolding
with the same gradualism until a full simultaneous agreement is reached.15
Moreover, we assume bargaining takes place under three additional requirements building
the implicit foundation of the wage bargaining contract. Concretely, the sides define:
(i) the accurate belief about the level of outside options; (ii) a fair ladder of outside
options’ beliefs in the market when compared with productivity of the workers, so that
no worker is unfairly and consistently degraded; and (iii) that wages are settled under
the principle of match stability, implying that both parties bargain over the split of the
match surplus assuming ex-ante that neither side will exert their at-will option to dissolve
14Dobbelaere and Luttens (2016) justifies the discarding of this mainstream prior, due to the almost
lack of empirical evidence of such event, with the sole exception of the Ronald Reagan and the air traffic
controllers case in 1981, which they argue was political. Holden (1988) and Holden (1989) resort to the
nordic peace-clause to also abstain from a full-lockdown assumption.
15Under this bargaining protocol, the presence of unions by itself does not deviate the equilibrium wages
from the one that would emerge through individual bargaining, as in Cahuc et al. (2008) or Acemoglu and
Hawkins (2014). See appendix B1 for further insights about the relationship of our modelling approach
and other canonical union-firm models.
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that match.16 Finally, we complement the bargaining apparatus with an employment
protection framework, which notably translates into the existence of firing costs/taxes,
in the spirit of Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Bertola and Caballero (1994) and Boeri
(2011).17
2.3 The Wage Setting and Outside Options
The debate about how to model outside options in the context of wage determination
has been prolific. The work of Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) for the French labour
market sparked attention to the implications of different modelling choices for the bar-
gaining framework of wages. The authors adopted sequential bargaining where firms bid
for worker’s services, creating an enforceable link between the prescribed value of the
worker’s outside option and the history of his past job offers while employed.
This link has been disputed due to the empirical rarity of a sequential bidding in defining
wages, and the predictable lack of enforceability of incumbent firm - individual worker
promises.18 Barron et al. (2006) highlights the implications of the Postel-Vinay and
Robin (2002) apparatus on the co-workers’ contracts, and thus define as theoretically
reasonable the existence of at most a selective counter-offer policy. Cullen and Pakzad-
Hurson (2021) reinforces the limited use of sequential bidding if there is transparent pay.
They empirically find a very moderate decline of wages when transparent pay is introduced
in some US locations, which is consistent with an ex-ante limited application of sequential
bidding. Concurrently, Di Addario et al. (2021) finds that the impact of previous firm
match is moderate in the wage setting, particularly in low-middle skilled jobs, making
such empirical results also difficult to conciliate with sequential bidding.
Altogether, our modelling choice follows the principle of nonexistence of counter-offers.
Rather, we assume unions and firms predict the value of outside options for each type of
worker, and those predictions are enforced in the collective bargaining. If a worker receives
16The ability of unions to have more accurate information than isolated workers, and to have the ability
to coordinate actions of workers to enforce state-contingent actions or implicit clauses in the contract is
precisely at the core of Hogan (2001) analysis. As a matter of fact, the dataset on workers’ characteristics
was created on the purpose that unions could inspect and monitor firm’s behaviour. Created by law in
1976, our workers’ characteristics dataset - Quadros de Pessoal - were mandatorily sent by firms to the
Ministry, and posted in a visible place in each establishment, with every relevant employment characteristic,
including the wages and the worker’s position.
17While Elsby and Michaels (2013) presents evidence on the identical fitting properties of a macroeco-
nomic search and matching model with kinked employment adjustment costs on hiring, on firing or on both
sides, we opted to follow the modelling option of Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Bertola and Caballero
(1994), and the evidence presented by Lazear (1990), about the relevance of considering firing costs.
18See Pissarides (1994), Mortensen (2005), Shimer (2006), and Dolado et al. (2008) for examples of
studies resorting to this set of arguments.
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Figure III.3: The Collective Bargaining System
a beneficial proposal, he leaves the current match.
2.4 The Institutional Data on Outside Options
In Portugal, as in the majority of the Southern European and French based labour mar-
kets, the centralization of wage bargaining is clear and engraved in existing collective
bargaining agreements. Those are signed without any opt-out possibility for a firm in a
covered industry or sector, and overwhelmingly by unions linked to the two major union
confederations. While there exist a fringe of tailored agreements at firm level, those repre-
sent less than 4 percent of the workforce, being the sector agreements, negotiated between
employers’ associations and unions, or the agreements only entangling some employers in
a sector, that predominate. Jointly with their subsequent administrative extensions either
to other similar sectors, or to an entire sector when the initial coverage was reduced to
some employers, the total coverage of collective bargaining reaches more than 85 percent
of the private sector workforce. This quite centralized apparatus provides strengthened
coherence to the bargained outcomes, particularly across comparable labour market con-
texts.19
19Legally, the firm-level agreements signed between an individual company and one or more unions
are designated Acordos de Empresa or AEs. Those are important in the oil sector and transport and
communications. The collective agreements signed by several employers that are not part of an employers’
association and one or more trade unions are known as Acordos Colectivos de Trabalho or ACTs. Those are
significant in the financial sector and utilities. Finally, the industry-level or sectoral agreements, the so-
called Contratos Colectivos de Trabalho or CCTs, are the ones negotiated between one or more employers’
associations and one or more unions. The administrative instruments that extend the agreements are
either Portarias de Extensão or Portarias de Condições de Trabalho. See further details in Addison et al.
(2017). See appendix A2 for an example of a representative wage floor table.
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In toto, the enacted agreements set a substantive set of rules on working conditions, and
a system of wage floors for detailed categories of workers. As presented in figure 3, we
have that those wage floors are defined based on the firm’s sector and the worker’s career
rank, or category, within a given task market (i.e. senior manager, junior manager, and
so on). Those ranks are then aggregated in a comparable set of types of workers, or
task markets across the sectors of activity (i.e. managers, group leaders, senior technical
workers, non-technical workers, and so on). As a matter of example, this labour market
functions in resemblance to the organization of the armed forces. You have a hierarchy
composed by groups of ranks or task markets (i.e. generals, commissioned officers and
unlisted grades), arguably compared across the three branches of the armed forces (i.e.
army, air force and navy), and within each task market you have a plethora of ranks (i.e.
field marshall, general, brigadier, captain, and so on). In total, the sectoral agreements
and their extensions explain the claim that Portugal has no less than 30,000 minimum
wages (see Martins (2014)).20
In our framework, we assume this definition corresponds to an estimate of the worker’s
outside option value, or fire-sale, assuming the match stability principle. Therefore, this
estimate corresponds to the worker’s value if he becomes suddenly and unexpectedly un-
employed. Empirically, we only have access to the ranks of the workers, and therefore we
establish the minimum paid regular wage in each identified rank as the proxy of the legally
binding minimum. In a nutshell, the system of sector-occupation ranks provides a com-
parable measure of the outside option value of the workers across sectors, and individual
histories. This empirical choice is not at the odds of the literature (see Card et al. (2014)
for an identical empirical choice).
2.5 Bargained Wages and Wage Cushion
As presented in figure 4, while this bargained wage sets the minimum wage conditions
of each labour relationship it does not correspond to the actual wage of the worker, as
the latter results from the proper wage bargaining dynamics at firm level. As seen by
the wage cushion measure, corresponding to the ratio between the total wage and this
proxy of the bargained wage, it is extremely common, and a stable feature of the market,
to see firms paying above the minimum condition.21 By the same token, the base wage
20We abstract the possibility of several collective agreements covering the same firm, as either they tend
to be coincidental, or the workers tend to pick the most advantageous one.
21The term wage cushion was proposed in Cardoso and Portugal (2005), corresponding to the difference
on the levels of the bargained wage and the base wage actually paid to the worker. Noteworthy, while
Cardoso and Portugal (2005) and Card and Cardoso (2021) assesses the difference between bargained and
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Figure III.4: Evolution of the Wage Cushion
Notes: The wage cushion is calculated as the ratio wagedrift = wagetotalwagebargained . The fading
grey shades corresponds, from the darker to the lighter respectively, to (a) 75th-25th per-
centile range; (b) 90th−10th percentile range; and (c) 95th−5th percentile range. Sources:
Quadros de Pessoal and Relatório Único, 1995-2016.
does not match the total compensation of the workers, as the proper institutional setting
often determines the mandatory existence of several supplements, as the meals subsidy
or even tenure related regular payments. Moreover, this distinction confers different de-
grees of future enforceability among types of pay, with some other regular compensation
supplements, as shift subsidies or availability supplements being in de-jure temporary or
partially temporary.
2.6 Heuristic Reduced Form Approaches to Estimate Wage Setting
A widely accepted way to portray the wage determination in the context of imperfect
labour markets is given by:22
wift = Outit + βQRift (III.1)
base wages of the worker, we assess the difference between bargained and total wages. See Addison et al.
(2021) for other analysis resorting to the wage cushion concept and unions. Further, this concept differs
from the wage drift which assesses minimum wage changes versus actual wage changes. See Holden (1988)
and Holden (1989) for treatments of this concept for the Nordic countries.
22This style of wage determination equation is for example compatible with: (a) bargaining in single
worker firm models as in Pissarides (2000); (b) search with multiple workers and Stole and Zwiebel (1996a)
bargaining as in Cahuc et al. (2008), Acemoglu and Hawkins (2014) and this chapter; (c) efficient unions
bargaining as in Abowd and Lemieux (1993); and (d) monopsonistic wage posting as in Manning (2011)
and Card et al. (2018).
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where Outit corresponds to the outside wage of worker i in moment t, and QRift corre-
sponds to the non-competitive quasi-rent the worker obtains at firm f in time t.
In this context, the leading way to identify the parameter β, or its related elasticity
resides in using proxies of the value of the quasi-rent. This path can be seen in Card et al.
(2014), and its extensively reviewed in Card et al. (2018). The potential limitation of
this approach resides in the proper availability of credible measures of productivity, as the
value added. Also, even when it exists, it often doesn’t enable the possibility to adopt an
identification that secures within firm heterogeneity of the quasi-rent component.
The advent of matched employer-employee administrative datasets represented a turning
point on the study of labour market dynamics. Empirically, the major drive to rely on this
data lies on its detailed, and overtime consistent, description of the relationship network
established among market actors (i.e. workers, firms, unions, households, among others).
Such interest on this type of data became most salient after the seminal contribution of
Abowd et al. (1999) − the widely known AKM model. Their model owes its popularity
to the pleasant empirical properties of the within estimator, which it naturally extends,
the easiness of its empirical implementation, its high explanatory power, the apparent
intuitive interpretation of its results in a canonical wage setting model, and even the
natural relationship with the traditional schooling and experience frameworks of Mincer
(1974) and Griliches (1977). Consistently, Card et al. (2013) highlighted the importance
of considering network data to identify unobservables. Contrary to past wage inequality
surge episodes, their assessment of the recent rise in inequality for West Germany found
that the most relevant drivers were not easily observable worker and firm characteristics.
Identically, Bloom et al. (2018) records long-lasting unobservable wage differentials with
firm size.
Typically, as presented in Card et al. (2018), an AKM approach to estimate the parameter
β (or its implied elasticity) would entail:
ln(wift) =ln(Outit) + β̃ln(QRift)
ln(Outit) =αOi + φOt + XOitγO
ln(QRift) =αV Ai + ψV Af + φV At + ZV Aift γV A
(III.2)
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+XOitγO + ZV Aift γV Aβ̃ + εift,
ψ̂f =ξ + β̃Ef [ln(QRift)] + vf ,
(III.3)
where the identification lies on the idea that the firm fixed effect only affects the non com-
petitive quasi-rent, and consists in a measure of the link between different compensation
policies across firms after partialling out the value of individual specific traits, and time
effects.
However, from those outset contributions, the debate acknowledged empirical hazards in
both the interpretation and use of the fixed effect estimates, and in its proper estimation,
which may suffer from several econometric impairments.23 Within the latter group, limited
mobility bias leads the suspects (see Abowd and Kramarz (2004) for the seminal treatment
of the question),24 endogenous mobility closely trails (see Card et al. (2016) and Card et al.
(2018) for classical discussions), and finite-sample bias and measurement error complete
the quartet of the most referred potential econometric faults. Even if validity is set aside,
the functional form of the canonical AKM setting has been questioned.25
Those empirical crossroads encouraged researchers to enlarge their strategies. Some at-
tempted to increase the parameter set to account for misspecification, even though it
implies even stronger identification restrictions when compared with the canonical AKM
(see Woodcock (2015) for a recent discussion). In more encouraging paths, some attempted
to devise bias correction methods for the limited mobility issue (see Andrews et al. (2008),
Borovicková and Shimer (2017) for two examples), while others defined different estima-
tors theoretically capable to address some of the identified issues without restricting the
modelling environment (see Kline et al. (2019) for a leave-out estimator of quadratic
form). Alternatively, several studies, among which Bonhomme et al. (2019) is a prime
example, tried to perform rankings of workers and/or firms, before the proper estimation
of the wage equation, with the aim of reducing the parameter set to be estimated while
23A leading example of an interpretation an use of fixed effects issue concerns the identification of age
and experience profiles in the presence of worker fixed effects (see Card et al. (2018)).
24One of the most relevant consequences of limited mobility bias concerns the validity of assessing the
level of sorting of workers and firms through the empirical correlation of worker and firm effects. See
Eeckhout and Kircher (2011) and Jochmans and Weidner (2019) for theoretic discussions; and Abowd and
Kramarz (2004), Andrews et al. (2008), Lopes de Melo (2008), Andrews et al. (2012), Hagedorn et al.
(2017), Borovicková and Shimer (2017), Torres et al. (2018) and Bonhomme et al. (2020) for a sample of
relevant studies on this debate.
25Allowing the value of the worker-firm match to unveil in more convoluted ways than its additive spec-
ification, and considering dynamic mechanisms composing a richer and arguably more robust longitudinal
analysis than its static environment have been two leading courses of action (see Bonhomme et al. (2019),
Card et al. (2018) and Lachowska et al. (2020) for recent analysis).
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maintaining the sound statistical explanatory power of AKM.26
In the spirit of these last developments, and given the collective bargaining administrative
ranking, a simplified version of our approach will empirically implement:27
wift =Outit + βQRift
QRift =TSift −Outit
Outit =ϕt + f(rankit, ageit, genderi)
TSft =ψft + Xitγ + αit
Xitγ + αit =E[Xit|rankit]γ.
(III.4)
where TSft corresponds to the total surplus of the match worker-firm. Notice that the
use of the collective bargaining administrative ranking will allow to identify bargaining
powers in a more parsimonious and flexible model as compared with the AKM, and in a
more flexible approach than the one usually available to the rent-sharing approach. In the
next two sections we will present the model and its implied assumption framework that
postulates this presented system of equations.
3 A Search and Matching Model of Labour Tasks
In a nutshell, this model corresponds to a search and matching archetype at workplace
level (id est firm/occupation/time partition), with gradual collective bargaining, intra-
firm wage bargaining, severance payments and on-job search. Under several twists in its
assumptions it becomes isomorphic to the models presented in Mortensen (2009), Cahuc
et al. (2008), Acemoglu and Hawkins (2014) or Pissarides (1990).
In this section we focus our description of the model in the required ingredients to obtain
dynamic equilibrium wages. The treatment of the remainder conditions describing the full
dynamic equilibrium, an alternative steady-state equilibrium, and the theoretical links
of this model and the literature of search and matching and union-firm bargaining are
26In this broad class of papers, one can consider: (a) Bonhomme et al. (2017), Bonhomme et al. (2019)
and Lentz et al. (2018) that resort to a two-step algorithm where in the first step either firms or workers (or
both) are classified in categories by using a k-means clustering algorithm; (b) Sorkin (2018) which resorts
to a replica of the Google’s PageRank algorithm to rank firms based on revealed preference to then identify
compensating differentials; and (c) Hagedorn et al. (2017) which, building on theoretic foundations of
Shimer and Smith (2000) and Eeckhout and Kircher (2011), presents the classical Kemeny-Young rank
aggregation algorithm as a way to rank workers and then firms based on the worker’s ranking (see Kemeny
(1959) for the first treatment of this algorithm).
27In the actual empirical implementation we will add a task market dimension - j - as we will subse-
quently introduce.
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presented in appendix B.28
Labour market structure. The proposed model unfolds in each period t according
with figure 5, where each period is decomposed in three hypothetical moments, with wage
bargaining happening before the job flow decisions take place.
Figure III.5: Structure of the Model in each Moment t
In this context, consider an economy with a numeraire good sold under perfectly competi-
tive conditions, and produced by a unit measure of large firms. In each period t, each firm
employ multiple workers, from the available pool i ∈ {1, . . . ,ℵ}, with each specializing in
one of the available labour tasks, j ∈ {1, . . . , J}. Workers sell their tasks exclusively to a
single firm. Time is continuous, and workers, the union, and firms discount time at rate
r ≥ 0.
The labour market is assumed to be frictional, as firms are required to post vacancies
to hire workers, and pay a cost γj per vacancy posted in task market j. Workers, either
employed or unemployed, do direct search at task market level, by selecting the task
market they are willing to perform search. They incur in the search cost cj if they search,
and then meet firms following a random search process within the task market.
The flow of worker-firm meets in task market j is determined by a typical constant returns
to scale aggregate matching function, M(uj(t)+ej(t), V̄j(t)), where uj(t) is the measure of
unemployed workers searching for a job in task market j at moment t, ej(t) is the measure
of employed workers searching in market j at time t, and V̄j(t) is the measure of vacancies







M(uj(t) + ej(t), V̄j(t))
V̄j(t)
(III.6)
28In detail, appendix B provides further technical details on the model, namely: (i) the conditions
under which the model become isomorphic to several search and matching models in the literature; (ii)
the relationship between the gradual collective bargaining apparatus and other canonical union-firm bar-
gaining solutions; (iii) the derivation of the remainder conditions describing the dynamic equilibrium and
of equilibrium wages; (iv) the definition and properties of the dynamic equilibrium and the steady state
equilibrium.
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represents the Poisson rate at which a worker, either employed or unemployed meets a
firm. Further, q(θj(t)) is the Poisson rate at which a firm meets a candidate, per vacancy
posted. For notational ease, we often just write θj , uj , ej or q(θj), omitting its time
dependence.
On the other side, matches are dissolved due to one of four reasons namely: (a) a bargain-
ing breakdown in the wage negotiation; (b) a termination exogenous shock, representing
reasons beyond the control of workers and firms, which happens with probability s̄; (c) a
successful on-job-search of a worker; and (d) the decision of the firm to fire the worker at
will, which may be triggered after the firm pays a severance payment given by S.
Description of Market Agents. Firms to be productive employ a J dimensional vector
of workers, N, resort to an exogenously predetermined capital input, K, whose rental
cost, I(K), is considered to be fixed and sunk, and implement the available homogeneous
production function F (N,K).29 Moreover, firms bargain with a representative union
over wages with heterogeneous bargaining strength, with I − β representing the firm’s
bargaining power vector - a [J×1] dimensional vector - implying heterogeneous bargaining
powers across types of tasks. Altogether, the firm exogenous heterogeneity is captured in
the two dimensional tuple {K,β}.30 The cumulative distribution of the firm’s types in
each moment is given by Γ(K,β).
Workers are potentially infinitely lived, but may suffer a death shock with a constant
hazard rate δ, and new workers arrive at the market at the same rate. Each worker is
exogenously endowed with an initial generic training and ability, whose stock is given
by a(0) extracted from the distribution Ψ0(a) = N(µ0,Σ0). Then, the worker develops
skill through a stationary and invariant process with the Markov property, so that the
transitions are described by the cumulative distribution function
Ψ(a′|a) = Prob(ai(t+ 1) ≤ a′|ai(t) = a),
ψ(a′|a) = d
da′
Ψ(a′|a) ∼ N(B0a,CC ′),
(III.7)
and accordingly, the density over the history of the worker at = [a(t), a(t − 1), . . . , a(0)]
29The firm’s production function is continuous at all arguments, concave, with constant returns to
scale, infinitely differentiable for all positive arguments. As will be clear in our identification strategy, the
adoption of an homogeneous production function is taken for exposition purposes, and do not constraint
our empirical environment.
30Notice that in describing the model, we present β as a scalar, so that we ease notation burden. When
pertinent, we present the implied differences. Further, we are assuming the agents while are forward
looking, they assume {K,β} will be stable, so that any future change in firm’s fundamentals are fully
unexpected, when bargaining takes place.
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corresponds to:
ψ(at) = ψ[a(t)|a(t− 1)] . . . ψ[a(1)|a(0)]ψ0[a(0)], (III.8)





In these regards, in each period, firms are required to incur in a operating cost per employed
worker dependent on the training and ability of the worker, and the task market, otherwise
he will become fully unproductive. The operating cost, corresponds to the flow:31
A(j, a) = ωj(a). (III.11)
Conditional on the firm’s characteristics, the function Gj,t(a|K,β) represents the number
of workers, employed in task market j in moment t, with at most a as level of operating
cost, which is assumed to be, in each moment t, common knowledge.32 Consistently, the

















where: (a) Ut(a) corresponds to the number of unemployed workers with at most an
operating cost of a; and (b) ℵ(a, t) consists in the number of available workers with at
most an estimated operated cost a in period t.33
The last notable agent in our model is the representative union. We assume the union fully
represents the workforce in the wage bargaining, independently of the actual workforce
31Technically, assume that ωj(x) > ωl(x),∀x ∈ [0, Ā], ∀j > l due to the increasing complexity of task
market. Further ωj(x) is strictly convex and holds limx→0+ ω(x) = Ā, limx→∞ ω(x) = 0. The use of a
Markov process in this context is classical. Bonhomme et al. (2017) uses a Markovian process to describe
earnings directly, whereas we adopt a Markovian process in skill, which allow for dynamics to be treated in
a slightly different angle. Jointly, the operating cost function and the skill acquisition can be represented
by a linear state-space system, as:
a(t) =B0a(t− 1) + Ce(t)
A(j, a) =ωj(a(t)),
(III.10)
with e(t) ∼ N(0, I). See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012) for further details of this process.
32In the process of matching in the labour market, we critically assume that a hiring firm only acquires
knowledge about a after the hiring is completed.













Further ℵ is exogenous and fixed. Then given Γ(K,β) and an initial distributions dGj,0(a|K,β) and dℵ(a, 0)
the distribution dU0(a) is identified, and given the dynamics of the former distributions the dynamics of
the latter is equally identified. The dynamics of dGj,t(a|K,β) are described latter.
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membership status, while employment decisions are left to firms. In representing workers,














where Ξj,t(a|K,β) is the value of a worker of type a conditional on being in a firm of type
{K,β}, and Out(a) is the value of the outside option of the worker of type a.
Value functions.34 The profit of a firm with fundamentals {K,β} is assumed to be
strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable in employment. It is given by:
rΠ(K,β)− ∂Π(K,β)
∂t






































− γjVj(K,β) + Vj(K,β)q(θj)JRj (K,β)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Value of the Hiring Policy
,
(III.15)
where s̃j(a|K,β) corresponds to the probability that the firm (K,β) fires at will the
worker of type a paying in such event a firing tax of S, and sj(a|K,β) corresponds to
the probability that the match (a,K, β) is dissolved. The intuition of equation (15) is
standard in the models of this type (see Cahuc et al. (2008)). Accordingly, profit of
a firm {K,β} accounts for: (a) the output of the firm; (b) the firm expenditure in the
wages of the employed workers; (c) the firm expenditure with operating costs; (d) expected
firing taxes; (e) the sunk cost related to the capital input; (f) the firm losses due to the
separation shock; and (g) the proceeds of the firm’s optimal vacancy posting behaviour
(i.e. Vj(K,β)), considering the probability the firm meets a candidate, the cost of creating
a vacancy (i.e. γj), and JRj (K,β) the firm’s expectation about the marginal profit obtained
with a new hire.
34For the sake of simplicity, and with a slight abuse of notation, we drop the time subscript in the
remainder of this modelling section and in most of appendix B, excepting when the expression is dynamic.
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Employment effect on wages of other task markets
− sj(a|K,β)Jj(a|K,β)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected value loss of
dissolving the match














Impact on value of the job of hiring and firing policies of the firm
.
(III.16)
Altogether, the value function of a filled job in firm (K,β) by a worker a can be described
as the match marginal productivity discounting the value of the worker’s wage, the impact
of the marginal hiring on the wages set in the other task markets, the loss inherent to the
future dissolution of this match, potentially including a firing tax if the dissolution happens
to be a firm at-will decision, and lastly the impact of the firm’s hiring and firing decisions
in other task markets on the value of the filled job.























Expected value of searching for a job
,
(III.17)
where ξoj (a) corresponds to an indicator function being 1 if the unemployed is search-
ing in task market j, and zero otherwise.35 By the same token, the corresponding value




































Impact of hiring and firing policy of the firm in the value of the employment
,
(III.18)
with 1[Ξl(a|K,β) > Ξj(a|K,β)] representing an indicator function equal to 1 if the value in
35It is assumed that the unemployed worker only searches in the task market that maximizes is expected
value of search. The same takes place in the case of the employed worker. Further details in appendix B2.
Moreover, the unemployment benefits - b - are independent of a merely for exposition purposes. It will be
clear that considering it dependent on a, i.e. b(a), will not affect our identification strategy.
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alternative match is greater than the current, and ξΞl (a|K,β) corresponding to an indicator
function being 1 if the employed worker is searching in task market j, and zero otherwise.
Collective Bargaining Protocol. In wage bargaining, which occurs in every period
t, the union and firms follow bilateral bargaining protocols, with a system of offers and
counter-offers in the spirit of Rubinstein (1982) and Brügemann et al. (2018).36 Further,
as previously described, the sides will firstly bargain binding minimum wages at aggregate
level, and subsequently will bargain actual wages at firm level.
In both stages, the union and the firm, or employer’s association, bargain wages assuming
the principle of match stability, which is algebraically translated into:
s̃l(a|K,β) = ξΞl (a) = 0, ∀l ∈ {1, . . . , J},∀{a,K, β}. (III.19)
Notice that precisely match stability implies that neither side is ex-ante considering the
other will dissolve the match at-will.
At aggregate level, we assume the association of firms and the union bargain the minimum
binding wage which is compatible with the lowest surplus viable match, namely the match
that generate a zero expected quasi-rent. Notice that the level of the expected quasi-rent
of the match of a worker of type a with the average firm in the bargaining corresponds to:




















Altogether, the aggregate bargaining solves the axiomatic constrained Nash bargaining,
considering the Dobbelaere and Luttens (2016) proposition, and thus that the disagree-
ment points are given by the loss of one match with a worker of type-a without the
36In particular, the insight of the Brügemann et al. (2018) allows for the ordering at which the contracts
for each match fundamentals are bargained do not influence the outcome of the bargaining.
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existence of side payments. Consequently:







s̃l(a|K,β) = ξΞl (a|K,β) = 0, (match stability)
EK,β[QRj(a,K, β)] = 0, (No quasi-rent condition)
∀l ∈ {1, . . . , J},∀{a,K, β}.
(III.21)
The solution of the aggregate bargaining problem is given by:




which precisely defines the minimum wage at aggregate level for type-a worker, i.e. the
bargained wage of type-a worker, as the level of his outside option.37
Considering the bargained wages of each type-a worker, the firm level bargaining takes
place, with the union and each firm bargaining contracts for each match fundamentals
{a,K, β}. In case of a full bargaining breakdown one of the matches, with match funda-
mentals as {a,K, β}, is expected to be dissolved without the existence of side payments
among the involved market actors.
Accordingly, the wage of a match with fundamentals {a,K, β} is obtainable by solving an








s̃l(a|K,β) = ξΞl (a|K,β) = 0, (match stability)




∀l ∈ {1, . . . , J},∀{a,K, β}.
(III.23)
Equilibrium Wages in the Dynamic Equilibrium. Considering the assumptions
37The solution of the aggregate bargaining entails that the worker’s bargaining power does not directly
influence the bargained wage of type a worker, but it influences the outside option through the worker’s
bargaining powers of the expected potential offers of the worker. Thus aggregate movements of bargaining
powers affect the level of the outside option and the bargained wage, while idiosyncratic movements of
bargaining powers of the bargained contract do not.
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referred in the previous sub-section, and the generalization of the bargaining power pa-
rameter set to be heterogeneous at task-market-firm level, the unique solution of the



















of the worker in the workplace (f,j,t)
−βj A(j, a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Op. Cost
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Idiosyncratic Surplus of the Match {a,K,β}
,
if wj(a|K,β) ≥ wMINj,t (a)
wMINj,t (a), if otherwise.
(III.24)
The expression of the idiosyncratic surplus of the match in the interior solution has a per-
turbed marginal productivity of the worker in the workplace, affected by the heterogeneity
in the bargaining powers across task markets, which is fully consistent with Cahuc et al.
(2008). Critically, notice that this term is invariant within the workplace (f, j, t).38
Moreover, in the absence of corner solutions, the difference between the average wage
within the workplace, and individual wages, is determined by two fundamental factors,
namely: (i) the differences in the level of outside options of the workers in the workplace;
and (ii) the heterogeneity in the level of operating costs of the workers. This conclusion
is easily reached if one represents equation (24) as a function of the average wage within
the workplace. Accordingly, we have that:












Diff. in Op. Costs=∆Aj(a,K,β)
.
(III.26)
Finally, notice that the aggregate bargaining constraint is assumed to not be binding in
38Technically, we refer to a workplace as the combination of worker-observations that share (f, j, t)
dimensions. Intuitively, the workers that in moment t are in firm f in task market j. Additionally, note
that the average wage in each workplace in the absence of corner solutions is given by:








dz − βjE[A(j, a)|j,K, β].
(III.25)
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the dynamic and steady state equilibria.39 We assume that the worker will pull off at
will from any match he is involved into that offers him a wage equal to the flow value of
his unemployment. Consequently, in the empirical implementation we will consider just
interior solutions.
4 Empirical Implementation
The main objective of the empirical implementation of the model is to estimate the actual
wage equation of the worker. According to the presented model, wages are given by:40








dz − βj,tA(j, at).
(III.27)
In estimating equation (27), we will take advantage of the information about the workplace
definition to infer the average wages, the outside option of each worker, provided by the
referred workers’ ranks, and the context of the union-firm bargaining, which will inform
the behaviour of operating costs.
Empirical Outside Options. Given our theoretical framework, we have an estimate
of the outside options of each worker (i.e. Out?(at) is known), which coincides with the
estimate of the wage floor of the rank in which the worker is placed. Thereafter, assuming
that: (i) the outside options’ valuation within each task market evolve, holding a parallel
trends assumption, as λ(j, t); and (ii) a first order Taylor approximation of the worker’s
outside option value around the average outside option of each workplace is reasonable,
we have that the outside option can be estimated as:
ln[wMINj,t (at)] = ln[Out?(at)] = λ(j, t) + ψ[rank(i, t), t− τ0(i), femalei] + vi,t, (III.28)
where λ is a task market and period effect, ψ is the contract characteristics effect. The
latter accounts for: (a) the experience of the worker (i.e. t − τ0(i)), (b) the current rank
of the worker (i.e. rank(i, t)), and (c) different career prospects by gender.41
39See Haanwinckel and Soares (2020) for an analysis of binding minimum wages in a wage bargaining
setting close to ours, and the consequences for the wage setting. They assume an arbitrary minimum wage
is set, and thus may become binding, while we assume the bargaining that results in the minimum wage.
40Notice that in the empirical description we recover the index t to avoid any confusion on the dimensions
of heterogeneity in the empirical model.
41The derivation details of this functional form are provided in appendix C. While in theory we could
resort directly to our proxy of Out?(a), we use the insight of Pei et al. (2018) to minimize the potential
impact of measurement error arising from the definition of the proxy.
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Empirical Operating Costs To fully estimate equation (27) one needs to consider the
functional form of the operating costs. In general, those correspond to the individual
characteristics of the workers, which influence the marginal productivity of the match
worker-workplace. For estimation purposes, we assume an additive functional form as:
A(j, at) = ξ(i, t) + Xi,tζj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Worker Characteristics
, (III.29)
where ξ(i, t) corresponds to time-varying unobservable characteristics of the worker, and
Xi,t to a vector of k observable characteristics of the worker. Notice that ξ would trans-
late in a very high dimensional parameter set, which ordinarily is beyond identification
capabilities of ordinarily implemented models.
In our approach we do not directly estimate the individual operating costs. Rather, we
assume unions and firms have an estimate of these operating costs, and consequently use
it to place the worker in the ranks of the firm. Consequently, we have that:
A(j, at) ≈ E[A(j, at)|rank(i, t)] = E[Xi,t|rank(i, t)]ζj + E[ξ(i, t)|rank(i, t)]. (III.30)
Equation (30) results from a revealed preference argument. Concretely, if a worker is
placed in a given rank within the firm, it can only be because the union and the firm agree
he has a level of operating cost that is compatible with that rank.
Moreover, we assume that the expected value of the unobserved characteristics of operating
costs is the same within each task-market. Thus:
E[ξ(i, t)|rank(i, t)] = E
[
E[ξ(i, t)|rank(i, t)]
∣∣∣∣j, t],∀ rank ∈ j. (III.31)
This assumption implies that idiosyncratic characteristics of the workers, either observ-
able or unobservable, contribute to their career path, i.e. their placement on a given rank,
as the measure of operating costs of each worker is assumed to be equal to the workers’
average of operating cost in the rank he is enlisted on - E[A(j, a)|rank(i, t)]. Moreover,
the unobserved component of this average operating cost, E[ξ(i, t)|rank(i, t)], is common
to every rank in the corresponding task market of the relevant collective agreement. In-
tuitively, this assumption implies that the ranks are differentiated based on observable
characteristics of their respective workforces, which we find a natural assumption given
the bargaining takes place between unions and firms.42
42Notice that we are not fully excluding idiosyncratic pay to a given characteristic of the worker vis-à-vis
the remuneration in the corresponding rank, as long as such payment is performed by resorting to bonuses,
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Given the equation (31), and our interest in the difference in operating cost between the

















Diff. in workplace versus rank on time-varying observables
ζj
=∆E[Xi,t|rank(i, t),Kt, βt]ζj ,
(III.32)
as the unobservable components cancel out. Notice that the ceteris paribus interpretation
of empirical marginal effects of any of the variables in matrix E[Xi,t|rank(i, t)] is equivalent
to the interpretation of a change in Xi,t in terms of wage change. Mechanically, one expects
that the change in operating costs changes the rank of the worker, implying that the worker
gets promoted. Altogether, equation (29) holds for that same worker, but on a different
rank the worker was then assigned to.43
The logarithm of actual wages. Considering equation (26), and the described be-




wj(Kt, βj,t) + (1− βj,t)∆Out?(at,Kt, βt)
+ βj,t∆E
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where εi,f,j,t corresponds to a disturbance. Accordingly, the wage is decomposed into:
(i) the average wage in the workplace of the worker; (ii) the differences in the outside
options, properly weighted by the worker’s bargaining power; and (iii) the differences in
the operating cost observables and the average observable operating cost in the workplace,
weighted by the firm’s bargaining power.
The estimation procedure. The first step deals with potential measurement error
in our proxy of outside option values, and consists in resorting to a high dimensional
heterogeneous slope model as:
ln[Out?(at)] = λ(j, t) + ψ[rank(i, t), t− τ0(i)] + vi,t. (1st Step)
While this first step estimates a large number of parameters, due to ψ term, it is signifi-
cantly more parsimonious than a model that resorts to worker and/or firm effects.
or irregular compensation policies.
43Noteworthy, implicit on the ceteris paribus analysis, we are assuming that the change in operating
costs is not affecting the outside option, which may be an unrealistic assumption. To fully study general
equilibrium marginal effects, one would have to estimate the impact of the change in that observable
characteristic both on operating costs and outside options. That is beyond the purpose of this chapter.
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Then we resort to the predicted outside option value - ̂Out?(at) to feed the estimation of
the actual wage empirical model, which corresponds to:
ln[wj(at|Kt, βj,t)] =ln
[
wj(Kt, βj,t) + (1− βj,t) ̂∆Out?(at,K, β)+











θ,Xi,t, wj(Kt, βj,t), ̂∆Out?(at,K, β)
)}2
, (III.34)
where θ = θ(βj,t, ζj) is the parameter vector.
Conjointly, the workings of section 3 and section 4 presented a search and matching model,
with the sufficient ingredients to consist in a credible environment for empirical implemen-
tation. While not every ingredient, particularly on job flows, is strictly necessary to estab-
lish the identification of equilibrium wage equations, their inclusion allows to understand
how the modelled collective bargaining environment interacts with them, in a setting of
a multi-employee and multi-occupational firm. In appendix D, we present a Toy model
version of the sections 3 and 4 presenting the minimal components considered in a search
and matching model capable to deliver the empirical identification presented.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Highlights from a Parsimonious Wage Setting Equation
The outset of our empirical analysis adopts the most parsimonious and static version of
our model. For this purpose, over the presented framework we assume that the workers’
bargaining powers are constant overtime. In this stylized version, the model preserves a
within-workplace structural approach, accounting for workplace time-varying effects and
workers’ observed and unobserved time-varying characteristics. The analogous reduced-
form implementation would correspond to:
ln[wifjt] =ln
[
φf,j,t + (1− βj)Ôut(a)− βj [ξ(i, t) + Xi,tζj ]
]
+ εi,f,j,t, (III.35)
where E[Xi,t|rank(i, t)] = ξ(i, t) + Xi,tζj .
While apparently straightforward, this reduced form would frame a conundrum in the ab-
sence of the model design of data usage. Either from a fixed or random effects perspectives,
the estimation of parameters and/or implied distributional features for φf,j,t, ξ(i, t) and
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Out(a) would become computationally unattainable; would be largely unidentifiable given
any largest connected set requirement; would imply strictly unrealistic orthogonality con-
ditions; or even would result in a preposterous overparameterized model. The suggested
relationship between workplace hourly wage and worker’s hourly wage; the use of bar-
gained wages; and the presented structure of individual and rank operational costs pave
the way out of the riddle.
The estimation results are presented in table 2. Forthwith, the goodness-of-fit of the model
is convincing, even in the context of a very favourable number of estimated parameters
versus number of observations trade-off, particularly if one uses the AKM standpoint.
Notice that in the first and second stages, the model resorts to 606,759 and 10 parameters,
respectively, while the number of observations are above 29 million in each stage, with an
average number of workers per year of around 1.4 million.44
Among the presented results, while the operating cost coefficients will be discussed at
a later stage of this section, we promptly highlight the worker’s bargaining power. Our
estimate for the entire economy is around 20%, which is consistent with several other
studies in the literature. For instance, for the Veneto region of Italy, Card et al. (2014)
find a reduced form coefficient of the outside option (i.e. (1 − β)) of 80%, when using
sector minimum wage as the proxy of the outside option, in both OLS and IV within
spell models of rent sharing. For France, Cahuc et al. (2006) estimate bargaining powers
mostly in the range between 0 and 38% depending on the task-market.45 For Germany,
Hirsch and Schnabel (2011) implement a right-to-manage model and estimate yearly bar-
gaining powers between 11%-18%, for the years 1992-2009. For Denmark, resorting to a
structural model with some commonalities with our theoretical approach, Bagger et al.
(2014) estimates an average workers’ bargaining power of around 30 percent, and while
Mortensen et al. (2010) matches that empirical estimate for the same dataset it further
presents sectoral heterogeneity, ranging from 7-61 percent. Discordantly, Dumont et al.
(2012) presents higher workers’ bargaining power estimates for Belgium, between 45-71
percent depending on the sector in analysis.
A breviary of the empirical results of the supra-cited studies and of table 2 highlights the
importance of bargaining power and operating cost heterogeneity over the time. Accord-
ingly, we consider the time dimension of heterogeneity in our empirical analysis.
44In our sample, a typical worker-firm-time AKM specification entangles 3,660,238 worker fixed effects,
127,333 firm effects and 21 yearly dummies. So we estimate around 16 percent of the number of parameters
a typical AKM would use in the first stage.
45The sole exception of that range is 98% for managers in the construction sector. Their partition of
the task markets is identical to ours, but they have 4 categories. Their two top categories (i.e. 1 and 2)
are condensed in our 1st category.
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Table III.2: Non-linear Least Squares with Common Slopes
Panel A: First-stage on Outside Option
Heterogeneous Slopes and Intercepts Number of Parameters
Rank - 3rd order polynomial age function - Female 606,696
Task Market - Year 63
Adjusted R2 0.9371
N. Obs. 29,586,448
Panel B: Second-stage NLS Estimation
Variable Coefficient (s.e.)
Managers Skilled workers Unskilled workers
β 0.3547*** 0.1761*** 0.1733***
(0.0021) (0.0002) (0.0013)
ζtenure/10 -0.0037 -0.0640*** -0.2681***
(0.0130) (0.0055) (0.0045)
ζtenure2/100 0.1457*** 0.0159*** 0.0555***
(0.0092) (0.0046) (0.0036)
ζtenure3/1000 -0.0290*** -0.0040*** -0.0006
(0.0018) (0.0009) (0.0008)
ζage/10 2.291*** -1.1753*** -1.4556***
(0.6120) (0.0413) (0.0230)
ζage2/100 -0.6283*** 0.2289*** 0.3414***
(0.1531) (0.0106) (0.0061)
ζage3/1000 0.0477*** -0.0086*** -0.0258***
(0.0124) (0.0009) (0.0005)
ζeducation -0.0312*** 0.0916*** -0.0452***
(0.0028) (0.0015) (0.0012)
ζeducation2 -0.0040*** -0.0139*** 0.0009***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
ζfemale 0.0453*** -0.3189*** -0.2211***
(0.0054) (0.0025) (0.0023)
Adjusted R2 0.9034 0.8567 0.7288
Obs. 4,797,735 14,937,457 9,851,256
Notes: Robust clustered workplace standard errors used in first-stage. Robust standard
errors use in the second-stage. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote significance at 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels,
respectively. Sources: Quadros de Pessoal, 1995-2009 and Relatório Único, 2010-2016.
5.2 The Prime Empirical Wage Setting Equation
In our benchmark empirical setting, we explicitly model an idiosyncratic time evolution of
bargaining powers for each task market, through two alternative functional form specifica-
tions, expressing different smoothness degrees ex-ante assumed for such time progression.
Ergo, in a more involving specification, we relax any smoothness prerequisite and estimate
bargaining powers resorting to a vector of year-task market dummies, while in a more fru-
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gal alternative, we impose a type-task specific third order degree polynomial functional
form of the time trend. Figure 6 presents the resulting workers’ bargaining powers esti-
mates.46
Figure III.6: Estimated Workers’ Bargaining Power per Task Market
Notes: The fading shades correspond to the 95th − 5th confidence interval, using robust
standard errors. Sources: Quadros de Pessoal and Relatório Único, 1995-2016.
At first glance, figure 6 reaffirms the existence of relevant bargaining power heterogeneity
at task market level, and confirms the relevance of accounting for time evolution. Tech-
nically, even though the polynomial specification doesn’t fully match the curves resulting
from the best fitting polynomial trend of the corresponding dummies’ series, it provides
46In the estimation, we adopted robust standard errors instead of clustering at any dimension. Abadie
et al. (2017) advocate the absence of clustering in the presence of a fixed effect specification when there
is homogeneous treatment effects within the cluster formed at the level of the fixed effect. We assume
such homogeneity by design as the workplace heterogeneity arises solely from the heterogeneity in worker’s
characteristics and not from the valuation of their characteristics. Moreover, the use of average real hourly
wage, i.e. w(K,β), approximates our setting to the fixed effect setting.
The time variation of bargaining powers will be modelled in two alternative specifications. Firstly, we
will consider
βj,t = D′β̃, (III.36)
where D is a [(J × T ) × 1] vector of year-task market dummies, and β̃ is the corresponding vector of
parameters. Alternatively, we will assume sufficient smoothness of the time series of bargaining powers,
and consequently fit a polynomial approximation as:
βj,t ≈ b0 + b1,j × t+ b2,j × t2 + b3,j × t3. (III.37)
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a close approximation, and thus consists in a reliable modelling option particularly in the
presence of smaller samples. Moreover, both sets of estimates are consistent with the re-
sults from table 2, and consequently confirm higher bargaining power levels for managers,
and very identical levels for skilled and unskilled workers. While some studies present
an higher bargaining power at the bottom of the wage table (for example Dumont et al.
(2012)), others present either broad monotonicity between wage tables and bargaining
powers, or even very identical, U-shaped, or mixed results depending on the sector of
activity under analysis (see Cahuc et al. (2006), Mortensen et al. (2010) or even Bagger
et al. (2014)).
On the time dimension, figure 6 records a downward trend in the bargaining powers
unfolding in-tandem for skilled workers and managers, broadly up to the Great Recession,
while for the unskilled workers we record a broad stability. These findings are consistent
with the estimates of Hirsch and Schnabel (2011) for the entire German economy in the
2002-2009 period, where the authors resorting to a right-to-manage model record a one-
third decline, which compares with 19 percent fall for managers, 20 percent for skilled
workers and rough stability for the unskilled workers, as displayed in table 3. For the
preceding period, i.e. 1995-2000, the cited authors find a stable environment whereas
we record a decreasing trend in every task market. Moreover, our findings also broadly
concurs with the evolution of the synthetic indicator of collective bargaining of Lombardi
et al. (2020) in figure 2.
Table III.3: Average Predicted Change in Bargaining Powers Implied by Best Fitting
3rd Order Polynomial Trend to the Dummy Series
Period Dates Ratio βfinal/βinitial − 1
Managers Skilled workers Unskilled workers
The Boom 1995-2000 -4.44% -12.96% -11.95%
The Slump 2000-2008 -17.98% -20.58% 0.39%
Financial Crisis 2008-2011 -7.69% -6.23% 5.77%
Euro Crisis 2011-2014 -3.43% -0.89% 8.00%
Timid Recovery 2014-2016 1.78% 3.54% 6.04%
Overall 1995-2016 -28.89% -33.48% 7.08%
β1995 40.30% 21.76% 18.99%
β2016 28.66% 14.48% 20.34%
Notes: The 3rd order polynomial best fitting curve to the dummy series of bargaining
powers is used to avoid the over-influence of any transitory fluctuation. The used periods
are collected from Blanchard and Portugal (2017) which outlines a detailed macroeconomic
analysis of the Portuguese Economy. Sources: Quadros de Pessoal and Relatório Único,
1995-2016.
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At the outbreak of the Great Recession, we estimate that bargaining powers were around
historical minimums. As presented in both table 3 and figure 6, the path of bargaining
powers was thereafter markedly idiosyncratic to each task market. For managers and
skilled workers, throughout the crisis we record a consistent fall in bargaining powers, but
at a less than halved pace relatively to the previous period. For the unskilled workers
the bargaining drainage is halted, and we witnessed a substantial re-surge, which visibly
commenced in the 2007-2010 period, coinciding with the most sizable surge in the minimum
wage for the entire time-frame of the study, of around 18 percent.47 In the post recession
period, namely marked by the end of the adjustment program in July 2014, every task
market observed an increase in the bargaining powers which was more pronounced the
lower the position of the task markets at the wage tables. By the finale of our analysis,
while for bottom of the distribution the bargaining drainage in the earlier period was fully
recovered, for the managers and skilled workers the bargaining bygones are estimated of
around 30 percent. Such abatement is a consequence of a long-lasting trend which has
unfolded with notable stability.
The erosion of bargaining powers, for managers and skilled workers, particularly if ampli-
fied by a significant progressive income taxation, may spark a plethora of effects. Namely,
the reduction in the wage differentials across skill groups and the increasing decoupling of
the worker’s wage from the firm productivity levels may degrade the incentives for skill
acquisition and on job training, and the alignment of worker and firm incentives may be
reduced.
Regarding the remainder of the model, figure 7 displays the total effect of education,
tenure, age and female proportions at the rank on the profile of real productivity of the
match per hour, as well as some of its distributional features on those dimensions. As a
general remark, the estimated behaviour of the productivity is consistent with the broad
literature on wage determination, and as well with Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002), where
the contribution of the individual characteristics become more relevant for higher skill
level task markets.
In broad brushstrokes, education has little effect on the unskilled workers, while it increases
exponentially the productivity of the remainder workforce, confirming in our model its role
as primary choice-based productivity enhancer when the job can benefit from the proceeds
of schoolwork. Also, it conforms with the idea of potential over-education when the worker
doesn’t land on a suitable rank position given her education (see Hartog (2000) for further
47The evolution of the monthly minimum wage is presented in figure 11.
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Figure III.7: The Operating Cost Estimates
Panel A: Estimated total effect on real productivity per hour.
Panel B: Distributional features of the real productivity per hour.
Notes: On panel A, the fading grey shades corresponds to the 95th−5th confidence interval.
On panel B, the fading shades corresponds to the 75th−25th percentile range of the implied
distribution. Sources: Quadros de Pessoal and Relatório Único, 1995-2016.
details on over-education for Portugal).
Differently, the tenure on the firm albeit displaying lower effects when compared with edu-
cation, present a reversed relationship. The lower fragments of the wage tables, primarily
unskilled workers, but also at a lower magnitude skilled ones, benefit the most from the
permanence at the firm, with a stable monotonic relationship, even for very long tenures.
In a different archetype, the productivity gains for managers while increasing more sizably
at early stages of the worker-firm match fade after the first five years, becoming increas-
ingly detrimental for very long tenures. Overall, such profiles could be consistent with
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Acemoglu and Pischke (1999), where increases in minimum wages, more likely to affect
the bottom of the wage tables, induce higher levels of on-job training sponsored by firms.
Regarding the age profiles, the gains for skilled and unskilled workers are increasing with
the wage tables, though ceasing to further accrue earlier in the career the lower the po-
sition of the worker on those wage tables. Relatively to managers, increases in expe-
rience translates in consistent real productivity gains at a latter stage in their careers,
broadly after around the 40 years of age, which however coincides with the most sizable
mass of existing managers.48 Before the cited threshold, the younger the manager the
higher his real productivity, ceteris paribus. Tentatively, their appointment encloses rel-
evant traits that make them particularly productive, as it is likely to be linked with an
entrepreneurial/family-owned business perspective - the ideal, and perhaps unique green-
way to land on a managerial position so early in their careers (see Blanchflower and Oswald
(2007) for an analysis on the traits of young entrepreneurs).
5.3 Elasticity of Wages to Exogenous Changes in the idiosyncratic Quasi-
Rents
One of the most pursued measures when studying wage setting mechanisms consists in the
elasticity of wages to exogenous changes in the idiosyncratic quasi-rents of the worker-firm
match, or in general the response of wages to exogenous productivity shocks.49 As noted
by Card et al. (2018), such measures provide a succinct description of the link between
productivity heterogeneity and wage inequality and it constitutes a cornerstone indicator
in the rent-sharing literature. Beyond its own merits, the estimation of this elasticity,
implied by the results of our model, contributes for the external validity of our results
given the proliferation of studies with different empirical techniques, inclusively resorting
to the Portuguese labour market.
In detail, the average elasticity of wages to exogenous changes in the quasi-rents is given
48In the period of analysis, 90 percent of the managers are older than 28 years, and 75 percent are older
than 33.
49See Garin and Silvério (2019) for a compatible theory review of the difference in changes in quasi-rents
which are: (a) idiosyncratic to the match; and (b) general to the relevant portions of the labour market.
The major difference is due to the presence of feedback effects on the outside options. We analyze option












Moreover, we implement the insight of Card et al. (2014) and compute the quasi-rents
estimate as:
Eft[QRj(K,β)] = V ABft(K,β)− 0.1K −Out(a), (III.40)
where V ABft(K,β) is the value added per hour, K corresponds to the level of assets
presented in the balance sheet of each firm, and 10% the considered costs of capital, as in
Card et al. (2014). Given equations (39) and (40), we resort to a two-step GMM, with the
logarithm of sales at firm level as instrument (i.e. ln[F (K,β)]), to estimate the average of
the referred elasticity of the economy per year.
Table 4 presents our average result, 0.062, and a sample of comparable studies about the
Portuguese labour market, which highlights the consistency of our findings with a signif-
icant branch in the literature that locates this elasticity estimates in the range between
0.05-0.15.51 Regarding the time evolution, as presented in figure 8, the average elasticity is
generally within the 0.05-0.15 bounds, and present a downward trend as in the bargaining
powers, with a particular fall during the Euro Crisis.
Table III.4: Estimates of the Elasticity of Wages to Exogenous Changes in the Idiosyn-
cratic Quasi-Rents for Portugal
Study Dates Elasticity (s.e.)
Our study 2005-2016 0.062 (0.0090)
Card et al. (2018) 2005-2009 0.056 (0.016)
Card et al. (2016) 2002-2009 Males - 0.14-0.16
Females - 0.04-0.05
Cardoso and Portela (2009) 1991-2000 0.00 (transitory shock)
0.09 (permanent shock)
Martins (2009) 1993-1995 0.03-0.05
Garin and Silvério (2019) 2005-2013 0.15 (0.066)
Sources: Quadros de Pessoal and Relatório Único, 1995-2016; SCIE 2005-2016; and the
referred articles.
50The structure of wages relates with the quasi-rents implied by our model as:
wj(a|K,β) = Out(a) + βj,tQRt(K,β). (III.38)
51See Card et al. (2018) for a more extended review of the literature covering 22 different studies
including for several European countries and the U.S.
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Figure III.8: Estimated Average Elasticity of Wages to an Exogenous Change in the
Quasi-Rents
Notes: The fading shades correspond to the 95th − 5th confidence interval range, using
clustered standard errors at collective bargaining level. The implied elasticity of quasi-
rents corresponds to the raw measure of equations (39) and (40). Sources: Quadros de
Pessoal and Relatório Único, 1995-2016.
5.4 Passthrough Rate of Bargained Wages
In the analysis of the wage setting in the continental European labour markets, the
passthrough rate of wage floors constitutes a particularly relevant market measure. It
displays how the settlement of bargained wages translates to total wages, thus broadly
displaying the influence of collective bargaining wage setting on the total wages. In our
setting, the average passthrough per year and task market, i.e. the average elasticity of
the total wage to the wage floor, is given by:







Our results are obtained through a standard two-step GMM with clustered standard errors
at collective bargaining level. Those support a classical continental European wage setting
feature, where the raise of bargained wages correspond to a shrinkage of the wage cushion,
due to an imperfect passthrough. We estimate the average passthrough at 44.8 percent,
implying that a 10 percent increase of bargained wages translates into a 4.5 percent increase
on total wages. Our findings concur with Card and Cardoso (2021) which estimates an
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average passthrough of about 50 percent.
Moreover, our finding displays the relevance of collective bargaining, as changes in wage
floors are associated to meaningful changes in total wages. According to our results in
figure 9, the link between wage floors and total wages is ordered, with the lowest task mar-
kets displaying the strongest link, in a relationship which is significantly stable overtime.
This finding is also consistent with Card and Cardoso (2021) which presents evidence of
an ordered passthrough rates with skill groups.
Figure III.9: Estimated Average Passthrough
Notes: The fading shades correspond to the 95th − 5th confidence interval range, using
clustered standard errors at collective bargaining level. Sources: Quadros de Pessoal and
Relatório Único, 1995-2016.
5.5 An Analysis of Heterogeneity
A classical heuristic method to assess wage differentials and the contribution of its con-
stituents to mounting inequalities is a covariance decomposition assessment. This section
assesses the contribution of each of the components of our primal wage setting equation,
accounting for the adopted formulation of the operating costs. Consequently, we have:
ln[wj(at|Kt, βt)× hoursit] = ln[hoursit] + ln
[











Real productivity per hour of the match
− βj,tXi,tζj︸ ︷︷ ︸
Obs. operating costs comp.
+βj,t[E[E(ξ(i, t)|rank(i, t))|j, t]]− βj,tξ(i, t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Unobservable operating costs comp.
















Γ(n) = 1 (III.43)
with Γi,f,j,t(n) representing each of the components of equation (42). Inspired on the
same structural view of decomposing the components an equivalent mean decomposition
is performed. While we could perform an yearly decomposition, we present the results for
the average decomposition given we find a broad stability of the contributes and of the
overall wage inequality over the period of analysis.52 Differently, Card et al. (2014) and
Song et al. (2019) link the evolution of heterogeneity with perceived growing inequality
in the US and Germany, which in their case is noticeable.
Our average covariance and mean decomposition results are presented in table 5. Our
first finding corresponds to the peripheral role of the hours worked in wage dispersion, as
it even reduces the magnitude of the heterogeneity of monthly wages vis-á-vis the hourly
counterpart, implying a negative correlation between hourly wages and hours worked.
Within the hourly wages, the major drivers of wage differentials resides at workplace level,
which explains around 63 percent of the overall heterogeneity in monthly wages, while
the components attributed to the worker, namely the level of the outside options and
operating cost components, contribute around 22 percent.
Within the later dimension, it is noteworthy the different weight of the outside option in
the covariance and mean decompositions of table 5. While the outside option component
only weights around 7 percent of the variability of wages, it represents around 41 percent
of the average wage paid in the economy. This finding highlights the property of the
outside option, and the role of labour market institutions, in compressing wages relatively
to the implied distribution of the real productivity of the match.
Holistically, table 5 indicates the workplace level productivity as the core engine of wage
dispersion, and consequently for the prevalence of heterogeneous labour market histories of
otherwise identical workers, as measured by the level of their outside options and operating
costs. In an experimental approach, this analysis signals that two unemployed workers
with identical ex-ante valuations for their work may end up with significantly different
wages based on the way they (re-)enter the labour market. This finding stresses the
importance of studying the mechanisms, and their underlying efficiency, by which workers
pair with a given level of occupation, and subsequently a given firm. It gives credit to the
52See figure 11 for the evolution of the percentiles of the wage distribution.
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literature branch that verses on the imperfectly competitive nature of the labour market,
either from a more monopsony perspective as in Manning (2011) and Card et al. (2018),
or a bargaining in a frictional labour market as we adopted.
Table III.5: Average Covariance and Mean Decompositions of Monthly Wages, over the
Period 1995-2016
Panel A: Average Variance Decomposition of Monthly Wages
Dimension Detailed Components Contributions
Extensive Margin Hours worked -2.66%
Worker
Outside Option 6.92%
21.84%Observed Operating Costs 4.95%
Unobserved Operating Costs 9.97%
Workplace Workplace Real Productivity 62.61%
Residual 18.21%
Panel B: Average Mean Decomposition of Monthly Wages
Dimension Detailed Components Contributions
Worker
Outside Option 40.67%
29.5%Observed Operating Costs -3.71%
Unobserved Operating Costs -7.46%
Workplace Workplace Real Productivity 71.29%
Residual -0.8%
Sources: Quadros de Pessoal and Relatório Único, 1995-2016.
In general, the literature has seen a sizable proliferation of variance decompositions of
wages, particularly since the advent of fixed effects spurred in the Abowd et al. (1999)
model (i.e. AKM). Typically, those, as in Card et al. (2014) for Germany, Torres et al.
(2018) for Portugal, and Song et al. (2019) for the US, attributes a leading role of the
worker dimension, which can be perceived at odds with our findings. However that might
not be the case. Firstly, note that we perform covariance decompositions and not variance-
covariance decompositions.53 Secondly, our central results from table 5 are not based
on firm dimension, but workplace dimension which is substantially different and more
atomistic, as it combines firm and task market. Thirdly, the studies resorting to ranking
algorithms or new estimator designs capable of solving the limited mobility bias issue
present mixed results. Borovicková and Shimer (2017) for Austria indicates that wage
heterogeneity is attributable more to the firm side than the worker side, while Bonhomme
et al. (2019) for Sweden, Bonhomme et al. (2020) for U.S. and several European countries,
and Kline et al. (2019) for Italy point for a leading role of the worker dimension with a
much marginal role for firms relatively to the AKM designs. Finally, in a more structural
53The results could be comparable by considering our covariances correspond to the relevant variance
plus half of the covariance term where the relevant term is displayed.
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and rent-sharing perspective, Mortensen et al. (2010) for Denmark conforms with our
findings by attributing a leading role to the rent-sharing component of wages vis-á-vis the
labour heterogeneity. As noted by both Borovicková and Shimer (2017) and Bonhomme
et al. (2020), the different specifications for modelling earnings and the processes of worker
and firm heterogeneity can be a leading cause for the disparity of results.
Amidst this debate, we partial out the main components of table 5 decomposition into
worker, task market, firm and time dimensions. This procedure approaches our decom-
position to an AKM setting, given the intuition of equations 2 and 3 of section 2. Then,
using the same dataset, we resort to a typical covariance decomposition of 3 different AKM
based strategies, which correspond to: (a) a firm-worker-year fixed effect formulation, in
the spirit of Card et al. (2014) and Song et al. (2019); (b) a firm, worker, year and task
market decomposition in the spirit of Torres et al. (2018); and (c) a workplace-worker de-
composition, where in the workplace fixed effect, measured as firm-task-market-year cells,
those three dimensions and their complementarities are captured.
In this exercise, we could perform bias correction for the covariances estimated in the AKM,
following recent trends in the literature. However, we take the approach of Song et al.
(2019), which abstains from going in this direction by noticing: (a) the computational cost
of the solution of Kline et al. (2019); and (b) the additional assumption framework required
in Andrews et al. (2012) and Borovicková and Shimer (2017). If anything the bias is likely
to affect equally the AKM decompositions and our AKM detailed decomposition, thus
establishing a comparable ground between our model and the most canonical empirical
approach. Noteworthy, our aggregate decomposition in table 5 does not suffer from limited
mobility bias, given it is based on a very small set of parameters.
The findings reported in table 6, particularly the comparison of the workplace-worker
AKM and our methodology presents a bridge between both approaches, as the workplace
dimension weights roughly around 60 percent of the entire variability of real hourly wages
in both methodologies. The differences between both lie on the worker and residual
components, with the latter sizably reduced in the AKM approach, and as a consequence
the formed fully absorbing the proceeds of the higher fit of the model. As one moves
towards more time invariant formulations of the firm side, and account for a partition of
the labour market into types of tasks, the worker fixed effect is largely capable to absorb
the leftovers of the variation which was previously enclosed in the workplace definition,
with the types of tasks acquiring a peripheral role.
Altogether, beyond modelling differences in earnings and in the processes of worker and
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Table III.6: Comparison of Covariance Decomposition between AKM and our Method-











10.60% 34.37% 38.06% 41.42%
Task market FE 6.06% - - -
Generic time FE 2.49% - - -







Task market FE 9.35% - -
Generic time FE 2.68% - -
Within residual 11.37% - -
Year effects FE - - - 6.91% 7.68%
Task market FE - - - 7.93% -
Residual 17.74% 17.74% 7.47% 11.46% 11.88%
Notes: The detailed decomposition consists in resorting to AKM models to de-
compose the worker and workplace components, namely: (1 − βj,t)Out∗(at) −





∂Nj(Kt,βj,t) dz − βj,tE[E(ξ(i, t)|rank(i, t))|j, t] = αi + γf + δj + χt + εt,
respectively. Sources: Quadros de Pessoal and Relatório Único, 1995-2016.
firm heterogeneity, this analysis raises the question of the boundaries of the worker effect
realm in such estimations as to precisely which components of wages are encompassed
in such set of parameters. Further, it also reinforces the importance to further assess to
what extend such worker’s dimension primary role could be a data based idiosyncrasy,
a mechanical consequence of the relative dimensionality of the worker’s parameter set
versus the firm, the consequence of any statistical shrinkage of such dimensionality to
conform workers and firms into classes, and/or the biases generated from the proper mo-
bility patterns of the workers - known to particularly affect AKM designs. In this context,
our approach provides a novel decomposition which links each covariance decomposition
component to the structural component of the equilibrium wage equation. While, a com-
parative scrutiny of the referred empirical methods would be interesting, it is beyond the
scope of this chapter.
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5.6 Assortative Matching
In another but related domain, the literature has embodied the proliferation of studies
with measures of assortative matching, canonically defined as the correlation between the
worker and firm components of wages. This empirical turf signalled a plausible defect of
the fixed effect designs based on Abowd et al. (1999), as it consistently estimated unreal-
istically small or even negative correlations. These unheralded results soon crystallized as
one of the most ad rem puzzles of the referred approach. In our setting, a measure of this




























where intuitively the worker component is given by his outside option value, while the
firm component is composed by the average real productivity in the firm.
The empirical estimates are translated in figure 10, where we resort to both the Pearson
and Spearman correlations to estimate equation (44). Our findings locate the Pearson
correlation in the range 0.38-0.48, with an average over the period of 44.14%, which is
broadly consistent with the Spearman rank correlation, despite its moderate decline in
the latter years of the sample. In detail, our time evolution do not present the upward
trend of Card et al. (2014), which the authors link with the increase of the wage inequality
in Germany; it does not record the significant fall as in Torres et al. (2018); and it conforms
with a broad stability as observed in Lentz et al. (2018) for Denmark.
Regarding the level, which has been the hotspot of scrutiny for the AKM approach, our
findings are consistent with the most recent developments on this specific literature, which
are resumed in table 7. Noteworthy, our approach seems not to suffer from the downward
bias that limited mobility allegedly causes to AKM, and conforms with the findings of
Bonhomme et al. (2019) for Sweden, Borovicková and Shimer (2017) for Austria, and are
somewhat higher than Kline et al. (2019) for Veneto, Bonhomme et al. (2020) for a range
of European countries and the US, and Lentz et al. (2018) for Denmark.
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Figure III.10: Measure of Assortative Measure
Sources: Quadros de Pessoal and Relatório Único, 1995-2016.
Table III.7: Breviary on Recent Results on Assortative Matching
Study Dates Country Method Estimate
Our study 1995-2016 PT Our methodology 0.4414AKM 0.1797
Torres et al. (2018) 1986-2013 PT Firm Measures 0.308AKM 0.08
Card et al. (2016) 2002-2009 PT AKM 0.152-0.162
Kline et al. (2019) 1984-2001 IT (Veneto) Leave-out 0.283
Borovicková and Shimer (2017) 1972-2007 AUS Non-parametric Withinmeasure 0.4-0.6
Hagedorn et al. (2017) 1993-2007 GER Ranking Algorithm 0.75AKM 0.055
Card et al. (2013) 1985-2009 GER AKM 0.034-0.249
Andrews et al. (2012) 1998-2007 GER Turnover correction 0.2-0.3
Andrews et al. (2008) 1993-1997 GER High turnover 0.224plants
Bonhomme et al. (2019) 1997-2008 SWE Bonhomme et al. (2017) 0.4913 (static)0.419 (dynamic)
Lentz et al. (2018) 1985-2013 DEN Bonhomme et al. (2017) 0.28
Lachowska et al. (2020) 2002-2014 Washington AKM -0.03-0.1Leave-out 0.1-0.2
Abowd et al. (2019) 1999-2003 US AKM 0.1Structural 0.0
Woodcock (2015) 1990-1999 US Match effects -0.1
Bonhomme et al. (2020) 1996-2015 US, IT, AUS, Woodcock (2015) 0.24-0.34NOR, SWE Bonhomme et al. (2019)
Lopes de Melo (2008) 1972-2007 BRA Co-workers 0.3AKM -0.08
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6 The Resilience of the Wage Setting Mechanisms: Like a
Bridge over Troubled Water
One of the advantages of studying Portugal in the last years resides precisely in the severe
magnitude of the Great Recession shock witnessed by this continental European labour
market. Moreover, the mishaps of the economic performance of the country, which records
the last period of sizable growth ending by 2001, being followed by a long slump, two
geminated crisis, and a modest recovery from 2014 onwards, presents an economy and a
labour market in a severe frail standing (see figure 11 and Blanchard (2007) and Blanchard
and Portugal (2017) for two analysis of the Portuguese economy over the timeline of our
study). Altogether, it presents the framework of assessing a Southern European and
French based labour market in distress.
Within these troubled times, the two crisis, most notably the European debt crisis, de-
cisively stroke the Portuguese economy, sparking the need for a significant loan from the
European Institutions and IMF to avoid an immediate sudden stop by 2011, backed by
significant economic conditionality under a Financial Assistance Program. On the labour
market side, while the collective bargaining apparatus kept its kinetics in the the wake of
the financial crisis shock, potentially even witnessing a more wage prone policy, it came
to a complete stall during the European debt crisis.54
Despite the regulatory stall, the labour market entropy was by 2013 evident, with the
unemployment rate skyrocketing for record highs, in a phenomena coined by Carneiro
et al. (2014) as a catastrophic job destruction. As noted in figure 12 and confirmed by
Carneiro et al. (2014), the dramatic surge in unemployment was largely fuelled by very
low job creation dynamics, and a stunning and unique surge of bankruptcies and firms
exiting the market.
Simultaneously, as noted in figure 11, the wages endured the shock with some signs of
downward nominal wage rigidity, evidenced by a sizable proportion of base wages, around
70 percent in our sample for 2013, frozen, while the distribution of real total wages shifted
rightwards, in a more sizable drift in the higher percentiles of the distribution, thus evi-
dencing a downward real adjustment capable of preserving, or even shrinking the pre-crisis
wage inequality level.
By the end of the adjustment program in 2014, and at the outbreak of the recovery path,
54As presented in figure 11, the financial crisis coincided with the most sizable surge on the minimum
wage in our timeframe, as a policy intended to boost internal demand in the wake of the financial crisis.
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Figure III.11: The Labour Market Dynamics
Panel A: The the real GDP growth and the unemployment rate.
Panel B: The evolution of the wage distribution in the labour market.
Notes: In the graph the two vertical black dashed lines delimit the period of Financial
Assistance Program with the ECB, the IMF and the European Commission, namely be-
tween 7th April 2011 and 30 June 2014. Sources: Quadros de Pessoal and Relatório Único,
1995-2016; Pordata website.
the capability of the labour market to follow the recovery dynamics of the economy, and
the timespan required for it to recoup pre-crisis levels, both on wages and unemployment
was the quintessential question. Alongside, the labour attachment of the newly created
employment, the potential regime shifts on the wage setting mechanisms, and the con-
ceivable alterations on the mechanisms of labour market matching, capable of shifting the
quality of newly created matches were pertaining queries.
Regarding the core question, figure 11 briefly provide the answer. In the first two years
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Figure III.12: The Evolution of the Job Flows in the Labour Market
Sources: Quadros de Pessoal and Relatório Único, 1995-2016.
of recovery, the labour market exhibited a strong and steady recovery path, affirming its
capability to absorb large chunks of unemployment in a relatively short period of time,
while keeping moderate real wage evolution, particularly at the top of the distribution.
Precisely, regarding the wage dynamics, this chapter provides answers for the latter two
questions, pertaining the wage setting mechanisms and the assortativeness of the economy.
Throughout the entire timeframe of analysis, and particularly during the European debt
crisis, the resilience of the wage setting mechanisms and of the matching quality in the
labour market is remarkable. For those incumbent workers that were spared from unem-
ployment, a freeze of base wages, coupled with at most a 10 percent fall in real wages
was momentarily imposed, but the underlying collective bargaining mechanisms of wage
setting were not destroyed, thus hastening the wage recovery once the crisis fade out.
Beyond significant doubts, those workers that were capable to sail out the crisis while
employed faced a solid bridge over troubled waters, particularly at the bottom of the wage
distribution. Their real wage losses broadly represented the depreciation of their real out-
side option value and the real value of quasi-rents. For those that faced the prospects of
unemployment or tried to enter the tormented market, they encountered dire prospects
of employability during the crisis, but witnessed a swift strong recovery, that in large
proportions absorbed them into employment. In toto, the assortativeness of the market,




The analysis of the wage setting mechanisms in a typical Southern European and French
based labour market is the focal point of this chapter. For this purpose, we develop an
empirically implementable microeconomic search and matching model with a collective
bargaining apparatus, and we implement it in the Portuguese labour market using data
from 1995 until 2016.
The proposed model has the convenience of discipline the use of data about the char-
acteristics of the placement of the worker-firm match on the collective bargaining wage
tables - the most perennial and comparable characterization of the labour relationships.
Consequently, our empirical identification do not rely on the mobility of workers across
firms, or on the definition and estimation of a production function or marginal product.
Despite such flexibility, the framework provided allows for the estimation of bargaining
powers, elasticities of quasi-rents, the passthrough rate of bargained wages, assortative
matching and variance decomposition of wages in a fully unified framework.
The macroeconomic context of our analysis has been particularly turbulent, which under-
scores the displayed resilience of the wage setting mechanism, particularly at the bottom of
the wage distributions, as a noteworthy feature of the market. For those that were capable
to remain employed throughout the rough waters, the wage setting laid out a sound bridge,
where the potential impact of the macroeconomic outlooks was circumscribed to tempo-
rary and moderate wage losses, particularly at the top of the wage distribution. Those
reflected the temporary decline in the valuation of the real quasi-rents of the worker-firm
match and of the worker’s real outside options.
Finally, the structural slow paced continuous erosion of bargaining powers, for managers
and skilled workers, highlights potential future productivity hazards, particularly if am-
plified by a significant progressive income taxation. In the absence of wage differentials
across skill groups, and the increasing decoupling of wages from firm productivity levels,
the sorting in the economy may be degraded, the incentives for skill acquisition and on job
training may be abated, and the alignment of worker and firm incentives may be reduced.
Any of these endanger future productivity levels.
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Chapter IV
The Last Dance? Credit Cycles and Labour
Market Adjustments throughout Downturns
Hugo de Almeida Vilares, London School of Economics and Centre for
Economic Performance
Abstract
The Great Recession in Continental Europe sparked a Great Unemployment Divergence,
led by job destruction in some countries. I resort to a Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari incomplete-
markets model with an indirect search frictional labour market, financial constraints,
labour market dualism, and downward nominal wage rigidity. I show that a catastrophic
job destruction phenomena can take place in the presence of significant aggregate negative
productivity shock, leading to a costly process of destruction of inter-temporally viable
jobs - a last dance episode. For such outcome, the leverage of firms and the management
of liquidity along the downturn are critical. In a calibration to portray the Portuguese
economy, no intervention would imply an elasticity between the initial downturn and the
unemployment rate of close to 1 for downturns of more than 5-6 percent. In such context,
several balanced-budget policies targeting the liquidity in permanent contracts prove to
be capable to alleviate sizably the job destruction mechanism.
140
1 Introduction
The Great Recession in the European Union was defined by its Great Unemployment
Divergence, particularly between neighbouring countries as France, Portugal and Spain,
or Italy and Germany (see Boeri and Jimeno (2015) for an overview). Despite similar
starting points, and often identical institutional designs (see Botero et al. (2004)), some
sailed through without significant unemployment spikes, while others recorded catastrophic
job destruction spells, defined by a strong spike in job destruction that led to a significant
rise in unemployment, as presented by Carneiro et al. (2014). What could justify such
divergent paths?
A standard agency problem between borrowers and lenders imply the existence of credit
constraints, which weaken the liquidity of firms in the presence of a negative MIT type
shock (see Gertler and Gilchrist (2018) for a broad overview). Even from an aggregate
perspective, Holmstrom and Tirole (2011) highlights that the constant need of firms to
manage and forecast liquidity and the limited pledgeability of the entrepreneur, as only part
of his income or wealth can be borrowed upon or used as collateral, provides a conceptual
framework where liquidity provision would be insufficient in the presence of aggregate
liquidity shocks. Empirically, among a plethora of studies in the context of the Great
Recession, Benmelech et al. (2011), Bentolila et al. (2013), Berg (2016) and Chodorow-
Reich (2014) shows a significant quantitative importance of financial constraints in the
employment decisions of firms, and Boeri et al. (2012) reports a clear link between firm
leverage and job destruction. In the latter, more leveraged firms may see their liquidity
being suddenly called back by the lender, thus affecting their ability to run and manage
existing jobs, forcing them to destroy some. In toto, if the external financing channel shuts,
and the shareholders do not inject further equity, firms can only turn to the adjustment
of input utilization, and their prices, to correct liquidity shortages, and alleviate the risk
of failure.
To address the ability of firms to resort to this internal financing channel, one needs to
define the institutional framework of the labour market and the financing of the economy,
as those shape the magnitude and the intensive-extensive margin calibration of labour and
capital adjustments. Regarding the labour market, I define the continental labour market
institution, where there is downward nominal wage rigidity, and following the insights of
Bentolila et al. (2013) and Boeri and Jimeno (2015), contract duality, with permanent
jobs enjoying higher employment protection, expressed by the existence of firing taxes and
higher predicted job tenures. Regarding the financing of the economy, while studying the
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shape of policies devised to alter it, such as monetary policy, is worth pursuing, in this
study I focus on the role of labour market policies. Accordingly, a stable and comparable
environment of external financing provides an orderly benchmark, and thus, I keep the
external financing of firms constant as percentage of assets.
Altogether, I propose a Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari incomplete-markets setting with an in-
direct search frictional labour market type model, in the spirit of Krusell et al. (2010).1
Then, I extend it to display: (a) increasing productivity with wealth, as proposed by
Eeckhout and Sepahsalari (2020);2 (b) financial constraints on the firm side in the spirit
of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997);3 (c) the referred permanent-temporary contract duality;
and (d) the downward nominal wage rigidity, in the spirit of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe
(2016). The heterogeneity of the model, coupled with its realistic wage setting, the con-
sidered labour market institutions, and the analysis of the workers’ savings problem allows
for a just sufficiently rich environment to analyse what conditions spark a catastrophic
burst of employment in the presence of stable financing of the economy, and which are the
most targeted workers.
The first contribution of this chapter is to clearly show that a model of this class is capable
to display catastrophic job destruction spells, for a model reasonably calibrated to match
the Portuguese economy. Indeed, for medium to severe aggregate temporary downturns
in productivity, above 5-6 percent of the stationary equilibrium levels, the unemployment
rate responds on a 1-to-1 basis to the initial productivity shock. This process is led by
job destruction of existing jobs, leading to a reallocation process that is more costly than
ensuring the continuity of most of the job assignments, in what I coin as a last dance
phenomena, as most of those jobs are inter-temporally viable.4
The second contribution of this chapter is to clearly establish a comparison between the
downward nominal wage rigidity environment and a benchmark wage flexibility environ-
ment, while preserving the other characteristics of the model. This provides a useful
comparison, where one can decouple the job creation weakening in the outcome of the
productivity downturn, and the job destruction mechanism. From this comparison, this
1See de Almeida Vilares and Reis (2021) for an empirical analysis of the suitability of a search and
matching structure of the wage setting for Portugal.
2See Bernstein et al. (2021) for an empirical analysis of the effect of negative wealth shocks on the
productivity of U.S. innovative workers. It confirms the wealth-productivity relationship proposed.
3Holmstrom and Tirole (2011) focuses in the ability of the private sector to generate enough liquidity
to fund aggregate liquidity needs to implement a second best production plan. Here we follow Kiyotaki
and Moore (1997) in defining financial constraints at firm level.
4The Last Dance corresponds to a documentary describing the decision of the Chicago Bulls to disman-
tle its current winning team and undergo into a deep restructure. It may find parallel in the phenomena
to dissolve inter-temporally viable firms due to instantaneous leverage concerns.
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chapter shows that the job destruction mechanism becomes particularly acute for medium
to severe downturns and coincides with the sizable spike in unemployment rate levels the
model prescribes. Consequently, it highlights the initial levels of leverage and its the
management along the adjustment path as decisive in determining the path of the unem-
ployment rate, and potentially in explaining the diverging paths undertaken by apparently
similar labour markets.
The third contribution of the chapter is to explore a set of budget balanced labour mar-
ket policies focused on permanent contracts, and their ability to alleviate the liquidity
constraint, and thus the job destruction phenomena. Concretely, I consider: (a) a cash
transfer to firms balanced with the saved unemployment benefits’ proceeds; (b) a mandated
reduction of wages; (c) a cash transfer to firms balanced with firms’ future payments; and
(d) temporary wage flexibility. Implemented for a year, with a quarter of implementation
lag, I found that those policies can alleviate job destruction in the presence of aggregate
productivity shocks, thus reducing the unemployment peak in the trough. Moreover, those
improve worker’s welfare along the worker’s wealth distribution and preserve higher levels
of capital stocks, while prescribing substantially different wage profiles along the adjust-
ment paths. Consequently, the chapter puts forward a wide set of policies that could be
adopted in the presence of substantial aggregate downturns.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an analysis of the Continental Eu-
ropean Labour market framework and some stylized facts on the divergent paths among
the economies sharing such taxonomy. Section 3 takes a closer look on the stylized facts
of the Portuguese labour market adjustment. Section 4 presents the model. Section 5
explains the calibration method and the most relevant stationary equilibrium results. Sec-
tion 6 presents the transitional dynamics of the model following a aggregate productivity
downturn. Section 7 relaxes the wage rigidity component and compares the transitional
dynamics with the benchmark economy. Section 8 prescribes several labour market poli-
cies towards permanent contracts and their ability to alleviate job destruction. Section 9
concludes.
2 Continental European Labour Market Institutions and
the Great Recession
The cross country differences in labour market institutions have been at the core of the
discussion of economic performance for decades. Traditionally, the Continental European
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countries have significant higher levels of labour market regulations and more generous
labour policies than the U.S. or the United Kingdom, ranging from higher levels of em-
ployment protection and more centralization of collective bargaining to more generous
unemployment benefit systems and a more frequent use of active labour market policies.
Even within Continental Europe, there is a high institutional heterogeneity. Boeri (2011)
singles out the Scandinavian, the Continental and the Mediterranean clusters as the sen-
sible partition. The first is characterized by a strong emphasis on fiscal policy rather than
employment protection, thus resorting to a generous unemployment benefit system, sub-
stantial use of active labour market policies and significant tax wedges instead of preventing
unemployment spells. The continental cluster, formed by France, Germany, Austria and
Belgium, presents a more balanced use of both types of instruments, resorting jointly to
high levels of employment protection and a substantial system of unemployment benefits
and active labour market policies. Finally, the Mediterranean concept of Portugal, Spain,
Italy and Greece relies fundamentally on very substantial employment protection laws and
wage rigidity, while the unemployment insurance is relatively low.
Table IV.1: Labour Market Dualism in European Continental Labour Markets
Countries: Strictness of EPL Strictness of EPL Temporary Wage Premia
Dismissals of Perm. Workers Hiring Temp. Workers employees (%) Perm. Contracts (%)
2007 2015 2007 2015 2007 2015 2010
Portugal 4.42 3.14 2.56 1.81 17.1 18.3 13.8
Spain 2.36 1.96 3.00 2.47 25.2 20.7 10.5
Greece 3.13 2.45 2.75 2.25 7.1 7.8 -
Italy 3.02 2.93 2.00 1.63 9.5 10.6 11.4
France 2.71 2.50 3.13 3.13 10.8 13.3 7.5
Germany 2.60 2.60 1.00 1.13 10.6 10.1 17.3
Austria 2.29 2.29 1.31 1.31 4.5 5.4 10.1
Belgium 1.69 2.07 2.25 2.06 6.8 7.3 8.3
Netherlands 3.30 3.24 0.94 0.94 12.9 14.0 16.5
Finland 2.08 2.08 1.56 1.56 12.7 12.1 9.4
Sweden 2.45 2.45 1.44 0.81 13.5 13.5 9.8
Denmark 1.47 1.53 1.38 1.63 7.4 6.9 3.4
U.S. 0.09 0.09 0.25 0.25 - - -
U.K. 1.51 1.35 0.38 0.38 4.4 4.6 12.1
Notes: On columns (1) and (2), the higher the index indicator the more stringent it is
to dismiss permanent workers or resort to hiring temporary workers respectively. The
wage premia for temporary contracts is the unexplained component of an Oaxaca-Blindler
decomposition using data of 2010 European Structure of Earnings Survey, as estimated by
Silva and Turrini (2015). Sources: OECD for employment protection legislation indexes
(EPL). Eurostat for percentage of temporary workers as percentage of all employees. Silva
and Turrini (2015) for the wage premia of temporary contracts.
Despite different policy mixes, a notable common feature of every Continental European
labour market is duality (see Boeri and van Ours (2013) and Boeri (2011) for recent
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overviews on the topic). In every geography coexists permanent and temporary contracts,
where the former are highly protected from dismissal, have a clearly defined career path,
and enjoy a sizable wage premium. The latter have hardly any protection, and are designed
to fill temporary necessities of firms. Table 1 presents a snapshot of duality indicators,
before and after the Great Recession. Beyond its across board prevalence, duality seems
more intense among the Southern European economies, where employment protection of
permanent contracts is particularly stringent, the use of temporary contracts is frequent
and the wage premia is sizable.
Figure IV.1: Real GDP Growth and Unemployment across Continental Europe
Notes: Every country, excluding Luxembourg, that adopted the Euro before 2005 are
included. Sources: Eurostat.
The institutional framework of the market is particularly scrutinized during downturns.
Among those, the Great Recession triggered by the financial turmoil in 2007-2008 sparked
a severe recession across the board. As showed in figure 1, the initial shock was broadly
symmetric, while the aftermath was influenced by an asymmetric sovereign debt crisis,
which particularly affected the Southern European countries. Altogether, one of the most
distinctive features of the Great Recession in Continental Europe was its unbearable un-
employment divergence which cannot be explained by the size or the specific nature of the
shock, or even by region-sector idiosyncrasies, as noted by Boeri and Jimeno (2015). Ben-
tolila et al. (2012)) in a comparison between the Spanish and the French labour market
highlights the role of labour market duality in mounting two remarkably different unem-
ployment realities across a single border, reinforcing the evidence of Boeri and Garibaldi
(2007), Costain et al. (2010) and Sala et al. (2012) that dual labour markets are more
prone to employment volatility.
In a complementary view, the pre-existing cross country financial asymmetries both on
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the financial standing of firms and on the financial system resilience also played significant
roles. Resorting to the U.S., Duygan-Bump et al. (2015) established the link between
higher financing needs and unemployment particularly for small firms. For Italy, Barone
et al. (2016) negatively links outstanding loans and credit supply and find a significant
effect of a credit crunch on productivity and employment, particularly for small firms and
in areas dependent of external financing. Bentolila et al. (2013) refers to the Spanish credit
crunch and confirm the existence of significant job losses on firms that were particularly
linked to frailer banks. Identical findings are found in Chodorow-Reich (2014) for the
US. For Portugal, Blattner et al. (2017) extends this evidence by presenting the role of
weaker financial institutions in misallocating resources towards stressed firms, rather than
recognizing further losses.
Figure IV.2: Financing Indicators
Panel A: Debt to financial assets ratio of non financial corporations
Panel B: Annual non financial corporations cost of borrowing for new
business
Sources: OECD and ECB.
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In this context, figure 2 presents key stylized facts on the financial standing of firms in
several Continental European economies. First, there is a high asymmetry in the leverage
of firms at the start of the Great Recession, with southern European economies presenting
significant higher leverage levels, notably Portugal, Italy, Greece or even Spain. Second,
beyond preexisting spreads across countries, some didn’t witness the same sizable reduction
in the cost of borrowing for non financial corporations as the majority of the Eurozone.
Thus, particularly for those countries that witnessed a severe repercussion of the sovereign
debt crisis component of the Great Recession, namely Portugal, Greece or Ireland, the costs
of borrowing didn’t witness a significant and durable reduction, thus allegedly muting the
effect of a potential financing ease along the downturn on the liquidity of firms. Altogether,
for an analysis of the Portuguese case, such stylized facts are compatible with a stable
financing environment as defined in our assumption framework.5
3 Stylized Facts of the Labour Market Adjustment in Por-
tugal throughout the Great Recession
The analysis of this chapter will adopt a calibration that is focused in the Portuguese
case. Beyond the accessibility to administrative datasets to inform the calibration, another
relevant advantage of calibrating the model to Portugal resides in the severe magnitude of
the Great Recession shock to the economy and the labour market (see Blanchard (2007)
and Blanchard and Portugal (2017) for context macroeconomic analysis of the Portuguese
economy). In detail, the Portuguese economy was severely hit by two germane crisis,
namely the 2008 Financial crisis, and the subsequent European debt crisis. By 2013 the
Portuguese economy was in such a frail standing that a significant loan from the European
institutions and IMF, coupled with an economic conditionality program was needed. From
2008 to just before the start of the Financial Assistance Program, the Portuguese economy
recorded a 7 percent fall in real GDP.
From a labour market perspective, as displayed in figure 3, the most notable consequence
was the catastrophic job destruction, as coined by Carneiro et al. (2014), that saw the
unemployment rate jump from around 8 percent in 2008 to 16 percent in 2013, display-
ing an unemployment rate growth that surpassed the real gdp fall in the same period.
In inspecting closely the drivers of such dramatic unemployment surge, the market was
severely affected in its flows. Leading the effects, figure 4 presents the displacement caused
5See Carneiro et al. (2014) for an empirical analysis of the influence of the credit channel in the job
destruction process.
147
Figure IV.3: The Real GDP Growth and the Unemployment Rate in Portugal
Sources: INE.
by the closing of firms, many of which bankrupted over the period, or simply closed due to
striking financial constraints. Simultaneously, the creation of new firms more than halved
in the trough in 2012, confirming a significant adverse conditions on firm survival and cre-
ation. For the staying firms over the period, the job flows are significantly reduced, with
the reduction on job displacement not being enough to overturn the supra-cited adverse
dynamics.
Figure IV.4: The Evolution of Job Flows in Portugal
Sources: Quadros de Pessoal.
Beyond flows, if one assesses the behaviour of wages, the existence of some degree of wage
rigidity is clear, as seen in figure 5. In the acute downturn moments, the base wage freezes
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Figure IV.5: The Evolution of the Wage Distribution in Portugal
Notes: The percentiles of wages consider real wages. The year-on-year wage freeze calcu-
lations consider nominal wages.Sources: Quadros de Pessoal.
significantly spiked to record highs of around 70 percent of the existing labour contracts
in 2012 and 2013, the total wage freezes increased to levels close to 20 percent, and the
number of minimum wage recipients continuously increased.6 If one measures the fall
in real wages, it is around 7.5 percent for median wages, having a monotonic increasing
relationship with the percentile of the 2007 initial wage distribution.
In a general sketch of the Portuguese adjustment from 2008 to 2013, the Great Reces-
sion meant a downturn that reached around 7 percent, leading to a significant burst of
employment, with the unemployment rate doubling to around 16 percent, in a process
significantly led by the reduction of flows in surviving firms, the reduction in the creation
of firms and a significant firm destruction. In the process wages displayed some degree of
wage rigidity, even though real wages sizably adjusted, with a fall of 7,5 percent of median
wages. Consequently, compositional effects played a significant role. A model produced
to describe the adjustment should be capable to mimic these findings.
4 The Model
Population and technology. Time is continuous. There is a continuum of consumers
in the economy, with measure 1, whom have standard time-additive preferences with
discount factor ρ. The consumers do not value leisure and they may be either unemployed
6The difference between total and base wages regards wage supplements, which typically may include
regular bonuses, meals subsidies, overtime compensation, and other fringe benefits.
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or employed. When employed, their contract may be either permanent (P) or temporary
(T).
Production is decentralized. There is a large mass of potential single job firms, which
operate in a perfectly competitive environment. Each firm produces z(a, j, t)F [k(a, j, t)],
with j ∈ {P, T} corresponding to the type of contract. k(a, j, t) is the capital stock used by
the worker and z(a, j, t) represents the productivity level of the match, which is assumed
to depend positively on the level of the worker’s assets - a, and it is heterogeneous by types
of contracts.7 F (·) is increasing and strictly concave. Capital depreciates geometrically at
rate δ. The output is either consumed, invested in further capital or in vacancy creation,
as I will subsequently detail.
The frictional financial market. Workers are at risk of unemployment, which is as-
sumed to be uninsurable. However, workers can save to smooth out the impact of such
adverse shock. For that purpose, workers hold an heterogeneous amount of assets a, which
they lend to a banking institution, and obtain a deposit rate r(t).
The financial system is composed by an investment institution and a banking institution.
The former manages a portfolio composed by the equity of the mass of firms (Q(t)),
whose flow dividends (D(t)) accrue from the difference between the firms’ flow profits
and the costs with labour flows, namely the investment in job creation and the taxes of
firing workers. The latter lends capital to firms, obtaining a lending rate rl(t), so that
rl(t) − δ = r(t). For parsimony purposes, we assume there is no seniority between loans
and capital in case of firm insolvency. Therefore, the arbitrage condition in the allocation




The lending market is frictional. The investment institution may withdraw activity or
declare bankruptcy of specific firms. Aware of such risk, the lender, in an attempt to
insure itself, may establish lending limits or tighten the surveillance of firm’s activity when
the EBITDA flows of each firm, or prospective firms, are sufficiently low. Such enhanced
surveillance affects the firms’ decisions regarding hiring, promotion and/or dismissal of
7Intuitively, we imply that a wealthier worker is inherently more productive. In the context of direct
search models, Eeckhout and Sepahsalari (2020) rationalizes an identical relationship.
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workers, as we will see. The EBITDA is defined by:
ξ(a, j, t) = z(a, j, t)F [k(a, j, t)]− w(a, j, t), j ∈ {T, P}, (IV.2)
where w(a, i, t) corresponds to the wage of a given worker with contract type i, which, as
will be evident in this section, depends on the asset level of the worker.
On top of the resources obtained from the wealth of domestic consumers, the banking
institution may may obtain resources from abroad, under the same conditions as the
domestic resources. Accordingly, ϑ corresponds to the ratio of domestically owned assets
to total assets in the economy, and the stock of assets owned by domestic consumers is
given by:
A = ϑ[eT (t)KT (t) + eP (t)KP (t) +Q(t)], (IV.3)
where: (a) eT (t) and eP (t) are respectively the stock of temporary and permanent contract
employed workers; (b) KT (t) corresponds to the aggregate capital in temporary contracts;
and (c) KP (t) corresponds to the aggregate capital in permanent contracts. The aggregate
capital by type of contract will be defined later. Further, we assume that external funding
is stable, thus ϑ is constant.
The frictional labour market. The labour market is assumed to be frictional. Firms are
required to post vacancies to hire workers, and pay a cost γ per vacancy posted. The flow of
worker-firm meets is determined by a typical constant returns to scale aggregate matching
function, M(u(t), v(t)), where u(t) is the measure of unemployed workers searching for
a job, and v(t) is the measure of open vacancies. Correspondingly, θ(t) = v(t)/u(t)
is the market tightness; θ(t)q[θ(t)] = M(u(t), v(t))/v(t) represents the Poisson rate at
which an unemployed worker meets a firm; q[θ(t)] is the Poisson rate at which a firm
meets a candidate, per vacancy posted; and γv(t) corresponds to the vacancy costs of the
investment institution.
At the hiring moment, any worker is hired on a temporary contract (T). Once the firm
and the worker meet, the probability of a successful completion of the match, h[ξ(a, T, t)],
follows a logistic decreasing function h(·), which is dependant of the EBITDA of the newly
formed match, ξ(a, T, t). While on a temporary contract, the match may be dissolved with
probability σT [ξ(a, T, t)], where σT (·) corresponds to a logistic decreasing function. In the
event of a dissolution it occurs costlessly, i.e. without any firing tax involved (ST = 0).
Simultaneously, the temporary worker can be promoted into a permanent contract (P).
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Such event occurs with probability ϕ[ξ(a, P, t)], where ϕ(·) is an increasing logistic func-
tion, and ξ(a, P, t) corresponds to the EBITDA of the firm after the potential promotion
of the worker. Once on a permanent contract, the match may be dissolved with proba-
bility σP [ξ(a, P, t)], where σP (·) is a decreasing logistic function. However, contrary to a
temporary contract, the dissolution entangles a positive firing tax - SP - paid by the firm.
Notation note. For notation simplicity, in the remainder of this section, consider j =
{P, T} and: (a) z̈ = z(a, j, t); (b) k̈ = k(a, j, t); (c) ξ̈P = ξ(a, P, t), (d) c̈ = c(a, j, t), and
(e) ξ̈T = ξ(a, T, t).
Consumers. Following the insight of Kaplan et al. (2018), beyond the wage, the worker
is also entitled to a percentage of the flow profit of the firm, ψ, in a form of a bonus.8
Consequently:
η(a, j, t) = ψ
[
z̈F [k̈]− rl(t)k̈ − w(a, j, t)
]
, j ∈ {T, P}. (IV.4)
In a recursive form, the employed workers in temporary contracts choose their consumption
by resorting to the following HJB equation and state-constraint boundary condition:
ρW (a, T, t) = max
c
{
u(c̈) + ∂aW (a, T, t)
[
w(a, T, t) + η(a, T, t) + (rl(t)− δ)a− c̈
]
+
+ σT (ξ̈T )
(




W (a, P, t)−W (a, T, t)
)
+ ∂tW (a, T, t)
}
subject to:
∂aW (a, P, t) ≥ u′
(




where: (a) the utility function, u(•), is assumed to be increasing and concave; (b) the
W (a, U, t) corresponds to the value function of the unemployed worker; (c) W (a, T, t)
represents the value function of an employed worker in a temporary contract; (d) W (a, P, t)
corresponds to the value function of a worker in a permanent contract; and (e) a represents
the lowest admissible level of wealth.
Beyond the proper structure of the career, which predicts no possible promotion for perma-
nent workers, the fundamental difference between a temporary contract and a permanent
contract is the existence of the positive firing tax SP in case of a termination of the match
8Intuitively, in this model the term ψ controls the percentage of the firms’ profits that are distributed
as a lump sum to the population, versus the share that is distributed directly to the involved workers.
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of the latter type. Consequently, the recursive problem of permanent workers is given by:
ρW (a, P, t) = max
c
{
u(c̈) + ∂aW (a, P, t)
[
w(a, P, t) + η(a, P, t) + (rl(t)− δ)a− c̈
]
+
+ σP (ξ̈P )
[
W (a, U, t)−W (a, P, t)
]
+ ∂tW (a, P, t)
]}
subject to:
∂aW (a, P, t) ≥ u′
(




Consistently with Krusell et al. (2010), the unemployed workers earn some exogenous
income of level b. Their recursive problem is given by:
ρW (a, U, t) = max
c
{






W (a, T, t)−W (a, U, t)
]
+
+ ∂tW (a, U, t)
]}
subject to:






The first order conditions of the described recursive problems corresponds to the respective




∂aW (a, i, t)
)
,
ȧ(a, i, t) = y(a, i, t) + (rl − δ)a− c̈, where y(a, i, t) =

w(a, P, t) + η(a, P, t) if i = P
w(a, T, t) + η(a, T, t) if i = T
b if i = U
.
(IV.8)
The savings policy functions are then considered in Kolmogorov forward equations defined
as:
∂tg(a, P, t) =− ∂a[ȧ(a, P, t)g(a, P, t)] + ϕ(ξ̈P )g(a, T, t)− σP (ξ̈P )g(a, P, t),
∂tg(a, T, t) =− ∂a[ȧ(a, T, t)g(a, T, t)] + h(ξ̈T )θ(t)q[θ(t)]g(a, U, t)− [σT (ξ̈T ) + ϕ(ξ̈P )]g(a, T, t),
∂tg(a, U, t) =− ∂a[ȧ(a, U, t)g(a, U, t)] + σT (ξ̈T )g(a, T, t) + σP (ξ̈P )g(a, P, t)
− h(ξ̈T )θ(t)q[θ(t)]g(a, U, t).
(IV.9)
Equation (9) describes the dynamics of the distribution of workers over states, g(a, i, t),
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where i ∈ {P, T, U}. Consequently, given the presented structure, the labour market




σT (ξ̈T )g(a, T, t)da+
∫ ∞
a
σP (ξ̈P )g(a, P, t)da−
∫ ∞
a




[σT (ξ̈T ) + ϕ(ξ̈P )]g(a, T, t)da+
∫ ∞
a




σP (ξ̈P )g(a, P, t)da+
∫ ∞
a


















Firms. The firms are owned by the investment institution, rent capital from the bank,
create jobs and produce. The firms maximize the present value of the profits, or identically,
the value of equity, which is not zero due to the existence of labour market frictions.
Further, to create jobs, firms are required to post vacancies and search for workers. The
time-dependent HJB equation for the value of posting a vacancy, V (t), is given by:
(rl(t)− δ)V (t) = −γ + q(θ)
∫ ∞
a
J(a, T, t)g(a, U, t)
u(t) da, (IV.11)
where J(a, T, t) corresponds to the value of a temporary contract job performed by a worker
with asset level a; and g(a, U, t)/u(t) represents the density function of the unemployed
workers. Noteworthy, due to labour market frictions, the firm posting a vacancy is unable
to target potential workers based on their level of assets.
The free-entry condition in the market implies that firms will post vacancies until V (t) ≡ 0.




J(a, T, t)g(a, U, t)
u(t) da. (IV.12)
Once a vacancy is filled, the value of the corresponding filled temporary contract job, given
9Notice that new firms enter the market based on the comparison between the expected inter-temporal
value of the job and the cost of the vacancy. It is possible that the firm would initially be formed with
very high leverage. In this situation, the job is not created, even though the firm undertakes the cost of
the vacancy creation.
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the assets owned by the worker, results from the following recursive problem:
(rl(t)− δ)J(a, T, t) = max
k
{
z̈F (k̈)− rl(t)k̈ − w(a, T, t)− η(a, T, t) + ∂aJ(a, T, t)ȧ(a, T, t)+




Notice I consider that a job that gets promoted means the current temporary job is
dissolved. For a permanent contract job, its value corresponds to the solution of the
respective problem given by:
(rl(t)− δ)J(a, P, t) = max
k
{
z̈F (k̈)− rl(t)k̈ − w(a, P, t)− η(a, P, t) + ∂aJ(a, P, t)ȧ(a, P, t)+




Notice that independently of the type of contract, the investment institution will borrow
capital optimally, and therefore we have that:
rl(t) = z̈F ′k(k̈), (IV.15)
which implicitly defines the capital stock available to each match.10 The dividends col-












z̈F (k̈)− rl(t)k̈ − w(a, P, t)
]
g(a, P, t)da− γv,
(IV.16)




k̈g(a, j, t)da, j ∈ {T, P}. (IV.17)
Wage Setting Mechanism and Worker’s Bonus. The wage is determined considering:
(a) a rent-sharing rule, subjected to a downward wage rigidity constraint;11 and (b) the
parties set wages disregarding the subsequent attribution of bonuses, that are only defined
once profits are determined. Therefore, for wage setting purposes, the parties consider
10Noteworthy, independently of a firm’s EBITDA, I assume each firm will acquire the optimal level of
capital. Consequently, in the proposed model the potential financial constraints affect the probability of
dissolution of the firm, and not the capital available to it.
11An alternative approach is to consider a (Generalized) Nash Bargain as in Krusell et al. (2010).
However, l’Haridon et al. (2013) shows that the difference is negligible in models without precautionary
savings, and the derivation of wages in a Nash Bargain arrangement in continuous time raises computational
issues regarding the marginal propensity to consume.
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η(a, i, t) = 0.12 Accordingly, the rent sharing rule is given by:
β
[




W (a, j, t)−W (a, U, t)
]
, s. to η(a, i, t) = 0, j ∈ {T, P},
(IV.18)
where β corresponds to the worker’s bargaining power, J(a, j, t) value function of the job,
W (a, j, t) the value function of the employed worker, and W (a, U, t) the value function of
the unemployed. The path of wages is subjected to downward wage rigidity, in the spirit
of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2016), so that:
w(a, j, t) ≥ λw(a, j, t− ε), j ∈ {T, P}, (IV.19)
where λ corresponds to the maximum quarterly downward adjustment of real wages.
Considering the solutions of the presented recursive problems and the downward wage
rigidity constraint, the wage functions are defined as:
w(a, j, t) =

w̃(a, j, t) if w̃(a, j, t) ≥ λw(a, j, t− ε)
w(a, j, t− ε) if w̃(a, j, t) < λw(a, j, t− ε)
, j ∈ {T, P}, (IV.20)
where w̃(a, T, t) corresponds to the unconstrained wages, resulting from: (a) the rent-
sharing rule; and (b) the lack of firm commitment, so that those unconstrained wages
are set on a period by period basis. However, when the resulting unconstrained nominal
wage is lower than the existing nominal wage in moment t − ε, the wage is not lowered.
Accordingly, the unconstrained wages are given by:13
w̃(a, T, t) =
β
[
ρ+ ϕ(ξ̈P ) + σT (ξ̈T )
]{




+ ∂tJ(a, T, t)
}




r(t) + ϕ(ξ̈P ) + σT (ξ̈T )
]{




+ ϕ(ξ̈P )W (a, P, t)
[1− β][r(t) + ϕ(ξ̈P ) + σT (ξ̈T )]∂aW (a, P, t) + β[ρ+ ϕ(ξ̈P ) + σT (ξ̈T )][1− ∂aJ(a, T, t)]
−[ρ+ ϕ(ξ̈P )]W (a, U, t) + ∂tW (a, P, t)
}
[1− β][r(t) + ϕ(ξ̈P ) + σT (ξ̈T )]∂aW (a, P, t) + β[ρ+ ϕ(ξ̈P ) + σT (ξ̈T )][1− ∂aJ(a, T, t)]
;
w̃(a, P, t) =
β
[
ρ+ σP (ξ̈P )
]{




+ r(t)SP + ∂tJ(a, P, t)
}




r(t) + σP (ξ̈P )
]{




− ρW (a, U, t) + ∂tW (a, P, t)
}
[1− β][r(t) + σP (ξ̈P )]∂aW (a, P, t) + β[ρ+ σP (ξ̈P )][1− ∂aJ(a, P, t)]
.
(IV.21)
12Intuitively, the wage corresponds to the fixed component of worker’s compensation. Then, once the
parties determine the profit of the firm and split the profit according to the profit-sharing rule, the variable
compensation component is determined.
13See appendix A for further details in deriving the unconstrained wage equations.
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Notice that by the proper definition of a stationary recursive equilibrium, the downward
wage rigidity constraint would not bind in computing such equilibrium.
5 Calibration, Computation and Stationary Equilibrium Re-
sults
In this section, the objective is to analyze the ability of the stationary equilibrium of the
model, and its proposed calibration strategy, to mimic a steady state for the Portuguese
economy. Once performed, such calibration strategy will serve as the basis for the transi-
tional dynamics analysis of the subsequent sections, and the impact of the labour market
policy alternatives considered.
Broadly, the three novel features of the model are the integration of a detailed description
of the labour market institutional setting, the prevalence of endogenous job destruction
associated with the level of leverage of firms, and the link between productivity and
wealth. Those will be key in the assessment of the adjustment paths of the economy during
downturns, and thus particular emphasis will be placed in comparing key untargeted
moments of the calibrated model and their empirical counterparts.
Computation. I formally define the recursive stationary equilibrium of this economy
in appendix B. The proposed model corresponds to a Krusell et al. (2010) type model
in a continuous time setting, solved through the finite-difference method of Achdou et al.
(2017). Differently from the traditional one-dimensional fixed-point problem of the Bewley-
Huggett-Aiyagari standard paradigm, this model corresponds to a functional fixed-point
problem, given the need to find the endogenous wage schedule.
Compared to the standard Krusell et al. (2010) model in continuous time, as presented in
Bardóczy (2017), our model presents two additional layers of complexity: (a) the existence
of two categories of workers, translating into two sets of HJB equations for employed
workers and firms, and a transition matrix defined for employed workers for both types
of contracts and the unemployed; and (b) the existence of endogenous job destruction
functions.
Despite the additional computational intensity, the algorithm I use is standard and works
as follows: (1) set up a grid for assets; (2) guess the market tightness, θ, the interest rate,
r(t), and define the wage schedule for temporary and permanent workers, w(a, T, t) and
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w(a, P, t); (3) compute the leverage of each type of worker along the grid and compute the
transition matrix; (4) solve the contraction mapping of the 3 types of HJB equations for the
workers; (5) compute the stationary distribution of workers; (6) given the distribution solve
the contraction mapping of the 2 types of HJB equations for the firms; (7) evaluate the
free entry condition and the asset market clearing condition; (8) perform the rent-sharing
rule and update the wage function; and (9) update rl and θ until there is convergence from
step 2 onwards in (w, r, θ). Appendix C presents further details on the algorithm used.
Benchmark calibration. The calibration follows two main objectives. First, the cali-
bration should present a consistent mapping between the model and several labour market
measures. Second, it should present a realistic representation of the financial standing of
firms and of households. For this purpose, I make the mapping between the model pa-
rameters and quarterly data from various sources, and take the years of 2016-2017 as the
benchmark steady state of the economy.
Regarding functional form assumptions, the utility function is u(c̈) = ln(c̈). The produc-
tion function z̈F (k̈) corresponds to z̈F (k̈) = z̈k̈α, where z̈ = z̃tz(a, j), where j{P, T}. In
the stationary equilibrium z̃t = 1, and z(a, j) is set as a logistic type function:
z(a, j) = z
1 + e−κz [a−zinv ]
+ z̃j , j ∈ {T, P}. (IV.22)
The matching function M(u, v) is set as M [u(t), v(t)] = χu(t)ηv(t)1−η. The labour flows
also follow logistic functions of the interest payment to EBITDA ( rlk̈
ξ̈
), so that the dis-
placement, promotion and hiring of workers is given by:
σj(ξ̈j) =
σj

















, j ∈ {T, P}.
(IV.23)
The benchmark parameter calibration is presented in table 2, and the mapping between
the empirical counterparts and several endogenous outcomes of the model is presented in
table 3. As in Shimer (2005), home production is commensurate with the average level
of unemployment insurance. Accordingly, the flow of home production is set at b = 0.85,
which corresponds to 47% of the average wage of the economy, matching the 5-year average
of the OECD net replacement ratio indicator. It is significantly higher than the 40% in
Shimer’s work, thus representing the more beneficial unemployment insurance protection
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prevalent in Southern European economies, and particularly in Portugal.




Discount factor ρ 0.005
Home Production b 0.85
Minimum asset level a 0
Labour
Market
Matching Efficiency χ 0.65
Worker Bargaining Power β 0.4
Share of EBIT Paid as Variable Component η(a, j, t) 0.3
Matching Elasticity of Unemployed η 0.4
Firing Tax SP 0.4
Vacancy Cost γ 0.772
Downward rigidity parameter λ 0.995
Steepness of flow logistic functions κσ = κϕ = κh 200
Inversion of logistic functions σinvj = hinv 0.95
Non-stressed promotion rate ϕ 0.11
Non-stressed displacement rate of temp. workers σ̃T 0.03
Non-stressed displacement rate of perm. workers σ̃P 0.12
Fully-stressed displacement rate of temp. workers σT 0.4
Fully-stressed displacement rate of perm. workers σP 0.15
Financial
Sector
Ratio of domestically owned assets ϑ 0.625
Share of Capital α 0.225
Depreciation rate δ 0.018
Prod.
Function
Steepness Parameter κz 0.03
Inversion Parameter zinv 12
Location Parameter (Permanent Contracts) z̃P 1.03
Location Parameter (Temporary Contracts) z̃T 0.97
Maximum Spread of Productivity z 0.20
The firing tax of permanent workers is set at SP = 0.4, it represents 22.5% of the average
wage, and it is consistent with survey data for Oslington and Freyens (2005). Notice that
following Boeri (2011), a firing tax should be distinguished from a severance payment,
which can be fully offset with a compensating wage adjustment in this framework (Lazear
(1990)). Thus, the firing tax corresponds to a pure deadweight loss, accruing from the
cost on the resources required to obtain legal advice, make the decision, gather the case
for the dismissal decision, meet with the worker, and potentially go to court. On the other
side, the cost of post a vacancy is set so that the labour market tightness is calibrated at
θ = 1. It corresponds to 51.6% of the average wage which is similar to the calibrations of
Krusell et al. (2010) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) whom set the vacancy cost at
60% and 58.4%, respectively.
The non-stressed separation rates of unemployment, σ̃P = 0.03 and σ̃T = 0.12, are set
considering the average tenure for each type of contract, the model’s postulated career
path, and the fact that job-to-job transitions are particularly noticeable in temporary
jobs, which increases the effective spell of employment of workers vis-á-vis firm tenure.
The promotion rate, ϕ = 0.1, and the matching efficiency parameter, χ = 0.65, are
set so that conditional on separation rates the calibration approximates: (a) the empirical
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Table IV.3: Endogenous Outcomes




Labour Market Tightness θ 1 1 - Internally calibrated
Unemployment Rate 100× u% 7.59% 8% - Eurostat(a)
Net Replacement Ratio 100× hE[w]% 46.55% 48% 2016-2017 OECD(b)
Proportion of Temporary contracts 100× eT(eP+eT )% 21.4% 17.85% 2016-2017 Eurostat
Permanent contract wage gap 100× E[w(a,P,t)−w(a,T,t)w(a,T,t) ]% 18% 13.8% - Silva and Turrini (2015)
Minimum to average wage ratio 100× [E[w]w ]% 122.9% 136.3% 2016-2017 Quadros de Pessoal(c)
Non-distressed average displacement rate 100× eTσT (ξT )+ePσP (ξP )(eP+eT ) % 4.93% 5.16% 2016-2017 Eurostat
(d)
Annual maximum real wage decline 100× (1− e−4λ) 1.98% 2% - Inflation Benchmark
Coefficient of variation of wages σwE[w] 0.81 1.51 2016 Quadros de Pessoal
Average tenure of temporary contracts 14 ×
1
σ̃T
2.08 1 2016 Quadros de Pessoal






8.33 9 2016 Quadros de Pessoal
Financial
Sector
Quarterly gross interest rate on capital 100× [1− e−4(rl)] 1.99% 2.64% - Card et al. (2014) (Italy)
Investment-output ratio 100× δk1−α 21.29% 17.15% 2016-2017 Eurostat
Average Leverage 100× E[ rlkξ ]% 83.7% 90.23% 2016-2017 SCIE
Annual deposit rate 100× [1− e−4(rl−δ)] 0.72% 0.54% 2016-2017 Banco de Portugal(e)
Average savings’ rate 100× E[ȧ] -7.6% -1.775% 2016-2017 OECD
Net External Debt to output 100× (1−ϑ)Kztk(eT+eP ) 111.92% 94.6% 2016-2017 Bank of Portugal
Consumers net worth as perc. of output 100× Aztk(eT+eP ) 186.54% 183.63% 2016-2017 OECD
(f)
Notes: (a) the indicator corresponds to unemployment as percentage of total population for indi-
viduals between 20-64 years; (b) Indicator in 2009 OECD Emplooyment Outlook; (c) the indicator
considers the average net average wage and net minimum wage; (d) the indicator resorts to the
labour market transition database and include transitions from job-to-unemployment and job-to-
inactivity; (e) the indicator corresponds to the average annual deposit rate of term deposits; (f) the
indicator corresponds to the product of the household net worth and the household proportion of
financial assets. Implicitly, as a simplifying assumption I assume the liquidity of assets as a proxy
of the liquidity of the net worth.
Sources: Eurostat, OECD, Banco de Portugal, SCIE 2016-2017, Quadros de Pessoal 2016, Silva
and Turrini (2015), Card et al. (2014).
counterpart of the percentage of temporary workers in the economy; (b) the unemployment
rate; and (c) the duration of a temporary contract until promotion, 14
1
ϕ , which is set at
2.5 years.14
Then, as the interest payment to EBITDA ratio approaches 95 percent, the displacement
probabilities increase logistically, and the hiring and promotion probability decrease, also
logistically, as presented in figure 6. The intuition behind the calibration is that a very
indebted firm will neither hire nor promote a worker. For a temporary worker in a stressful
firm, the hazard of being dismissed becomes 52 percent, translating into an additional
expected job duration of 5.8 months, while for a permanent worker in an equally stressed
firm, the additional expected job duration is shortened to around 1,4 years.
Regarding the productivity function, two features are noteworthy. First, I assume the
insight of Eeckhout and Sepahsalari (2020). The productivity of the match is an increasing
function of the wealth of the worker, as presented in figure 6.15 Second, the permanent
14The maximum allowed number of successive temporary contracts in a firm is 3. Given the typical
temporary contract is of 1 year, 2.5 years of average length until promotion, conditional on not being
dismissed before, is deemed adequate.
15The model presented by Eeckhout and Sepahsalari (2020) is a direct search model, where the wealthier
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Figure IV.6: Calibrated Functions
Panel A: Functions for Labour market transitions
Panel B: Productivity function
jobs are more productive, following a standard reasoning of positive productivity effects
of tenure, which is fully consistent with the structure of the adopted model.
The discount rate and the deposit rate influences savings decisions of consumers. The
discount rate is set at ρ = 0.005, which corresponds to a 2% annual discounting. The
annual deposit rate of assets is endogenously determined at 0, 7%, leading to an average
savings rate of −7.6%, which is lower than the OECD estimate of the savings of households.
Further, the ratio of domestically owned assets, ϑ = 0.625, pin-points the net external
debt, endogenously defined as 112% and the consumers net financial worth of around
187%. Both are not substantially different from the empirical counterparts from Bank of
Portugal and OECD.16
The deposit rate jointly with the depreciation rate, leads to a gross annual cost of capital
worker is more selective when searching for a job, thus landing on average on a more productive firm. Here
we take such relationship as exogenous.
16The OECD indicator used for the net financial worth of the agents corresponds to the product of
the household net worth and the household proportion of financial assets. Implicitly, as a simplifying
assumption I assume the liquidity of assets as a proxy of the liquidity of the net worth.
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of 7.59%, which is consistent with Card et al. (2014) for Italy. Then supplemented with
the capital share leads to an investment share of 21.29%, which is not at the odds with the
Eurostat data. Noteworthy in the financial side, particularly given the mechanism of job
destruction proposed, the average leverage of firms, of 83.7% is broadly in line, or being
slightly more conservative, when compared with the information of the administrative
panel data of firms (SCIE).
An important feature of the model is its ability to generate wage and wealth dispersion.
When compared with the benchmark, the model generates around 54% of the empirical
standardized variability of wages, as directly measured in Quadros de Pessoal for 2016.
This lack of dispersion is consequence of the simplified nature of the productivity functions.
While it moderately depends on the wealth of the worker and its type of contract, it does
not vary exogeneously, as I do not assume the existence of inherently different firm types.
In a more detailed analysis, if one focuses in the wage variation associated with worker’s
components of a typical AKM wage decomposition, the benchmark empirical coefficient
of variation of wages becomes around 0.92, which implies that the model generates 88%
of such empirical within variability of wages.17 Altogether, I abstain from undertaking
adjustments to the model in order to allow it to generate wage variability compatible
with its empirical counterpart. That would require the adoption of a distribution of
firm types that would significantly increase computational burden. Given the match of
the model’s variability with the within empirical results, one should interpret the results
as representing the adjustment of a representative firm. The implied stationary wealth
distribution is given in figure 7.
One of the key model mechanisms of job destruction is associated with the leverage of
firms, namely the interest payment to EBITDA ratio. In figure 7, it is clear that in steady
state the firms are not financially stressed, and the permanent contract jobs are around 20
percent more leveraged than the temporary jobs. In what concerns savings, the shape of
the savings functions are consistent with the results of the standard Krusell et al. (2010)
model, and establishes a reasonable ranking of types of workers, where the permanent
contract workers are the ones saving the most.
17See Torres et al. (2018) for an empirical analysis of the sources of wage variability in Portugal,
resorting to the same dataset. I use their findings in calculate the within variability of wages, as the sum
of the variability associated with the worker fixed effect and time-varying covariates, in their two high
dimensional fixed effect model.
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Figure IV.7: Steady State Worker’s Wealth Distribution, Savings and Firm Leverage
Productivity shock. With the presented calibration, the core of the exercise of the
chapter is to study the adjustment paths of the economy subjected to a negative, aggregate,
unexpected and one time productivity shock, with a subsequent productivity path until
the steady state values. In this process, instead of a defined magnitude of the shock, I
build a grid of different magnitudes of an initial shock, z0, from zero to 10% of the steady
state productivity levels. The function of the shock is given by:
zt = 1 + (z0 − 1)e−0.3t. (IV.24)
Thus, the shape of the calibration of those shocks is presented in figure 8. As we will
inspect, the adoption of an interval of shocks allows to further highlight the mechanisms
generating labour market adjustments, particularly under different wage rigidity regimes
and policy options. The algorithm to analyse the transitional dynamics of the proposed
economy throughout the downturns implied by the grid of productivity shocks is presented
in appendix D.
163
Figure IV.8: Productivity Shock
6 Transitional Dynamics with Downward Nominal Wage
Rigidity
In the standard description of the modelled labour market, wages are rigid in nominal
terms, there persist a significant contract duality, where 21 percent of the workers have
their labour relationship governed by a more precarious temporary contract, and firms
are at hazard of financial distress if their leverage increases substantially, thus increasing
the odds of an episode of match dissolution or insolvency. Such dissolution episodes,
when affecting a permanent contract firm consumes a share of the capital available to the
insolvent firm in the form of a firing tax.
Under these cornerstone conditions, the model generates substantial unemployment spikes
in the outcome of sufficiently negative productivity shocks, particularly at the higher end
of the shock magnitude, in absolute terms. As presented in figure 9, the unemployment
growth in the first quarters of the downturn, consistently exceeds the initial size of the
downturn for initial shocks of 3.5% or higher, reaching a job destruction of 11.8% for
the maximum considered downturn of 10%. By definition, such unemployment behaviour
corresponds to the aggregate of job creation and destruction dynamics. In our model
it intimately relates with the leverage standing of firms. As presented in figure 10, a
sizable productivity shock creates significant liquidity constraints at firm level. Those
substantially increases the odds of firm dissolution.
The results presented partially follows Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), where endoge-
nous job destruction generates increased volatility of employment when compared to the
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standard textbook search and matching model. However, in our model, the destruction
mechanism is not directly determined by an idiosyncratic productivity shock coupled with
a general exogenous threshold, but rather due to an increased hazard rate of bankruptcy
of highly indebted firms, which increases significantly the odds of a terminal financial
disruption.
Figure IV.9: Unemployment and Job Finding Rate Transitional Dynamics
Additionally, differently from the standard mechanism, our model establishes a firm liq-
uidity channel to job creation. As presented in figure 6, in this labour market, no highly
leveraged firm is ever created, as firms cease to hire temporary workers, and promotions
into highly indebted firms is also ceased, thus stopping the steady state dynamic of con-
tract graduation. Consequently, the leverage also refrains the job creation dynamics, over
and above the standard receding caused by the fall of the textbook inter-temporal job
value vis-à-vis the cost of posting a vacancy.
The increased leverage of firms with impact on the firm survival rate also impacts capital,
over the standard prescribed mechanism. Traditionally, the fall in productivity reduces
the capital utilization of firms, reducing the annual cost of capital rate and the deposit
rate, thus creating a pull of investment into consumption. In this model, on top of the
traditional mechanism, when firms become highly leveraged, some of then bankrupt, which
leads to a capital loss due to increased firing taxes, which further weightens the decline in
capital, while on this part not transforming it into consumption.
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Figure IV.10: Firm Level Mechanisms of Adjustment
Then as the productivity starts to recover, leverage starts to fall, firms start employing
more capital, the distress in the labour market flows recedes, with direct impacts on job
creation and job destruction, and the unemployment starts to converge to the steady state
values. Altogether, the aggregate dynamics highlight a strong propagation mechanism of
productivity downturns into unemployment, which can be described as a catastrophic job
destruction, as the empirical study of Carneiro et al. (2014) as coined.
To further understand the mounting of the described adverse mechanisms, one should
assess the behaviour of wages and contract types, which are displayed in figure 11. Gener-
ally, in search and matching models, the instantaneous bargaining of wages can constitute
an internal financing of the firm in the presence of downturns, as wages are automatically
reduced in the response to the downturn. However, in this setting the fall in wages is an-
chored to a maximum rate of allowed decline, which is compatible with a calibrated year
inflation rate of 2%. In these regards, it is assumed that any potential new hires are also
subjected to the same degree of rigidity of their wages in relation to steady state wages.
Beyond computational concerns, such assumption seems reasonable, as the hiring during
the acute phase of downturn is particularly hampered thus not substantially altering the
implied wage rigidity, there are tabled wages and compensation policies sizably bargained
at sector bargaining level, and there are equal pay equal job concerns. Consequently, with
the wage financing channel impaired, firms witness a stronger leverage increase that sparks
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the described labour market distress.
Figure IV.11: Segmented Wage and Employment Transitional Dynamics
When one partials out the employment dynamics by type of contract, the initial response
is lead by a fall in both temporary and permanent employment. Then, as the leverage
of actual and potential temporary contract firms is reduced, from an significantly lower
level when compared with permanent contract firms, both the current temporary workers
see the survival rate of their jobs increase substantially, and the job creation recovers
substantially, even though still adversely affected by free entry condition fundamentals.
Thus, one starts witnessing an increase in temporary contract employment soon after
the initial shock. However, the possibility of graduation into permanent contracts is still
impaired while the potential permanent contracts would result into highly leveraged firms.
Consequently, the adjustment is marked by a cleansing of permanent contract firms which
are dissolved, and the mounting of temporary contract firms which do not graduate during
the first phase of the transition. All in all, such adjustment in flows leads to compositional
effects that imply a more sizable economy wide average wage adjustment, than the ones
witness at contract level, which may potentially mask at aggregate level the degree of wage
rigidity.
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7 Flexible Wages Paradigm
In this section I start from the same benchmark economy description, but the wages are
assumed to be flexible, so that they are continuously determined through the rent-sharing
rule, disregarding the wage rigidity rule.18 Beyond the usefulness of analysing transitional
dynamics under this policy change on the standard environment, this analysis allows to
further highlight the consequences of the shutdown of the wage financing channel present
in the previous section.
Figure IV.12: Firm Level Mechanisms of Adjustment under a Flexible Wage Regime
As presented in figure 12, the first stark difference between the considered environments
concerns leverage. As wages immediately adjust in response to a fall in productivity, and
thus of the match surplus, the leverage of firms increase by a substantially less degree when
compared to the rigid-wage scenario. Consequently, firms are less financially distressed,
with temporary job firms not even trespassing to a region of substantial increase in the
dissolution hazard rate. Thus, the cleansing effect on permanent contract firms is more
short-lived and less sizable. The reduction of hiring dynamics is fundamentally driven
by the traditional free entry condition dynamics, rather than by the influence of leverage
on hiring, and the promotion hold-up lasts fewer periods. Altogether, it implies a lower
reduction of the capital stock, due to less firing taxes paid, and less adverse job dynamics.
18See appendix E for further details on implementing the flexible wage transitional dynamics algorithm.
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The annual cost of capital thus fall by less.
The underlying mechanism that hampers the rise in leverage is displayed in the behaviour
of wages in figure 13. When compared with the rigid-wage case, wages fall substantially
more, for example by more than the triple in a 10% initial negative shock in productivity.
Such adjustment immediately provides the referred internal financing mechanism, which
translates in significantly less employment adjustments across types of contracts, thus
leading to less powerful composition changes between temporary and permanent contracts.
Consequently, the fall in wages in both contract types and economy wide are identical.
Noteworthy, while the fall in wages is more pronounced the recovery path is also stronger,
implying a return of wages to the steady state levels at a much faster pace.
Figure IV.13: Segmented Wage and Employment Transitional Dynamics under a Flex-
ible Wage Regime
The less impactful financial distress also affects the job creation dynamics, as seen in
figure 14, which are now solely driven by the dynamics of the inter-temporal free entry
condition. Altogether, the difference in unemployment is very sizable. With the presence
of flexible wages, the unemployment rate increase is fairly moderate and never surpasses,
or comes close, to the amount of the initial productivity downturn. For example for a 10%
downturn the unemployment rate increase reaches a maximum of 3%.
Notice that the defusal of a catastrophic job destruction is not operated by assuming a
textbook drop of an endogenous job destruction mechanism, thus assuming a standard
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Figure IV.14: Unemployment and Job Finding Rate Transitional Dynamics under a
Flexible Wage Regime
search and matching model unable to generate significant unemployment spikes, or in
a more broad discussion a significantly high elasticity of productivity to labour market
tightness (see Shimer (2005) for further details). In this environment, I keep the endoge-
nous job destruction mechanism untouched, in the sense that equally high leverage still
causes financial distress with the previously described consequences. However, the simple
relaxation of wage rigidity, with the consequent opening of the wage bill internal financing
channel of firms, substantially mutes the adverse effects witnessed in the downward rigid
wage environment.
From a comparative perspective, the adoption of downward nominal rigid wages does not
have a substantial impact on unemployment behaviour for minor or moderate productiv-
ity downturns, namely in the range of 0% to 2%. For more sizable downturns the labour
market disruption is increasingly more noticeable in downward nominal rigid wages. In a
nutshell, this comparison highlights the potential nefarious consequence of the job destruc-
tion leverage based mechanism coupled with downward nominal rigid wages. Indeed, such
mechanism is capable to generate a costly process of destruction of inter-temporally viable
jobs, particularly permanent jobs, due to the bite of the instantaneous leverage effect on
firm survival. This constitutes what I coin as a last dance phenomena. The subsequent
policy section of the chapter will discuss different alternatives of aggregate policy designs
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in trying to defuse this catastrophic job destruction.
In a welfare based perspective, we adopt an adapted continuous-time version of the welfare
measure proposed by Krusell et al. (2010). I follow the percentiles of the distribution of
workers’ asset holdings for each relevant situation of the workers, under the relevant tran-
sition path, and record his consumption path. Then, I compare the consumption path of
the worker’s percentile with the consumption path of the equivalent worker in the equiv-
alent percentile of asset holdings under the stationary distribution. Denote this welfare











, j ∈ {P, T} (IV.25)
where cs(a, j, t) represents the consumption level in the steady state.19 Accordingly, I will
focus in assessing π to measure welfare losses or gains.
Figure 15 resumes the findings for the downward nominal wage rigidity and wage flexible
regimes, coupled with an analysis of the path of average savings in both environments.
Regarding the welfare measure, the results broadly confirm the insight of a direct unem-
ployment analysis. Until 2%-3%, the welfare loss associated with either regime is broadly
identical, whereas for stronger downturns, the downward nominal wage rigidity regime sig-
nificantly penalizes the workers, in an across board effect, namely targeting the considered
percentiles for every condition the worker finds himself into.
A notable characteristic is the strong consistency of the results for the different labour
market groups, and broadly for percentiles. This implies that in the presented model,
with either wage adjustment regime, an aggregate productivity shock affects the different
groups of workers in a broadly identical percentage of the stationary equilibrium initial
welfare state. In terms of percentiles, while in the flexible wage regime there is a substantial
homogeneity in the percentage effect, in the case of downward nominal wage rigidity there
is a slightly lower impact for the lower percentiles of temporary and unemployed workers.
For example, in such regime in the presence of a 10 percent downfall, the ratio of the fall
in the welfare measure between the 25th and the 50th percentiles of those workers is on
average 1.06. Noteworthy, an identical fall in consumption paths, signalled by π, imply a
loss in the utility levels that is decreasing in percentage terms as the initial consumption
















Figure IV.15: Welfare and Savings Comparison across Different Wage Regimes
level increases. Consequently, the utility loss is greater for lower levels of assets, which
predominantly populates the unemployed and temporary worker groups.
Regarding the average savings, those are fundamentally influenced by the earnings, and the
relationship between the discount rate and the deposit rate, with the latter being indexed
to the annual cost of capital. The differences in the trough of the savings adjustment path,
across regimes are not substantial. In the downward nominal rigid wage case, while the
wage rigidity binds, and the job destruction does not sufficiently kicks in, the adjustment
in savings happens at a slower pace, and the trough is attained later, when compared with
the flexible wage regime. There, the immediate fall in earnings entices the consumers to
immediately resort to savings in order to smooth out consumption. Overall, the rigid wage
regime delays slightly the path of adjustment, but do not substantially change it, neither
in terms of magnitude, nor in terms of shape. Consequently, it adds additional evidence
that the potential intent of downward rigid wages to secure income of the consumers is
trampled by the job destruction dynamics.
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8 Labour Market Policies on Permanent Contracts
While the previous section provides a useful benchmark to assess the mechanisms under-
lying the adjustment of a more typical Continental European labour market as modelled,
it is often the case that wage flexibility is not a feasible policy option, even on dire down-
turns. By standard, these labour markets have been defined around the notion of some
degree of either nominal or real wage security, which is often enshrined in the law. Its re-
laxation frequently requires either clear popular support, or a broad collective bargaining
consensus. Those have not been reached in an aggregate, or even large sector sense in past
downturns as the Great Recession. Consequently, in this section I will explore other policy
alternatives, focusing in defusing the mounting of very high leverage levels in permanent
contract firms.20
Simultaneously, as the stance of the fiscal policy in the response to a downturn, and par-
ticularly a sizable downturn is often uncertain, and frequently constrained, I will abstain
from assuming any degree of fiscal expansion, or any acceptable level of public debt. Thus,
the policies considered will be budget balanced, either inter-temporally or instantaneously.
Moreover, I will assume that a policy response takes time. To ensure a comparable basis,
every policy entangles one quarter of policy lag implementation. The policy objective will
be labour market stabilization, with the policy maker willing to fasten the closure of the
gaps vis-à-vis the stationary equilibrium levels, in terms of employment in both types of
contracts and of unemployment.21 Consequently, when selecting the optimal calibration




{∣∣∣∣eT (t) + eP (t)− esT − esP ∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣u(t)− us∣∣∣∣}dt. (IV.27)
Finally, also to ensure comparability, and given the nature of the policies to be considered,
I will assume their liquidity provision phase will last for 1 year in the calibration proposed.
Altogether, the core of this section is to explore a set of policies that are comparable at
face value.
Policy #1: Unemployment benefit transfer. The first policy considered starts with
20See appendix E for the details of the algorithms to estimate the transitional dynamics implied by the
productivity shocks, while accounting for each of the proposed policies.
21Alternative, one could consider a policy maker that intents to maximize a welfare function. Here, I
take the approach to assume the policy maker intents to act over a visible indirect measure of welfare and
functioning of the labour market, and by the end of the section we will make a detailed analysis of the
welfare implications of such approach.
173
a slight change in the assumption framework. If one assumes b is home production that is
provided by an unemployment benefit transfer, a natural policy is to provide a transfer to
firms by front-loading the resources that latter, throughout the adjustment path, would be
spent in unemployment benefits if the front-loading does not take place. Consequently, the
policy maker pools such resources and provides a transfer to firms in form of a ad-valorem
subsidy on the wage of the worker - τub. Accordingly, from the end of the 1st quarter and
until the 5th (i.e. Υ = [υ; ῡ]), while the wage of the worker is not altered, the profit of the
firm, before the payment of bonuses, becomes:
η̃(a, P, t) =
[
z̈F (k̈)− rl(t)k̈ − (1− τub)w(a, P, t)
]
, if t ∈ Υ. (IV.28)
The referred budget balance condition is given:
∫ ∞
υ
b× [uNP (t)− u(t)]dt =
∫
t∈Υ
[τubw(a, P, t)]dt, (IV.29)
where uNPt correspond to no-policy scenario unemployment paths, which are naturally the
ones recorded in the downward nominal rigid wage environment. Given conditions (28)
and (29), a calibration of such transfer is attainable, and it will be performed numerically.
Policy #2: Income Tax and firm subsidy transfer.22 The second policy represents
a direct attempt to unmute the wage internal financing channel of firms, through an ad-
valorem tax on wages and the equivalent subsidy to firms - τ ts. From the side of permanent
workers, their period income becomes:
y(a, P, t) = (1− τ ts)w(a, P, t) + η(a, P, t), if t ∈ Υ. (IV.30)
From the side of the firm, the flow profit before bonuses becomes:
η̃(a, P, t) =
[
z̈F (k̈)− rl(t)k̈ − (1− τ ts)w(a, P, t)
]
, if t ∈ Υ. (IV.31)
Differently from policy #1, this policy requires an objective function, as it is instanta-
neously balanced by nature. Thus the policy maker will select τ ts, holding conditions (30)
and (31), that minimizes condition (27).
22An identical policy based on a reduction of the social security contribution paid by the firms, and
an increase of the social contribution paid by workers was proposed in Portugal, with a calibration of 7
percent, during the Great Recession in 2012. Due to strong public resistance it was abandoned.
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Policy #3: Moratorium in cost of capital transfer. This policy entails a temporary
administrative reduction in the cost of capital, which is subsequently balanced by a future
increase in the cost of capital. After the initial policy lag in the period [0, υ], the reduction
covers the period Υ, which is calibrated to cover 1 year. Then the repayment period is
calibrated as 5Υ, in the period [Υ, 5Υ].
The present policy does not consist in a pure loan. Rather, it is drafted as a loan with
an adjusted interest rate which accounts for the entry and exit of firms along the policy
implementation and repayment periods, and assumes that every firm is subjected to the
policy at any given moment, independently of its history. Consequently, for instance firms
that enter the market in the repayment period are always subjected to the increased cost of
capital, whereas a firm that bankrupts in the middle of the policy implementation period
does not have a repayment requirement. The interest rate considered in the policy will be
calibrated to ensure the policy is balanced in aggregate flows.
Given this structure, defining LC(a, P, t) as the function that perturbs the standard cost
of capital, the flow profit before bonuses becomes:
η̃(a, P, t) = z̈F (k̈) + LC(a, P, t)− rl(t)k̈ − w(a, P, t), (IV.32)
with LC(a, P, t) being positive in the implementation period, and negative in the repay-
ment period. The relevant interest rate applied to the profile of the moratorium, rloan, is





[LC(a, P, t)g(a, P, t)e−rl(t)t]dadt = 0. (IV.33)
As in the case of a tax-subsidy policy 2, the pin-point of the calibration requires the policy
maker to minimize the problem in equation (27), as any design policy entangling equations
(32) and (33) is by definition inter-temporally balanced on aggregate terms.
Policy #4: Joint transfer policy. This policy combines the policy instruments of
policies 1, 2 and 3. The policy has a balanced unemployment benefit transfer component, a
income tax - firm transfer component and a cost of capital moratorium transfer component.
Accordingly, the flow profit of the firm, before the payment of bonuses is given by:
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η̃(a, P, t) =

z̈F (k̈) + LC(a, P, t)− rl(t)k̈ − (1− τub,j − τ ts,j)w(a, P, t), if t ∈ Υ.
z̈F (k̈) + LC(a, P, t)− rl(t)k̈ − w(a, P, t), if t ∈ [Υ, 5Υ].
(IV.34)
The balancing of the policy entangles the moratorium and income tax and firm subsidy





[LC(a, P, t)g(a, P, t)e−rl(t)t]dadt = 0;∫ ∞
υ





Finally, the calibration of the policy is achieved by the minimization of the objective
function in equation (27).
Policy #5: Temporary wage flexibility transfer. Differently from the previous
policies, this policy will not be based on transfers and taxes. Rather, it will impose a
temporary wage flexibility of wages, which could be implemented by forcing a renegotiation
of the collective agreements in the market to define temporary paying clauses that will
bind in the period Υ. So while the wages will follow a flexible wage path in the period
Υ, they will recover the value they would have under the downward nominal rigid wage
regime afterwards. Quantitatively, instead of equation (20), we have:
w(a, P, t) =

w̃(a, P, t) if t ∈ [0, υ] ∪ (ῡ,∞), w̃(a, T, t) ≥ λw(a, P, t− ε)
w(a, P, t− ε) if t ∈ [0, υ] ∪ (ῡ,∞), w̃(a, P, t) < λw(a, P, t− ε)
w̃(a, P, t) if t ∈ Υ,
w̃(a, P, t) if t = ῡ, e−λ(t−t0)w(a, P, t0) < w̃(a, P, t)
e−λ(t−t0)w(a, P, t0) if t = ῡ, e−λ(t−t0)w(a, P, t0) ≥ w̃(a, P, t)
(IV.36)
where t0 is the moment of the downturn shock. This policy will be different from the
previously considered flexible wage regime in two fundamental characteristics. First, I
assume that the market is initially functioning as a downward nominal rigid wage regime.
When faced with the downturn, the policy maker assesses the situation and during the
policy lag implementation forces the collective bargaining sides to bargain temporary wage
relief clauses. Second, the policy is temporary. The reintroduction of the wage rigidity
environment takes place at moment ῡ. In that moment, the wage rigidity constraint for
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that period is compatible with the wage rigidity that would have bound if the downward
nominal rigidity constraint was not temporarily relaxed.
Calibration and policy effects. The calibration of the policies is presented in figure
16. For policies #1-#3, the calibration prescribes an increasing path of intervention,
particularly for downturns of higher magnitude, in which the growth of the rates assumes
an exponential path. There, the policies that are balanced through transfers from the
market, namely the income tax firm subsidy, has higher rates, when compared with a
policy that is back-up by future savings in unemployment benefits. Also notice that the
rate of the moratorium policy is not directly comparable with the other two, given that
the rate focuses in the cost of capital flow instead of wages.
Figure IV.16: Optimal Policy Calibration
Regarding the joint policy approach #4, the broad trend of rates follows the findings of
the isolated policies #1-#3, but there is some degree of substitution of the magnitudes of
each component of the policy. This interaction is expected, as in theory there may exist
trade offs among the components of the policy. For example, the opening of the firm’s
wage bill financing channel through the income tax firm subsidy component could reduce
the front-loading of future savings in the unemployment benefits component.
The main policy maker priority is to contribute to the stabilization of labour market flows.
In figure 17, the comparison of the unemployment rate dynamics of the market under a
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Figure IV.17: Unemployment Effects
no policy approach vis-à-vis each considered policy is presented. The first notable finding
is that, in presence of a small to moderate downturns, namely below 6 percent, every
policy is largely ineffective in enhancing a faster convergence to the stationary equilibrium
flow values. For those downturn levels, the leading mechanism for the dynamics of job
creation and destruction is rather inter-temporal, focused in the free entry condition and
non-distressed hazard rates, as the period financial distress due to very high leverage
levels is not triggered. Consequently, the temporary short-lived policies are fundamentally
transfers into the profits before bonuses of the firms and wages, rather than having a sizable
effect on job creation and job destruction. In a nutshell, given the budget balance nature
of the policies, they are simply not sufficiently powerful to translate into significant gains
in the dynamics of job creation, and thus their effects are very moderate.
However, in the presence of significant downturns, namely with an initial shock above 6
percent, the policies become significantly effective, reaching a reduction in unemployment
in the peak of around 20 percent for a 10 percent downturn. In levels that would translate
in a reduction of around 4 percentage points in unemployment rate, which is notable given
that every policy does not entail a change in the stance of the fiscal policy. Moreover,
the bucket of considered policies present an identical unemployment effect along the con-
sidered paths of productivity shocks. These findings highlight the ability of the policies
to reduce the sharp increase of the leverage of firms, thus stimulating a quicker reduction
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in its levels from the disruptive region that, as presented before, constitutes a powerful
mechanism of job destruction and weakening of job creation. Thus, by attenuating the
adverse contribution of the leverage mechanism, the policy maker effectively attenuates
the catastrophic job destruction spell.
Figure IV.18: Capital Effects
The referred attenuation translates into visible capital stock effects, as presented in figure
18. As the job destruction is reduced, the loss in the capital stock associated with firing
taxes is also attenuated. Here, while the effects are broadly shape identical across policies,
it is visible the moderate adverse effects of the moratorium policy in the repayment period,
where the capital gains are attenuated when compared to the other policy alternatives, and
inclusively when compared with the joint policy alternative that resorts to a less sizable
moratorium component.
Regarding the effects of the policies in the income profiles along the adjustment path,
figure 19 presents the path of the average income. Here, significantly different paths co-
exist. On one hand, the policies that focus in reposing some degree of wage flexibility,
namely the income tax firm subsidy and the temporary wage flexibility, imposes an initial
fall in real terms on the income of workers, when compared with the no policy path.
Further, those declines are prescribed even for moderate and small downturn magnitudes.
Consequently, these policies confirm the ability to be imperfect substitutes to a wage
flexible regime. Differently, the policies that do not directly affect the wages of workers,
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namely the unemployment benefit subsidy and the moratorium policies, do not entangle
an initial real income decline, prescribing immediate sizable income gains.
Figure IV.19: Average Income Effects
These different income profiles offers are a very relevant finding in this discussion. Those
constitute alternatives that enable the policy maker to select a preferred shape of income
profiles along the adjustment path, while attaining identical unemployment and capital
effects. For instance, an initial decline of real income may encounter strong political and
public opposition, as for instance was the case in several continental European countries
during the Great Recession.
The final point of analysis of this section focuses in the welfare, along the percentiles of
the wealth distribution for the different types of workers. The approach is identical to
the welfare discussion undertaken before, but the benchmark policy to compare with is
the standard model with downward nominal rigid wages without any policy intervention.









e−ρtlog[cNP (a, j, t)]dt
]
, j ∈ {T, P}
(IV.37)
where cNP (a, j, t) are the consumption paths under a no policy intervention.
The results are summarized in figure 20, and supplemented with a comparison between the
pure wage flexible regime and the downward nominal wage rigidity regime. Noteworthy,
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in the presence of aggregate productivity shocks, the welfare effects are quite identical in
shape and magnitude across workers in different positions in the labour market, concretely
permanent and temporary contracts and unemployed, and among the considered wealth
percentiles.
A fully flexible wage regime has sizable welfare gains for any moderate to strong downturn
when compared to any of the adopted policy interventions in the downward nominal wage
rigidity environment. In fact, confirming previous findings, those policies only have visible
effects for strong downturns. In a ranking, the consumers would prefer a policy based on
a subsidy backed by future savings in the unemployment benefit system, followed by the
joint policy alternative, and then the remainder policies, concretely the temporary wage
flexibility, the moratorium and the income tax firm subsidy alternatives, which attain
identical welfare results.
Figure IV.20: Welfare Analysis of Policy Interventions
Notes: The presented welfare measure is the ratio of the standard welfare measure under
the policy intervention to the standard welfare measure under the no policy intervention
regime.
Altogether, this section highlights several key findings. First, when facing severe aggregate
productivity downturns in an environment where there are downward nominal rigid wages
and instantaneous financial distress in the presence of high firm leverage, there are budget-
balanced policy interventions that can significantly attenuate the spike in unemployment,
reduce the loss in capital stock arising from labour market disruption, and provide across
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board welfare gains to consumers. Those are particularly ineffective for lower magnitude
shocks. Second, the bucket of policy alternatives is sufficiently rich to provide an ample
set of alternatives to the policy maker concerned in stabilizing labour market flows. Third,
those alternatives are visibly different in the wage profiles they imply, with some potentially
collecting more public and political support than others. Fourth, either current financing
constraints of the fiscal policy, or time-consistency constraints in the implementation of
some of the prescribed policy alternatives can be surpassed by alternatives that, while not
entailing the same type of policy structure, produces similar unemployment and capital
effects. All in all, in our environment, when facing a severe downturn there is a high cost
of not intervening.
9 Conclusions
I have analyzed the effect of negative aggregate productivity shocks varying from 0.5
to 10 percent of the benchmark productivity levels, and the subsequent labour market
adjustments, in the context of a Bewley-Huggett-Aiyagari incomplete markets model with
search frictions, financial constraints, and a labour market of the Continental European
type, namely one that combines contract duality and downward nominal wage rigidity.
With a benchmark calibration to portray the Portuguese case, I analyze the adjustment
paths of the main labour market indicators.
Along the grid of negative aggregate productivity shocks, job creation is increasingly
negatively affected, due to the fall of the inter-temporal value of a job, which restricts the
creation of new vacancies. However, this mechanism alone is not sufficiently powerful to
cause a burst in employment, as the decline in the inter-temporal value of a job facing
a short-lived productivity downturn is not sizable enough to generate the required and
sufficiently permanent fall in job creation. Even if it was, that would not mimic the
stylized empirical facts of the market in the Great Recession, where a job destruction
spike carried a sizable role.
Moreover, under standard wage flexibility, the model does not predict any other sizable
adverse mechanism to employment. When one allows wages to instantaneously adjust to
the value of the worker-firm surplus, firms facing productivity downturns resort to internal
financing to face liquidity shortages, as they can reduce the wage bill. Intuitively, they
share with the workers, as per the magnitude of the relative bargaining powers plus the
fall in bonuses, the costs of the adjustment and largely ensure their survival, even in the
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presence of severe downturns. However, this mechanism contradicts the stylized facts of
wage adjustments, where one sees a significant rise of wage freezes, and few to none wage
reductions. Thus, I propose a mechanism that hampers the internal financing channel of
firms and places them at greater risk of failure.
The mechanism consists in combining downward nominal wage rigidity, which limits down-
ward real wage adjustments, with instantaneous liquidity constraints, where firms with
very high leverage levels, measured as the comparison of the period cost of capital versus
the EBITDA of the firm, significantly increases the firm’s failure rate when it reaches
very sizable levels, of above 0.95. Indeed, as the magnitude of the shock becomes se-
vere, namely above 5 to 6 percent of the stationary equilibrium levels, the model with
this mechanism predicts a sizable unemployment surge, with an around 1-to-1 elasticity
between the shock magnitude and the unemployment surge, lead by the failure of firms.
This finding is compatible with a catastrophic job destruction phenomena described in the
empirical literature during the Great Recession for Portugal.
Noteworthy, even in the presence of a temporary productivity shock, this mechanism
predicts a sizable phenomenon of firms’ failure even if they are solvent, as the critical
binding constraint becomes liquidity. Thus, the market enters in turmoil with a signifi-
cant number of workers, particularly permanent workers, facing unemployment with their
reemployment dynamics being led by the job creation dynamics. This process is more
costly than ensuring the continuity of their job assignments, and can be coined as a last
dance effect of terminating inter-temporally viable jobs.
The last dance effect is critically determined by the leverage level at the dawn of the pro-
ductivity shock, and the liquidity of firms along the adjustment path. While the managing
of the former is fundamentally to be performed prior to the shock, the managing of the
latter can be made once the shock has materialized. Accordingly, I devise several balanced-
budget policies to enhance the internal financing channel in the trough of the downturn,
in order to alleviate the last dance effect. Options entangle instantaneously transferring
resources from permanent workers to firms, inter-temporally changing the profiles firm’s
interest rate payments when they have permanent workers, relaxing them in the trough of
the downturn, or even by resorting to future savings in unemployment benefits to subsidize
permanent jobs. For severe downturns above 7 percent, every policy, or combination of
policies, proved to be effective in reducing by almost 20 percent the maximum recorded
unemployment rate under a no policy scenario. Those also translates into less capital
destruction, and they have positive welfare effects across the board. Interestingly, they
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prescribe different wage profiles along the adjustment, opening the possibility of the pol-
icy maker to select the most acceptable path, also considering potential public financing
constraints.
All in all, in the presence of a market where wage flexibility is impaired and there are
instantaneous financing constraints, the labour market adjustment would benefit from
policies devised to partially open the internal financing channel of firms, when the down-
fall is predicted to be strong or severe. The lack of action can spark catastrophic job
destruction spells, with significant costs in terms of unemployment and welfare. In this
chapter, I addressed the question resorting to aggregate shocks and homogeneous policies
targeting permanent jobs. While this proves to be effective under the conditions of the
proposed model, it also opens the question of how much more powerful could be targeted
policies that takes into account the much richer information about each firm’s financial
standing that policy makers have access to. Altogether, it reinforces the merit of relaxing
institutionally defined constraints in extraordinary periods, to minimize costly last dance
effects.
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Up: Job Losses in the Great Recession. IZA Discussion Papers, Institute of Labor
Economics (IZA), December 2013.
Tobias Berg. Got rejected? Real effects of not getting a loan. Working Paper Series 1960,
European Central Bank, 2016.
Shai Bernstein, Timothy Mcquade, and Richard R. Townsend. Do Household Wealth
Shocks Affect Productivity? Evidence from Innovative Workers During the Great Re-
cession. Journal of Finance, 76(1):57–111, February 2021.
Olivier Blanchard. Adjustment within the Euro. The Difficult Case of Portugal. Portuguese
Economic Journal, 6(1):1–21, 2007.
185
Olivier Blanchard and Pedro Portugal. Boom, Slump, Sudden stops, Recovery, and Pol-
icy Options. Portugal and the Euro. GEE Papers, Gabinete de Estratégia e Estudos,
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Precautionary Savings and Aggregate Fluctuations. Review of Economic Studies, 77(4):
1477–1507, 2010.
Edward P. Lazear. Job Security Provisions and Employment. The Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 105(3):699–726, 1990.
Olivier l’Haridon, Franck Malherbet, and Sébastien Pérez-Duarte. Does Bargaining Matter
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This manuscript have overviewed the conduct of the Portuguese labour market, an example
of a Southern European and French based labour market, particularly during the Great
Recession. In this analysis, the institutions, as the features that define the market, the
contracts, and the relationship of the market actors with those, took a primal part.
In this archetype of market, sectoral bargaining assumes a key role, with trade unions and
employer’s associations defining the preset of labour contract that firms and workers are
bound to follow, or to improve upon. Dynamically, the market is set around the notion
of acquired rights, largely implying that nominal pay may not be reduced, and dismissals
may only take place in a limited set of events, often entangling sizable severance payments.
The upshot of this central organization is the enhanced role of trade unions. Differently
from other latitudes, trade unions do not need to justify their legitimacy to bargain, as
they have their role in collective bargaining legally enshrined. Thus, despite a severe
membership erosion through the last decades, they still cover an almost universal set of
contracts. Their presence in the wage setting has not abated, but their link to workers
have been continuously lessened. Despite this lessening, trade unions still secure higher
wages in workplaces and/or sectors in which they represent more workers.
In this treatment, I interpret the wage bargaining as constituting two phases, in a periodic
process, with the trade unions incapable to cause complete shutdowns of activity in case of
disagreement. At sector level, trade unions and employer’s try to argue the worth of each
type of workers in the market, and inscribed their findings as collective bargaining tables
of nominal wage floors, with sufficient detail to be tailored for each type of worker and job
performed. Then, at firm level, either a trade union or the worker, and the respective firm,
bargain for potential improvements upon the established minima. Once an agreement is
reached, the nominal wage often becomes an enduring right of the worker, which shall not
receive less than it for the remainder of the job spell.
Consequently, when the market goes into turmoil due to a severe downturn, the sides tem-
porarily shutdown bargaining, as trade unions understand that further nominal gains are
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impossible to agree upon, and firms realize that trade unions have locked up their already
acquired nominal wage levels. For staying workers, the realignment of real wages with
productivity levels takes place as inflation degrades the previously agreed nominal wages.
Then, the bargaining process eventually reopens once both sides reacquire incentives to
bargain, leading to a very resilient wage setting in real terms.
This internal devaluation is a process that is more liquidity intensive to firms than the
re-bargaining of wages without nominal constraints. Moreover, often firms have limited
ability to adjust the workforce without substantial costs, resulting in dismissals of perma-
nent contracts being often circumscribed to voluntary exits, and the dismissal of temporary
contract workers plus the pause on hiring not being enough to secure a sizable adjustment.
If liquidity is sufficiently exhausted and leverage increases sizably the firm risks bankruptcy
as the financial institutions pull off.
Critical to avoid a disorderly adjustment in these markets, with the breakdown of inter-
temporally viable worker-firm matches, is inflation, which fastens the process of real wage
adjustment. It is not by chance that many of these economies have hold higher inflation
levels when managing their own currencies. Alternatively, in contemporary low inflation
regimes, the management of firms’ liquidity, and of its leverage, becomes critical during
the slump. If neither is sufficiently effective, a catastrophic job destruction takes place,
largely fueled by bankruptcies. I argue this process was behind the Great Unemployment
Divergence recorded during the Great Recession.
Yet, the fate is not mechanical. It is possible to navigate identically rough waters with sub-
stantially different outcomes. For such, the management of leverage and liquidity of firms
along the downturn is critical, and relief may pour from a combination of monetary and
fiscal policy. Even considering temporary fiscal budget balanced policies, or extraordinary
collective agreement flexibility, it is possible to sizably alleviate the pressure. Perhaps,
that has been the difference between the approach undertaken in the Great Recession,
and so far in the current COVID shock, where unemployment didn’t increase sizably.
After severe tribulations that these labour market institutions have endured and prevailed,
one should find ways to fit policy to alleviate its propensity to spark catastrophic job
destruction, particularly in a low inflation regime, rather than attempting to dismantle
the institutional framework, that has always witness substantial popular support.
Success is not final; failure is not fatal: it is the courage to continue that counts.
Winston Churchill
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Appendix to Chapter 2
Appendix Table 1: The Most Representative Collective Agreements, 2010-2013
Rank Collective Agreement Number of Covered Average Number of
description workers per year Union Density Job Titles
1 Building and Construction 254,840 2.9% 461
2 Office Workers 143,941 2.9% 62
3 Metalwork and Metallurgy Industry 126,300 10.4% 34
4 Building and Construction II 109,115 2.6% 421
5 Supermarkets and Hypermarkets 108,632 9.4% 125
6 Private Social Security Institutions 103,563 5.8% 386
7 Car Industry and Trade 78,897 7.7% 412
8 Building and Construction III 69,662 2.2% 407
9 Textile Industry 65,065 5.6% 233
10 Hospitality Sector - Center and South Region - Restaurants 63,072 3.0% 259
11 Retail - Lisbon Region 61,141 2.9% 493
12 Cleaning Services 60,240 8.7% 105
13 Hospitality Sector - North Region - Restaurants 45,364 1.6% 390
14 Public Transport and Road Transport of Goods 43,470 3.4% 106
15 Private Education 42,196 3.2% 115
Source: Relatório Único, 2010-2013.
191
Appendix Table 2: OLS Estimation of the Union Wage Gap for Total Monthly Wages
including Non-Covered Workers
Variable Coefficient (s.e.)





Notes: Dependent variable: total monthly wages (in logs). The controls also include a
quadratic term in age, a quadratic term in tenure, a gender dummy, schooling dummies
(7), firm size dummies (5), sector of activity dummies (25), and year dummies (24).
The number of observations is 43,455,566. Robust firm clustered standard errors are in
parentheses: all coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.01 confidence level.Sources:
Quadros de Pessoal 1986-2009; Relatório Único, 2010-2013.
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Appendix Table 3: Summary Statistics
Variable Period
1986-2009 2010-2013
Union density − 9.90%
− (21.77)
Logarithm of Total Monthly Wages 5.47 5.60
(0.55) (0.53)
Logarithm of Bargained Wages 5.22 5.31
(0.46) (0.44)
Logarithm of Wage Cushion 0.25 0.29
(0.40) (0.43)
Worker’s age (in years) 36.85 40.01
(10.93) (10.37)
Tenure of the worker (in years) 8.18 8.79
(8.43) (8.56)
Proportion of Females 40.4% 45.7%
Education:
Less than primary school 2.76% 0.68%
Primary school 35.59% 15.52%
Basic school 21.94% 18.51%
Elementary school 17.05% 27.05%
Secondary school 16.39% 24.2%
Post-secondary school 0.23% 0.41%
University attendance 1.58% 1.90%
College degree 4.47% 11.72%
Workers in firms with:
less than 50 employees 47.23% 51.94%
50 to 99 employees 11.73% 11.51%
100 to 499 employees 21.20% 18.92%
500 to 999 employees 6.00% 4.55%
1000 to 4999 employees 8.93% 8.13%
more than 5000 employees 4.91% 4.95%
Worker-Year Observations 30, 397, 602 6, 237, 187
Notes: For the continuous variables, the mean is presented, with the standard deviation
displayed in parenthesis. Sources: Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2009; Relatório Único, 2010-
2013.
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Appendix Table 4: Conditional Decomposition of the OLS Estimation of the Union Wage
Gap for Different Model Specifications
Variables Base Model Full Model Gelbach
(γ0) (γ1) Decomposition
Standard Model
Union Wage Gap 0.1619*** −0.0029 −
(0.0244) (0.0086)
τα1 (Worker FE) − − −0.0026
(0.0055)
τθ1 (Job-title FE) − − 0.0571***
(0.0198)
τλ1 (Firm FE) − − 0.1103***
(0.0134)
R2 0.5373 0.8801
Standard Model without Firm Size and Sector Dummies.
Union Wage Gap 0.4492*** −0.0222* −
(0.0333) (0.0115)
τα1 (Worker FE) − − 0.0031
(0.0063)
τθ1 (Job-title FE) − − 0.0637**
(0.0281)
τλ1 (Firm FE) − − 0.4047***
(0.0208)
R2 0.4442 0.8799
Standard Model without Education, Firm Size and Sector Dummies.
Union Wage Gap 0.6643*** −0.0178 −
(0.0572) (0.0123)
τα1 (Worker FE) − − 0.0744***
(0.0140)
τθ1 (Job-title FE) − − 0.1491***
(0.0337)
τλ1 (Firm FE) − − 0.4586***
(0.0261)
R2 0.2044 0.8797
Notes: Decomposition based on Gelbach (2016). Robust firm clustered standard errors
are in parentheses: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10
levels, respectively. The standard model includes as regressors a quadratic term in age, a
quadratic term in tenure, schooling dummies (7), a gender dummy, firm size dummies (5),
year dummies (24), and sector dummies (25). The number of observations is 36,616,379.
Sources: Quadros de Pessoal, 1986-2009; Relatório Único, 2010-2013.
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Appendix Table 5: The Conditional Decomposition of the OLS Estimation of the Union
Wage Gap for Total Monthly Wages, using ESCO Occupation Definition
Variables Base Model Full Model Gelbach
(γ0) (γ1) Decomposition
Union Wage Gap 0.1619*** 0.0091 −
(0.0244) (0.0095)
τα1 (Worker FE) − − 0.0072
(0.0086)
τθ1 (Occupation FE) − − 0.0164**
(0.0077)
τλ1 (Firm FE) − − 0.1292***
(0.0126)
R2 0.5373 0.8801
Notes: Decomposition based on Gelbach (2016). Robust firm clustered standard errors
are in parentheses: ***, ** denote statistical significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels,
respectively. The base model includes as regressors a quadratic term in age, a quadratic
term in tenure, schooling dummies (7), a gender dummy, firm size dummies (5), and sector
dummies (25). The number of observations is 35,764,082. Sources: Quadros de Pessoal
1986-2009; Relatório Único, 2010-2013.
Appendix Table 6: 2SLS Estimation of the Union Wage Gap for Total Monthly Wages,







Notes: Dependent variable: total monthly wages (in logs). The second stage regression also
includes as controls a quadratic term in age, a quadratic term in tenure, a gender dummy,
schooling dummies (7), firm size dummies (5), sector dummies (25), year dummies (24),
firm fixed effect and worker fixed effect. The first stage regression has union density on the
left-hand side and the job-title fixed effect plus the controls presented in the second stage
on the right-hand side. The number of observations is 36,616,379. Robust firm clustered
standard error is in parentheses. The coefficient for predicted union density is statistically
significant at the 0.10 confidence level. Sources: Quadros de Pessoal 1986-2009; Relatório
Único, 2010-2013.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
A The Dataset and Collective Bargaining Structure in Por-
tugal
A1 Quadros de Pessoal, Relatório Único, and Sistema de Contas In-
tegradas das Empresas (SCIE).
The data sources of this study comprises information about the balance sheet and income
statement of the firms obtained from SCIE - Sistema de Contas Integradas das Empresas,
for the years 2005-2016, and information about the characteristics of the workers and of
their employment relationship, provided in Quadros de Pessoal (Personnel Tables) for the
years 1986-2009, and Relatório Único (Single Report), for the years 2010-2016.1
The three datasets are fully matched for the common years of the data. Consequently,
for each year from 1986 to 2016, we have a longitudinal matched employee-employer-
contract-job-title database, which from 2005 is supplemented with matched information
at firm level about the balance sheet and income statement of those firms.
The Quadros de Pessoal and the Relatório Único datasets are recorded by the Ministry of
Employment and Social Security and correspond to a mandatory survey on an annual basis
for all establishments with at least one wage earner. In this survey all workers employed
in October of each year are reported, although civil servants and workers in domestic
service are not covered. Therefore, the dataset covers the entire population of workers of
private-sector firms in manufacturing and services. Further, the long-lived requirement
of the information to be published at establishment level, ordinarily at the door of the
establishment ensures greater validity.
The dataset reports the firm’s location, industry, employment, sales, ownership, and legal
1For the year 1990 and 2001, the survey was either not administered, or not digitized.
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basis. Worker information includes gender, age, skill, occupation, schooling completed,
starting date at the firm, earnings, and working hours. In addition, the survey also records
the collective bargaining arrangement and the specific job-title held by the worker under
collective agreement, which is of particular importance for this study.
In these datasets the following restrictions were applied: (a) we only consider full-time
employers in receipt of what is contractually defined for the reporting month; (b) we ex-
clude workers from agriculture, fisheries, and energy products/extraction sectors; (c) we
exclude workers aged less than 18 years or greater than 65 years; and (d) we exclude work-
ers earning less than 80 percent of the minimum wage2. A significant array of descriptive
statistics on this matched dataset is provided in table A1 and A2.
As a matter of empirical implementation, we do not have the wage floor for each job-title,
and we just have the identification of each category for each worker. However, we are
aware that each job-title is subjected to a minimum base wage. Therefore we estimate
the minimum base wage for each job-title as the minimum hourly wage reported for the
workers working with that category in the entire economy. Implicitly, we are assuming
that the minimum base wage for each job-title is at least binding for one worker.
Then we combine the established matched dataset with the SCIE dataset, with a coverage
of the match above 97 percent. The SCIE dataset is managed by National Statistics Insti-
tute, which provides a unified survey system. Its reporting is mandatory for the universe
of registered firms operating in Portugal, including those with no employees. This dataset
has a vast array of accounting information, namely with detailed information about every
entry of the balance sheet and income statement legally required for accounting purposes
under the SNC - Sistema Normalização de Contas. Among the information provided,
one has access to the level of assets, liabilities and equity, and its typical accounting par-
titions, as well as profits, output value, value-added, payroll, purchase of intermediate
goods, investment levels, service of debt among others.
A2 Example of a Wage Table of a Collective Agreement of the Por-
tuguese Labour Market
In the Portuguese Labour Market, each collective agreement and its wage table is published
in the Boletim do Trabalho e Emprego (i.g. Work and Employment Bulletin). As a matter
of example, table A3 presents one of the wage tables existing in 2017. It corresponds
2Corresponding to the lowest admissible wage in the case of apprendiceships.
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to a CCT, or sector agreement, between AHRESP (i.g. the association of employers of
hospitality and similar), and SITESE (i.g. the union of workers and technicians of services,
commerce and hospitality), signed in April 22, 2017.3
Interestingly, and common to the vast majority of the agreements in place, the presented
agreement is incredibly detailed with more than 60 clauses and a vast number of ap-
pendices. For example, there are specific rules for: (a) working conditions; (b) minimum
payments for meal subsidy among other side payments; (c) specific rules that even includes
clothing; and (d) the definition of minimum ranks based on observables, for example ed-
ucation and tenure.
Our claim in the text is that each of these agreements correspond to a branch, each
ranking the workers, in this case with 13 ranks, and classifying the workers, within the
ranks, according to their job titles. These classifications often exist in more than one
agreement. It is noteworthy the sector nature of these agreements. While it may be
perceived as a breach in the ranking, in our interpretation it provides adjustment of the
outside options to sector preferences and sector labour market outcomes governing the
outside option. Such argument is reinforced by the proper structure of unions, which are
aggregated in two major confederations (i.e. UGT and CGTP) - clearly a centralized
system.
Our interpretation is reinforced by the idea that those wages are pledged and legally
binding for the future, and tie the firm to pay those values given the worker’s rank, whom
cannot be demoted. Simultaneously, the firm and the union may still at firm level bargain,
with the latter pushing for better working conditions and compensation, which for the
former will be more flexible to withdraw in the presence of adverse economic conditions.
It is this reasoning that lead us to consider that those bargained wages are indeed the
level of the immediate outside option of the worker.
3The translations presented are freely derived by the authors, and thought as faithful to the original
meaning in Portuguese. This corresponds to a revision of a previous sector agreement between the parties












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table A3 - Representative Wage Table, with Bargained Wages.
Rank Job Description Minimum
Base Wage
13 General Manager 1,515
12 Board Assistant; Commercial Manager; Service Manager; 1,240
Human Resources Manager; Technical Manager
11 Head of Department; Head of Division; 1,018
Head of Services; Nutrition Technician 1st Class
10 Head of section (office); Head of Sales; Inspector; 898
Board Secretariat officer; Nutrition Technician 2nd Class
9 Administrative; Head of Cafeteria; Head of Purchases; 808
Head of Kitchen; Head of Pastries; Head of Storage;
Head of Dinning Room; Inspector of Sales
8 Cashier; Head of Preparation Room; Controller; 771
Cook of 1st Class; Sub-Head of Dinning Room;
Administrative Assistant; Pastry Cook; Sales Technician
7 Driver of Heavy Vehicles; Storage Keeper; Polyvalent Worker 716
6 Driver of Non-heavy Vehicles; Administrative 700
Assistant 2nd Class; Pastry Cook 2nd Class; Sub-Head
of Dinning Room 2nd Class; Sales Representative
5 Cook 2nd Class; Controller of Balcony; Controller of Bar; 629
Controller of Storage and packing; Admin. Assistant 3rd Class
4 Head of Copa; Cook of 3rd Class; Packing worker; Storage Worker 582.50
3 Controller cashier; Storage worker; Bar Worker; 570
Balcony Worker 1st Class; Distribution Handler;
2 Balcony Worker 2nd Class; Admin. Intern; Hospitality Assist. 562
1 Driver Assistant; Distribution Assistant; Barman 557
Intern (1 year); Cook Intern (1 year);
Pastry Intern (1 year); Cleaning Worker; Dining room Employer
Notes: Amounts in euros, and corresponding to monthly payment. Table extracted from
the Sector agreement signed on the 22nd of April 2017, between AHRESP (e.g. the as-
sociation of employers of hospitality and similar) and SITESE (e.g. the union of workers
and technicians of services, commerce and hospitality). Source: Boletim do Trabalho e
Emprego, 2017.
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B Technical Details on the Model and Links with the Lit-
erature
In this appendix we present: (i) the relationship of the model with the search and match-
ing literature and the union-firm bargaining literature, in part B1; (ii) the derivation of
additional relevant conditions to fully describe both the dynamic and the steady state
equilibria, in part B2; (iii) the derivation of equilibrium wages for both types of equilibria,
in part B3; and (iv) the description of the dynamic and steady state equilibria and their
properties, concretely regarding existence and uniqueness, in part B4.
B1 The Links between the Model and the Search and Matching Liter-
ature and the Firm-Union Bargaining Literature
Bridging the Model of Labour Tasks and some Canonicals of the Search and
Matching Literature. The apparatus of our model was constructed so it can be easily
reshaped as several canonical models in the literature of search, mostly resorting to: (b)
a wise choice of parameters, and (c) variations of the modelling of the choice of capital.
Firstly, the mutation of our model into the model of Acemoglu and Hawkins (2014) crit-
ically requires that: (a) we set J = 1, as they abstain from modelling different types of
tasks; (b) ξΞ(a|K,β) = 0,∀{a,K, β}, as they don’t consider a model with on job search;
(c) {K} to be relabelled as z their idiosyncratic firm’s productivity parameter; (d) β = β̄
so there is homogeneous bargaining power in the economy; (e) a = ā and known by workers
and firms; and (f) s̃(a|K,β) = 0 as there is no firing at-will.
Further, in the model of Acemoglu and Hawkins (2014) consider γ(V ) to be linear and
not strictly convex as presented. The fundamental implication of this deviation is that
instead of having a growth path of each firm, which is pivotal in the author’s analysis, we
assume a firm can immediately attain its optimal scale without incurring in further costs
due to simultaneous hiring.4 Closely related with this deviation, we do not model entry
and exit of firms, and thus in their model consider FCt =∞ - no entry of new firms, and
δ = 0 - no exit of firms.5
4The extension to allow the incorporation of their class of vacancy costs increases the complexity of
the model by some degrees, given one is required to keep track of the history of firms.
5This deviation allows for notation simplicity, and given the intention to focus on optimal scale, comes
without further implication.
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Secondly, one can also adapt this model to resemble Cahuc et al. (2008), which models a
representative firm. For this purpose, consider: (a) ξΞ(a|K,β) = 0,∀{a,K, β}, so there is
no on job search; (c) A(j, a) = 0, ∀j, a so that operating costs are fully neglectful; (d) there
is no firing at will so s̃(a|K,β) = 0,∀{a,K, β}; and either (e1) {K,β} = {k, β̄}, ∀{K,β},
where k is a given constant, and β is homogeneous across firms, but potentially different
across task markets, representing a J × 1 vector. Therefore, firms do not have any het-
erogeneity arising from capital or bargaining powers, and we follow the most restrictive
version of their model, without capital; or (e2) consider that capital is also chosen optimally
ex-ante to the task decisions and thus add the following condition to our equilibrium:6
∂F (N,K)
∂K











where d is the depreciation rate, which we have abstracted in our model formulation, and
Aj(π) is identical to equation (41) of appendix B2.
Thirdly, resorting to the insights of Cahuc and Wasmer (2001), the model can also be
translated to the large firm version of the matching model of Pissarides (1990). For that
purpose, we have: either (a1) J = 1 so that there is only one type of tasks; or (a2) J > 1,
but the types of tasks are perfect substitutes; (c) ξΞ(a|K,β) = 0,∀{a,K, β}, so no on job
search; (d) a = ā,∀j, a, so that the worker heterogeneity is fully neglectful for equilibrium
purposes; and (e) perfect capital markets, and simultaneous decision of labour and capital




= r + d. (.2)
Fourthly, the model would mimic Mortensen (2009) if we consider: (a) there is not entry
or exit of firms (i.e. δ = 0 and FCf =∞); (b) J = 1 so that there is only one type of tasks;
(c) a = ā,∀j, a so that operating costs are fully neglectful; (d) K is constant overtime, and
represents the idiosyncratic productivity of the firms, presented in the chapter as p(x),
and (e) β = β̄ is constant for every firm and in every task market.
In a nutshell, our model is isomorphic to a wide range of standard search and matching
models. Mainly that is attainable by: (a) sufficiently restricting the parameterization
of the model (i.g. heterogeneity); (b) considering alterations of the capital allocation
6See Cahuc et al. (2008) to the details on how to obtain this expression from our model under this set
of assumptions. Further notice that if one considers optimal choice of capital, ex-ante to task allocation,
and fully neglects the firm heterogeneity arising from bargaining powers, then we are in an environment
of a representative firm.
7See Cahuc and Wasmer (2001) for the specific details about this equivalence.
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mechanism, whose implications for our modelling objectives are fairly minor; and (c)
considering the dynamics of vacancy costs and entry and exit of firms.
Finally, Krause and Lubik (2007) provides relevant insight about the macroeconomic impli-
cations for the empirical fitting of a search and matching model with intra-firm bargaining
in the spirit of Stole and Zwiebel (1996a). Firstly, intra-firm bargaining causes firms to
expand employment in order to bolster their bargaining position relatively to workers,
as analyzed by Cahuc et al. (2008). Theoretically, such movement causes not only an
expansion in employment, but also an increase in wages, due to the lower unemployment
and higher vacancies posted, which raises outside option values in a general equilibrium
framework. While this could be perceived as an important effect, whose implications are
worth to study, Krause and Lubik (2007) provides evidence of a meaningless effect in the
fitting of a proper macroeconomic model. Our choice of modelling is thus rooted not by
claims it increases the macroeconomic fitting, but by the microeconomic appeal it has in
fitting with the workings of the market.
The Relationship of the model with some Canonical Firm-Union Bargaining
Models. Particularly since the 1970’s and 1980’s, there was a growing interest in de-
veloping and assessing different approaches to incorporate trade unions in regular labour
economics models in general, and in the search and matching context in particular.8
From this debate four stylized approaches have settled, concretely: (i) the monopoly model
of Dunlop (1944); (ii) the right-to-manage model of Nickell and Andrews (1983); (iii) the
efficient bargaining model of McDonald and Solow (1981); and (iv) the sequential models of
wage-employment bargaining of Manning (1987). The fundamental theoretic divergences
among those classes of models lie on the structure of the bargaining and the bargainable
variables, rather than the profit maximization objective of the firm, and the members’
welfare maximization of unions. Those objective functions are presented in equations 15
and 14 in section 3.
While there is a consensus on the objectives of the parties, the notion of union’s members
has been debated. Some approaches consider as union members the employed workforce,
while others consider the entire available labour force as potential union members.
Regarding the structure of bargaining, each of the four presented categories of models have
8See Johnson (1975), Parsley (1980), Oswald (1985) and Manning (1992) for comprehensive surveys of
the literature of theory models of union and firm wage and employment setting. Further, see Pissarides
(1986) which corresponds to the first paper to introduce a union in a search and matching model.
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different implications, which however can be compared. The monopoly model considers
that the union maximizes its welfare by choosing the wage, and firms are left to define the








assuming an interior solution in equilibrium.
The right to manage model is a generalization of the monopoly model, where instead of
unions defining wages, union and the firm bargain over the wage, resorting to an axiomatic
generalized bargaining as in Nash Jr (1950), or a game theoretic approach as in Rubinstein
















where W̄t and Π̄ would correspond to union’s members welfare and profits in the case of
a full bargaining breakdown, respectively.
In a different paradigm, in the efficient bargain model, unions and firms bargain resorts to
the propositions of either Nash Jr (1950) or Rubinstein (1982) and Binmore et al. (1986),













While apparently different, the work of Manning (1987) bridges the previously presented
models, by considering a sequential bargaining, where first unions and firms bargain over
wages, and subsequently they bargain over employment. Thus solving backwards, we have
























Noteworthy, this model boils into: (i) the monopoly model if β̃ = 1 and β = 0; (ii)
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the right to manage model if β = 0; and (iii) the efficient bargain model if β̃ = β.
Moreover, Manning (1987) shows that if employment is decided before wages the sequential
model always yield the efficient bargain model solution, regardless of the relative strength
of bargaining powers. Altogether, in the canonical firm-union environment the models’
equilibria can be graphically compared, as in figure B1.
The way the representative union is integrated in our model relates to this debate, sub-
jected to the remainder assumption framework of the model. Firstly, given in continental
Europe collective bargaining coverage is extremely high, independently of membership,
we adopt a fully representative union, which therefore considers the welfare of the entire
available labour force, as presented in equation 14. Secondly, we consider the insight of
the right-to-manage and monopoly models by considering the union bargains over wages
alone. Thirdly, in the dynamic formulation of our model, we adopt a sequential modelling
where firms and the union bargain over wages, and then firms set employment.
Finally, we supplement our model with another instrumental assumption. Most of the
models in the literature assume that if there is a bargaining breakdown the entire workforce
is displaced at least temporarily. In our setting, we adopt a gradual collective bargaining
setting as in Dobbelaere and Luttens (2016), where the union bargains sequentially in
the name of each worker, and does not impose a full lockdown in case of bargaining
reaching a standstill. Rather, in the specific contract that originated the stalemate, a
worker leaves the firm without being entitled to a severance payment. Then, the parties
restart the bargain again, for every contract. This process unfolds until the deadlock may
be surpassed.
Altogether, our kind of union will determine that the outcome of the bargaining corre-
sponds to the competitive environment, as in other search and matching models with
individual intra-firm bargaining, whose equilibrium conditions perfectly match the ones
of our model (for example Cahuc et al. (2008) and Acemoglu and Hawkins (2014)). In a
more stylized model would therefore be identifiable as point C in figure B1.
Alternatively, one could consider the proposition of Bauer and Lingens (2010), where in
a setting close to ours the authors consider a union with power to impose lockdowns,
and firms with the ability to displace the entire workforce. The major change actually
comprises equation (23) of the model. Instead of bargaining sequentially for each worker,
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Figure B1: Graphical Analysis of the Union’s Models Solutions.
Notes: The M point represents the Monopoly model solution, and C point represents the
competitive solution, where in the canonical environment β = 0. The right to manage
model solution takes place anywhere on the demand curve (LD), between points M and
C, as it entails bargaining with an intermediate bargaining power of unions, compared to
the presented extremes. Then point ER represents the efficient bargain solution, when β
would be compatible with a right-to-manage solution in point R.













s. to: same constraints.
(.8)
In this case we would end up with a solution somewhere in the locus of points [C,M ].
Our modelling choice relies on the lack of empirical evidence that a bargaining breakdown
leads to either: (i) the dismissal of the entire workforce of a firm, or (ii) a prolonged strike
that locks down the firm. Regarding the former, the only known case of an entire dismissal
of workers following the breakdown of negotiations happened in the Ronald Reagan and the
air traffic controllers case in 1981, which as presented by Dobbelaere and Luttens (2016)
was predominantly political. Regarding the latter, Boeri and van Ours (2013) presents
evidence that strikes are relatively rare, and prolonged strikes even more in Continental
European labour markets. For the years 2000-2003, Spain had the most lost working days
to strikes among continental European countries, representing 0.6 working days per year
and worker. For the same sample, the average duration of strikes was at most 5.1 days,
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recorded for Ireland and Poland.
B2 Complementary Definitions on Job-Flows
Firm’s Hiring Policy. The profit of the firm with fundamentals {K,β} is assumed to
be strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable in employment. It is given, as in
equation (15) of the text, by:
rΠ(K,β)− ∂Π(K,β)
∂t







































− γjVj(K,β) + Vj(K,β)q(θj)JRj (K,β)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Value of the Hiring Policy
.
(.9)










if Vj(K,β) = 0
. (.10)
Firm’s Firing Policy. Apart from the hiring policy, firms also define their firing policy.
Firms, may fire at-will any worker, as long as they pay a corresponding exogenous firing
9The considered corner solution exists due to the impossibility of costless firing at will, as motivated
in Bertola and Caballero (1994). Further we assume JRj (K,β) > −∞, so it is bounded from below.
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J(a,K, β)︸ ︷︷ ︸




− Jj(a,K, β)− S + max
{
− e−r∆tγ + e−r∆tq(θj)JRj (K,β); 0
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Optimally decide if replace or not the fired worker
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸





where the firm balances the option of keeping the worker, against the options to firing
him, and subsequently either replace or not replace him in the following period. Notice the
firm considers a consistent policy for its entire workforce due to the linkages between the
marginal values of the jobs across workers. The maximand function s̃j(a|K,β) corresponds
to a threshold function as:
s̃j(a|K,β) =

1 if a ≤ aj(K,β)
0 if a > aj(K,β)
. (.12)
Beyond a potential bargaining breakdown with the union, and its decision of firing a
given worker, the firm is also subjected to displacement due to an exogenous shock, for
example due to the death of a worker, which happens with probability s̄, and a successful
outcome of the on-job-search of its employed worker, given by the function mj(a|K,β).
The displacement rate function is given by:
sj(a|K,β) =

1 if a ≤ aj(K,β)
s̄+mj(a|K,β) if a > aj(K,β).
(.13)
Altogether, we have defined the behaviour of firm’s (K,β) type in managing its workforce.
Job Search. Synchronously, both workers and the unemployed have the option to search
for jobs. For that purpose, when they decide to search, they do so in the task market
which yields the most expected return, and in searching they incur in a cost given by
cj(a), dependent on the task market they intend to search for, and their type a. For an
10The operator ∆t represents a time lag. −e−r∆t represents a discount factor, where (1)
lim∆t→0+ −e−r∆t = 1, and (2) lim∆t→∞−e−r∆t = 0.
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employed worker, he solves his search problem as:




























where 1[Ξl(a|x, y) > Ξj(a|K,β)] is an indicator function being 1 if the potential offer
Ξl(a|x, y) provides an higher value than Ξj(a|K,β).






























where Out(a) is the unemployed value, given his type, and ξ are indicator functions,











−Out(a)− cl(a) > 0 for at least one task market j, so
that the unemployed always search in some market; (ii) Ξj(a|x, y) > Out(a) ∀{x, y}, so
that after they decide to search and after paying the search cost, which becomes sunk,
an unemployed worker will always prefer to work;11 (iii) cj(a) is differentiable, convex,
strictly decreasing in a, holds limx→0 cj(x) = C̄ > 0 and limx→∞ cj(x) = 0; and (iv)
cj(a) < cl(a) ∀l > j. Altogether, the optimal search behaviour for the unemployed follows
a system of threshold rules. Thus, the vector of search choices becomes:
ξu(a) =
[
1(l = 1, a > a1), . . . , 1(l = j, al−1 > a > al), . . . , 1(j = J, a < aJ)
]
(.17)
implying that unemployed perfectly segment across the task markets accordingly to their
type. Furthermore, given the search behaviour of an unemployed, we have that:
ξΞj (a|K,β) ∈ {0, ξu(a)}, (.18)
so that an employed worker if he searches, he does so in the task market he would search
if he was unemployed. Concretely, given Ξl(a|K,β) > Out(a),∀l ∈ {0, . . . , J}, the worker
may eventually decide not to search, when he would do so if unemployed. Therefore, the
worker’s type, a, is a sufficient statistic of task market choice in on-job search, conditional
on searching.






where b stands for the unemployment benefit, so that eventually a firm shall not grow indefinitely.
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As a reference, this behaviour of the agents regarding employment flows and selection
reproduces the behaviour of the classical selection model of Roy (1951).12
Probability of successful on-job-search. Following this structure, the probability of










Prob. the worker accepts a job in j
(.19)
where Dl(w(a|K,β)) is the distribution of wage offers in task market j.13 The expectation






ξuj (a)J(a|K,β)dU(a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected value of a job





















ξΞj (a|x, y)dGl(a|x, y)dΓ(x, y)
da︸ ︷︷ ︸
Expected value of a job when a employed searching at task j is hired
.
(.20)
Market tightness and vacancy yield. Given the search behaviour of workers and






























j (a|K,β)dGl(a|K,β)dΓ(K,β)da represents the number of




j (a)dU(a)da gives the
number of unemployed searching for a job in the task market j; and (iii) the number of





Given this market structure, the probability of a firm of type {K,β} to find a worker of
12Notice that in this framework, theoretically our results will not be plagued by endogenous mobility
conditional on the described behaviour. A different outcome would potentially be achieved if for instance
one would consider a generalized Roy model (see Heckman and Vytlacil (2007) for an example). For
modelling ease we do not consider such generalization, as we do not empirically explore the potential
selection model that would emerge from this behaviour.






























where X−j (w(a|K,β)) = limx↑w(a|K,β)Xj(x) is the distribution of wages that employed
workers which are searching in task market j are receiving. Notice, as typical in these type
of models we assume workers do not move to a worse paying match.14 Accordingly, the
vacancy yield of a firm of type (K,β), i.e. the probability of firm of type {K,β} to hire a





Evolution of workforce composition. Finally, the expected evolution of the workforce
composition of a firm of type (K,β) is then given by:15
∂dGj,t(a|K,β)
∂t
= −dGj,t−ε(a|K,β)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Workers of type a at period t− ε
+ yj,t(a|K,β)Vj,t(K,β)︸ ︷︷ ︸








Prob. that incumbent workforce at firm develops into workforce of type a
,
(.24)
where: (i) the probability that a worker to keep his operational cost fixed from a period
to another is zero so the workforce in a at period t − ε will not be in a at period t; (ii)
yj,t(a|K,β)Vj,t(K,β) represents the probability of hiring a worker of precisely operating
cost a per vacancy posted (i.e. Vj(K,β)); and (iii) the third term consider, from the
workers that have not left the firm of type {K,β}, those whose skill acquisition process
leave them precisely at operating cost level a, where ψ(a|a′′) is the probability distribution
function of the random component of the skill acquisition process, from previous period
a′′ to current period a.





















15For notation clarity, in this equation, we refer to a′′ as the skill stock in the previous period, and a
as the skill process in the current period.
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B3 Derivation of Equilibrium Wages
On the heterogeneity of bargaining powers. The derivation of the interior solution
of the dynamic equilibrium wages follows closely the steps considered in Acemoglu and
Hawkins (2014) and Cahuc et al. (2008). In this derivation, we will assume that β is a
vector of bargaining powers, implying instead of a common bargaining power for every
task market within the firm, the existence of heterogeneous bargaining powers per task
market, i.e. β = [β1, . . . , βj , . . . , βJ ].





































Impact of hiring and firing policy of the firm in the value of the employment
,
(.1)
At this stage we impose the assumption that both parties bargain under the assumption of
match stability, i.e. no party, at-will, will dissolve the match, implying the parties believe,

























Given the bargaining arrangement, expressed in equation (23) of the text, assuming the











In addition, considering that the outside option bargained between the parties is not






































































































and together with equation (7), one obtains:



























Incorporating equations (3) and (5), and simplifying the resulting equation, we obtain
a system of differential equations governing the equilibrium wages for each match with
fundamentals {a,K, β}. Such system is given by:




























and consistently with equation (10), becomes:


















Further, given equation (11), the proper wage for the match fundamentals {a,K, β} is
given by:



















Solving the system of differential equations for the partial equilibrium wages
To solve the system of differential equations of equation (12), we follow the insight of
Cahuc et al. (2008). Thus, take the partial derivative of the average wages, wj(K,β),
with respect to employment in another task market Nl(K,β), l 6= j, given the difference
between any wj(a|K,β) and wj(K,β) is based, in the moment of the bargaining of prices
within the firm, on the exogenous values, i.d. (a) Out(a) versus E[Out(a)|K,β]; and (b)

























































Jointly, this allows to write equation (12) as:



















The case of homogeneous β at firm level. At this stage let us first assume that
βj = β - homogeneous bargaining power at firm level so that χjl = 1, ∀{l, j}. Considering
the generalized spherical coordinates ι, ω1, . . . , ωJ−1, where ι is the distance to the origin
such that ∑Jj=1Nj(K,β)2 = ι2, where ωj are angles of projection in different subplanes,
one can write:
N1(K,β) = ιcosω1 . . . cosJ−2cosJ−1
N2(K,β) = ιcosω1 . . . cosJ−3sinJ−2











= ι∂wj(ι, ω,K, β)
∂ι
, (.20)
where ι is the scale of use of labour tasks, and ω reflects the proportions in which the
different types of labour tasks are used. ω = (0, . . . , 0) means that firm only employ




















; and (2) A(j, a), we
can drop it and thus we have:
dwj(ι, ω,K, β)
dι
+ wj(ι, ω,K, β)
βι





Notice that the solution of the homogeneous equation ∂wj(ι,ω,K,β)∂ι +
wj
βι = 0 is given by:








































∂F (ι, ω,K, β)
∂Nj(K,β)
, (.26)







∂F (z, ω,K, β)
∂Nj(K,β)
dz +D, (.27)
where D is the constant of integration. Given the property that
limι→0+ ιwj(ι, ω,K, β) = 0, we have that the constant D is identically equal to zero.
Therefore the solution to equation (21) satisfies:



















Further, notice that if N(K,β) = (ι, ω), then (zι, ω) = [zN1(K,β), zN2(K,β), . . . , zNJ(K,β)] =














dz − βE[A(j, a)|K,β],
(.29)
and by doing so fully eliminating the spherical coordinates, which results in the solution
of the system of differential equations in equation (12).
Further, from equation (29), one can infer that the equilibrium wages, and the solution of















dz − βA(j, a),
(.30)
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The case of heterogeneous β at firm level. It is helpful to consider a new variable, as














with vj [Mj,j(K,β),K] = wj(K,β). Also, we assume it holds:
1. G(Mj ,K) = F (N(K,β),K);



















One feasible solution, not necessarily the only one, corresponds to:
Mj,l = Nl(K,β)
1
χjl = Nl(K,β)χlj (.34)

















since χjj = 1. The system in equation (12) can be expressed as:


















which is identical to equation (18). Therefore, following the procedure explained for
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identical β’s, one obtains:













,K)dz − βjE[A(j, a)|K,β]
(.38)















dz − βjE[A(j, a)|K,β]
(.39)
Then, given the definition of the wages for each match fundamentals {a,K, β}, and namely















dz − βjA(j, a),
(.40)







βfjt 0 . . . 0
0 . . . . . . 0





. . . . . . . . . 0







As one can notice, considering heterogeneous β fundamentally change the calculus of the
relevant marginal product of labour, and the portion of the idiosyncratic surplus that the
worker is capable to extract.
General equilibrium wages in a dynamic equilibrium with heterogeneous β.
To obtain the equilibrium wages in a dynamic equilibrium, we need to consider the HJB






























dz − βA(j, a),
(.42)
where 1[Ξl(a|K,β) > Out(a)] is an indicator function being 1 if the offer has a higher
value than the outside option. Notice that this result confirms the intuition that under the
assumption of match stability the outside option do not depend on the current match of the
worker. Moreover, notice that by assumption we have that Ξl(a|K,β) > Out(a)∀{a,K, β},




























dz − βA(j, a),
(.43)





























dz − βA(j, a),
(.44)
Given the assumptions of: (1) bounded expression; (2) smoothness of production function;
and (3) match stability in bargaining, the unique solution for wages in the dynamic equi-
librium is given by equation (41) and (43). This expression is identical to wage expressions
using intra-firm bargaining of Stole and Zwiebel (1996a). In that stream of studies, one
can refer to Cahuc et al. (2008), Bauer and Lingens (2010), Elsby and Michaels (2013),
Acemoglu and Hawkins (2014) and Dobbelaere and Luttens (2016).
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The solution of the aggregate bargaining. Consider the solution of the firm level
bargaining, as provided in equation (24) of the text. Accordingly, the average wage for a
type a worker is given by:


























































and consequently, once we impose the constraint of zero expected quasi-rents, we have:




Therefore, the solution of the aggregate bargaining in equation (21) of the text is equation
(48). Notice, that the key to identify this solution is to realize that an identical derivation
to the one presented in equations (1) to (10) of this appendix can be easily computed for
the average firm in the market. Indeed if equation (10) holds for every single firm, it also
holds on average for each type a worker. Then one needs just to consider the additional
constraint presented in the aggregate bargaining versus the firm bargaining, namely the
absence of quasi-rents.
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B4 The Dynamic and Steady State Equilibria
Additional Assumptions for dynamic equilibrium. At this stage we consider two
additional technical assumptions, as follows:
• Bounded expression - limNj→wj(a|K,β)Nj = 0;
• Smoothness of Production Function - F (N(K,β),K) is continuous for all Nj >
0, and infinitely differentiable for all Nj > 0. Further, Nj ∂F (N(K,β),K)∂Nj , and the











These assumptions are fairly technical to ensure there exists an equilibrium wage function
that is smooth in all Nj > 0, and unique. Altogether, the dynamic equilibrium of the
model is defined as follows:
Theorem 1 (Dynamic Equilibrium). A tuple{
θj(t), Out(a), G(a|K,β), dG(a|K,β), J(a|K,β),Ξ(a|K,β), wj(a|K,β), ξuj (a),
ξΞ(a|K,β), sj(a|K,β),mj(a|K,β), yj(a|K,β), Vj(K,β), dℵ(a)
} (.1)
is a dynamic equilibrium if for all t, the following statements are jointly satisfied:
• J(·), Out(·) and Ξ(·) satisfy HJB equations (16), (17) and (18) of the text;
• Vacancy Posting is optimal so it holds equation (9) and equation (20) of appendix
B2;
• G(a|K,β) has a density dG(a|K,β) satisfying equation (24) of appendix B2;
• Job search is optimal so it solves the problems in equations (14) and (15) of appendix
B2;
• sj(a|K,β) holds equation (13) and mj(a|K,β) holds equation (19) of appendix B2;
• The vacancy yield holds equations (22) and (23) of appendix B2;
• The market tightness hold equation (21) of appendix B2, and equation (5) of the
text;
• The unemployed distribution dU(a) and the distribution of workers dℵ(a) follow
equations (12) of the text;
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• The equilibrium wage satisfies the problem in equation (21) and equation (23) of the
text.
Core definitions and assumptions of the steady state equilibrium. In the model
one can define a steady state equilibrium where all aggregate variables are constant over
time, and where wages and the vacancy-posting strategies of firms depend only on firm’s
fundamentals (K,β). Let us define a level aR such that:
JRj (K,β) = Jj(aR|K,β), (.2)
so that it is the level of skill that is compatible with the expected marginal profit profit





























Given the steady state equilibrium imposes stability of aggregate variables, there is sta-















Through a process identically presented in The system of Differential equations for equi-
librium wages part of appendix B3, we have:














The Vacancy Curve. Given by assumption s̄ > 0, then we have that V (K,β) > 0 in a








−A(j, aR)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Marginal Product net of op. costs
=wj(aR|K,β)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Wage












Employment effect on wages
.
(.8)
This result is typical in steady-state equilibria of search and matching models, and intu-
itively entails that the expected marginal worker produces on the margin the value of the
cost of hiring such worker.16 Following similar steps to the ones presented to solve this










Overemployment Effect - OEj(K,β)
∂F (N(K,β),K)
∂Nj(K,β)












Considering the wage equation with the assumptions identified in equations (5) and (6),
and the definition of employment effect, we have:



























dz − βA(j, aR)

















































































Those equations corresponds to the vacancy curves of the firm with fundamentals (K,β)
- V Cj(K,β).17 Notice that the right-hand side of the vacancy curve is unambiguously
increasing in θ.
Lemma on Profit of firms and wages. The flow profit
rΠ(K,β)− ∂Π(K,β)
∂t














A(j, a)dGj(a|K,β)da︸ ︷︷ ︸
Operating Cost Bill
















− γjVj(K,β) + Vj(K,β)q(θj)JRj (K,β)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Value of the Hiring Policy
.
(.12)
is continuous, strictly concave and satisfies:
lim
N→0+







assumed in the model, it implies that:
lim
Nj(K,β)→∞
Π(K,β) = −∞, (.15)
implying that the optimal workforce size vector N(K,β) is finite in every task market for
every firm. Further notice that










































































































































fore, given the production function is strictly concave and displaying decreasing returns


















by assumption, that wages are strictly positive and strictly decreasing with firm size. As
noted by Acemoglu and Hawkins (2014), given
lim
Nj(K,β)→0+
wj(aR|K,β) = +∞ (.19)
the level of employment that maximizes the flow profit is strictly positive.
Considerations on steady-state equilibrium. Given the shape of the profit function of
a firm, precisely: (a) limN→0+ Π(K,β) = 0; (b) Π(K,β) is strictly concave on employment;





then equation (20) has a unique vector of employment N(K,β) conditional on the values
of the endogenous variables.
The steady-state condition The steady state equilibrium concept offers a greater sim-
plification to our framework, which arises from imposing stability of aggregate flows at firm
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level. Thus, the stability of aggregate flows, equation (24) of appendix B2, and equation
(5) jointly yield:













































Steady state equilibrium description. Therefore, the steady-state equilibrium is a
specialization of the dynamic equilibrium presented with the following properties:
Theorem 2 (Steady-State Equilibrium). A tuple{
θj(t), Out(a), G(a|K,β), dG(a|K,β), J(a|K,β),Ξ(a|K,β), wj(a|K,β), ξuj (a),
ξΞ(a|K,β), sj(a|K,β),mj(a|K,β), yj(a|K,β), Vj(K,β), dℵ(a)
} (.25)
is a steady state equilibrium if for q(θ) > 0 and s̄ > 0, the following statements are jointly
satisfied:
• J(·), Out(·) and Ξ(·) satisfy HJB equations (16), (17) and (18) of the text;
• Vacancy Posting is optimal so it holds equation (9) and equation (20) of appendix
B2;
• G(a|K,β) has a density dG(a|K,β) satisfying equation (24) of appendix B2, and
equation (23) of this appendix;
• Job search is optimal so it solves the problems in equations (14) and (15) appendix
B2;
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• sj(a|K,β) holds equation (13), and mj(a|K,β) holds equation (19) of appendix B2;
• The vacancy yield holds equations (22), and (23) of appendix B2;
• The market tightness hold equation (21) of appendix B2, and equation (5) of the
text;
• The unemployed distribution dU(a) and the distribution of workers dℵ(a) follow
equations (12) of the text;
• The equilibrium wage satisfies the problem in equation (21) and (23) of the text;
• The steady state conditions of equation (4) and equation (24);
• The stability of expectations of HJB functions in equation (5).
Note that the the distribution of skill within workplaces satisfies an ergodicity condition
and thus Gj(a|K,β) is unique. So there is no loss of generality to apply such distribution
which is assumed to be continuously differentiable. Note that s̄ > 0, which is partially
justified by the death and birth shocks d. Note, that to ease the technical explanation on
ergodicity, one can reason such shocks as a massive destructive shock on skill, which leads
the worker to have his skill extracted from Ψ0(a), rather than having the worker dying
and a new worker entering the market. Thus, we arive at the uniqueness of the invariant
distribution through Theorem 11.9 of Stokey et al. (1989).18
18An identical argument is used in Acemoglu and Hawkins (2014).
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C Derivation of the Empirical Model for Outside Options
The equilibrium wage expression with heterogeneous bargaining powers is given by:








dz − βjA(j, a). (.1)
Let us focus in the dynamic behaviour of Out?(a) function.
The time effect on outside Options. Notice that we have that the outside option is
given by:





where Et[Out(a)] is the expected outside option of worker with skill level a. With standard
algebraic manipulations one obtains:
Out(a) = Et[Out(a)]
[












Inside the expected value of the outside option. We have that the expected value

























At this point, we consider a first order Taylor approximation around the initial value of a

















where aτ0(i) represents the skill value of the worker in the moment he enters the labour
market.
Moreover, let us consider the expected value of skill a worker with a in the current period




























and after a first order Taylor approximation around the logarithm of expected value of



































Functional form of empirical model for outside options. Combining equations (4)
and (8), we have:
ln[Out(a)] = Out(a)− Et[Out(a)]
Et[Out(a)]︸ ︷︷ ︸







































(j, t) = λ(j, t). (.10)
Intuitively, one is assuming that the evolution of outside option value of every worker of
a given type a within a task market j is identical.
The reduced form of Outside Options and measurement error. Altogether, we
therefore have that the reduced form representation, as presented in equation (28) of the
text, is given by:




Moreover, following the insight of Pei et al. (2018), notice that in the case of existence of
a classical measurement error in wbargain, so that:
wbargain = w?bargain + η(i, t), (.12)
where η(i, t) corresponds to the classical measurement error, with the following properties:
1. E[η(i, t)] = 0;
2. E[λ(j, t)η(i, t)] = 0;
3. E[ψ(t− τ0(i), rank(i, t))η(i, t)] = 0;
4. E[vSi,tη(i, t)] = 0.
Consequently:
ln[wbargain] = λ(j, t) + ψ(t− τ0(i), rank(i, t), femalei)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ôut(a)
+ vSi,t − η(i, t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vi,t
, (.13)
with vi,t corresponding to the composite error term.
In a nutshell, the first stage of our empirical implementation, beyond providing empirical
structure to our estimation, also provides relevant answer to the existence of measurement
error, particularly given wbargain corresponds to a proxy. As long as the measurement error
is classical, it only has efficiency impacts, and not on the consistency of the estimates.
Given the high dimensionality of our data, naturally efficiency of the estimator does not
lie in the top of our priorities.
Intuition on the expected contract profile. We take advantage of the knowledge of:
(i) the actual rank of the worker, which is linked with Et[Out(a)], apart from the trend
behaviour; (ii) the experience of the worker, given by t− τ0(i), so that we are capable to
estimate the predicted contract path of each worker; and (iii) we allow for heterogeneous
contract profiles by gender.
The identification of the predicted contract path enables the estimation of a time-task
market effect, so that it controls for any time trend. Altogether, we are bunching the
information of the workers sharing the same contract at collective agreement level (i.e.
experience, actual rank and gender), and thus we improve our position to better value the
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individual-task market effect. Accordingly our identification follows the intuition of figure
C1.
D A Toy Model
In this appendix we present a toy version of the model presented in the text. This toy
version abstracts from several key ingredients of the main model, but preserves the link
between the model and the identification strategy implemented.
Labour market structure. The labour market is frictional, workers search for jobs and
get randomly matched with vacancies posted by firms.
Consider a standard constant returns to scale matching function as M(u,v), and define the
labour market tightness as θ = vu , where v is the number of vacancies in the market posted
by firms, and u is the number of workers unemployed and searching for a job. Accordingly,
the poisson rate at which workers meet a vacancy is given by θq(θ), and the poisson rate
at which a vacancy is filled corresponds to q(θ).
Worker and firm heterogeneity. Further assume the economy is populated by ex-
ogenously capital heterogeneous firms, and exogenously skill heterogeneous workers, with
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K ∈ [0, 1] and A ∈ [0, 1], respectively. The production function of a job filled in a type-K
firm by a worker of type-A, is given by:
F (K,A) = A+ f(K). (.1)
Value Functions. Considering the setting, the value function of a vacancy is given by:





where r is the discount rate, γ the cost of posting a vacancy and EA[J(A,K)] the expected
value of a vacancy filled in a type-K firm.
The value function of a filled vacancy constituting a match between a type-A worker and
a type-K firm corresponds to:





where δ is the depreciation rate, s is the probability of termination of the match and
w(K,A) is the wage earned by the type-A worker in such filled vacancy. Moreover, the
value function of a type-A employed worker in a type-K firm is:





with U(A) corresponding to the value function of a type-A worker which is unemployed.
Such value function is in detailed given by:
rU(A) = b+ θq(θ)
[
EA[Ξ(A,K)|K ∈ Θ]− U(A)
]
, (.5)
with b corresponding to the flow of unemployment benefits, Θ consisting in the set of
type-K firms which are expected to post vacancies, and EA[J(A,K)|K ∈ Θ] representing
the expected value of filled vacancies by a type-A worker, given the type-K firms posting
vacancies.
Free Entry. It is assumed that there is free entry for posting vacancies. Accordingly, it
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Termination rate. It is assumed that a filled vacancy can be terminated either due to




1 if A+ f(K)− (r − δ)K − rU(A) ≥ 0
s if A+ f(K)− (r − δ)K − rU(A) < 0.
(.7)
Wage bargaining and equilibrium wages. The wage is set through a 2 stage bargain-
ing. In detail:
1. The first takes place at national level between a fully representative right-to-manage
union and a fully representative employers’ association;
2. The second stage happens subsequently at firm level, between the referred union and
the firm.
At national level, the union and the firm association bargain the minima wage require-
ment for each type-A worker, with the union committing to abstain from a full national
lockdown. Moreover, the sides agree the minima wage requirement by bargaining an aver-
age national wage for type-A worker and then consider the least minimum viable match,
namely the wage that would arise in the absence of an average positive quasi-rent at
vacancy-filled level - EK [QR(A,K)]. Notice that the quasi-rent corresponds to:
QR(A,K) = A+ f(K)− (r − δ)K − rU(A). (.8)
Therefore, the bargaining at national level solves:




EK [J(A,K)]− V (K)
]1−β
subject to
A+ EK [f(K)]− (r − δ)E(K)− rU(A) = 0 (Quasi-Rent Constraint),
(.9)
where β corresponds to the union’s bargaining power. Altogether, the solution of opti-
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mization problem in equation (9) corresponds to:
wMIN (A) = rU(A). (.10)
At firm level, the union and a single firm bargain over wages, with the union committing









w(A,K) ≥ wMIN (A) (National bargaining constraint).
(.11)
Accordingly, the solution corresponds to:
w(A,K) =

(1− β)rU(A) + β
[
A+ f(K)− (r − δ)K
]
if A+ f(K)− (r − δ)K − rU(A) ≥ 0
wMIN (A) if A+ f(K)− (r − δ)K − rU(A) < 0,
(.12)
which given the termination rate, translates to:
w(A,K) = (1− β)rU(A) + β
[
A+ f(K)− (r − δ)K
]
. (.13)
Empirical Identification. Consider the difference between the equilibrium wage defined
in equation (13), and the average wage of type-K firm:









which can be represented as:
lnw(A,K) = ln
[























Equation (14) corresponds to the empirical model to be implemented resorting to a Non-
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linear Least Squares algorithm.
Derivation of the set of minimum wage requirement. Given the optimization
problem presented in equation (9), the value functions in equations (2)-(5), the free entry
condition and the termination rate, we have that the minimum wage requirement set for










A+ EK [f(K)]− (r − δ)E(K)− rU(A) = 0




rEK [J(A,K)] = A+ EK [f(K)]− (r − δ)E[K]− EK [w(A,K)]− s
[
EK [J(A,K)]− EK [V (K)]
]
.








A+ EK [f(K)]− (r − δ)E[K]− EK [w(A,K)]
]
A+ EK [f(K)]− (r − δ)E(K)− rU(A) = 0,
and the set of wage minimum is given by:
wMIN (A) = EK [w(A,K)] = (1− β)rU(A) + β
[
A+ EK [f(K)]− (r − δ)E(K)
]
which can be reduced to:
wMIN (A) = rU(A).
Derivation of the equilibrium wage. Given the optimization problem presented in
equation (11), the value functions in equations (2)-(5), the free entry condition and the



















The referred system can be reduced to:
w(A,K) = (1− β)rU(A) + β
[




which corresponds to the equilibrium wage equation in the interior solution. Thus:
w(A,K) =

(1− β)rU(A) + β
[
A+ f(K)− (r − δ)K
]
if A+ f(K)− (r − δ)K − rU(A) ≥ 0
wMIN (A) if A+ f(K)− (r − δ)K − rU(A) < 0.
However, notice given the termination rate, the equilibrium wage holds in the interior
solution.
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Appendix to Chapter 4
A Derivation of Unconstrained Wages
As referred in the text, the wage setting follows a rent-sharing rule assuming: (a) the
potential promotion of a temporary job into a permanent job entails the extinguishing
of the temporary job position, requiring the firm to potentially post a new vacancy; and
(b) the wage setting do not consider the subsequent attribution of bonuses, that is only
defined once profits are determined. Hence for wage setting purposes η(a, j, t) = 0 with
j ∈ {T, P}.
Permanent contract wages. Given the assumption framework, the wages are defined








W (a, P, t)−W (a, U, t)
]
;
r(t)J(a, P, t) = z̈F (k̈)− rl(t)k̈ − w̃(a, P, t) + ∂aJ(a, P, t)ȧ(a, P, t) + σP (ξ̈P )[−SP − J(a, P, t)] + ∂tJ(a, P, t);
ρW (a, P, t) = u(c̈) + ∂aW (a, P, t)ȧ(a, P, t) + σP (ξ̈P )
[
W (a, U, t)−W (a, P, t)
]
+ ∂tW (a, P, t)
ȧ(a, P, t) = w̃(a, P, t) + (rl − δ)a− c̈
(.1)
Solving this set of equations, I have:
w̃(a, P, t) =
β
[
ρ+ σP (ξ̈P )
]{




+ r(t)SP + ∂tJ(a, P, t)
}




r(t) + σP (ξ̈P )
]{




− ρW (a, U, t) + ∂tW (a, P, t)
}
[1− β][r(t) + σP (ξ̈P )]∂aW (a, P, t) + β[ρ+ σP (ξ̈P )][1− ∂aJ(a, P, t)]
.
(.2)
Then notice that in the case of a stationary equilibrium, by definition ∂tW (a, P, t) =
∂tJ(a, P, t) = 0.









W (a, T, t)−W (a, U, t)
]
;
r(t)J(a, T, t) =z̈F (k̈)− rl(t)k̈ − w̃(a, T, t) + ∂aJ(a, T, t)ȧ(a, T, t) + [ϕ(ξ̈P ) + σT (ξ̈T )][−J(a, T, t)]+
+ ∂tJ(a, T, t);
ρW (a, T, t) =u(c̈) + ∂aW (a, T, t)ȧ(a, T, t) + σT (ξ̈T )
[




W (a, P, t)−W (a, T, t)
]
+
+ ∂tW (a, T, t);
ȧ(a, T, t) =w̃(a, T, t) + (rl − δ)a− c̈;
(.3)
Solving this set of equations, I have:
w̃(a, T, t) =
β
[
ρ+ ϕ(ξ̈P ) + σT (ξ̈T )
]{




+ ∂tJ(a, T, t)
}




r(t) + ϕ(ξ̈P ) + σT (ξ̈T )
]{




+ ϕ(ξ̈P )W (a, P, t)− [ρ+ ϕ(ξ̈P )]W (a, U, t) + ∂tW (a, P, t)
}
[1− β][r(t) + ϕ(ξ̈P ) + σT (ξ̈T )]∂aW (a, P, t) + β[ρ+ ϕ(ξ̈P ) + σT (ξ̈T )][1− ∂aJ(a, T, t)]
.
(.4)
Then notice that in the case of a stationary equilibrium, by definition ∂tW (a, T, t) =
∂tJ(a, T, t) = 0.
B The Definition of the Stationary Equilibrium
In this section we provide a calibration for the model and present its consequent sta-
tionary equilibrium. Formally, the stationary recursive equilibrium consists of (a) set of
value functions {J(a, P, t), J(a, T, t),W (a, P, t), W (a, T, t), V (t),W (a, U, t)}; (b) a set of
policy functions {c(a, P, t), c(a, T, t), c(a, U, t), ȧ(a, P, t), ȧ(a, T, t), ȧ(a, U, t)}; (c) a distri-
bution over assets and employment {g(a, P, t), g(a, T, t), g(a, U, t)}; (d) a capital stock per
firm k(a, T, t) and k(a, P, t); (e) a labour market tightness θ(t); (f) the firm’s dividents
D(t) and (g) a set of prices {r(t), rl(t), Q(t)} such that:
• the workers solve the problems in equations (5), (6) and (7) given prices, the capital
stock and labour market tightness;
• the firms defines the capital stock by solving the problems in equations (13) and
(14), given prices and the labour market tightness;
• the job finding and filling probabilities are as explained in the frictional labour
market description part;
• free entry condition holds as presented in equation (12);
• the stationary distributions over assets and employment satisfy the standard Kol-
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mogorov forward equations;
• the wage setting satisfies the rent-sharing rule;
• the asset market clears according to equation (3), the price of equity corresponds
to the present value of the dividend string as in equation (16), and the arbitrage
condition as in equation (1) holds;
• The final good is produced in firms and at home and it is spent in consumption and















[zt(a, i)F (k(a, i, t)]g(a, i, t)da+ uth
(.1)
C Algorithm of Stationary Equilibrium
The stationary equilibrium results from a fixed-point algorithm over {θ, r(t)}. The HJB
equations are solved via the finite difference method as described in Achdou et al. [2017].
This section follows closely the work of Bardóczy [2017], with the required adjustments to
the concrete model implemented. Accordingly, the algorithm unfolds through the following
steps:
Step 1. Set up the grid for assets. In this computations, I have a ∈ [0, 150], with 501
points. The choice reflects: (a) the resulting stationary equilibrium estimate, which is well
covered in the grid; (b) the idea that the upper bound is quite irrelevant for the agent’s
decisions in the relevant range; and (c) the computational requirements to efficiently run
the algorithm.
Step 2. Guess the tightness θ in the market. The calibration implemented seeks a
θ = 1 in equilibrium. Accordingly, the cost of posting a vacancy, γ, is adjusted to attain
such objective. Then, given tightness, one obtains:
θq(θ) = χθ1−η; q(θ) = χθ−η; (.1)
Step 3. Guess the capital per worker k for each type of contract, and the cost
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of capital rl(t). So we use as initial guess:












; rl(t) = r(t) + δ; (.2)
where r(t) is initially set at 0.004.
Step 4. Define the wage schedules w(a,T, t) and w(a,P, t). I start with an initial
guess where we have:
w(a, j, t) = β
[
z(a, j, t)k(a, j, t)α − rl(t)k(a, j, t)
]
, j ∈ {T, P}. (.3)
Step 5. Define the leverage of firms ξ(a,T, t) and ξ(a,P, t), and define the flow
probabilities. Accordingly, the leverage of the firms is defined as:
ξ(a, j, t) = rl(t)k(a, j, t)
z(a, j, t)k(a, j, t)α − w(a, j, t) , j ∈ {T, P}. (.4)
Then, define the flow probabilities σj [ξ(a, j, t)] with j ∈ {T, P}, h[ξ(a, T, t)] and ϕ[ξ(a, P, t)].
Step 6. Solve the worker’s problem. The discretized HJB equations become:
ρW (a, i, t) =u[c(a, i, t)] + W (a+ ε, i, t)−W (a, i, t)∆a︸ ︷︷ ︸
∂aWF (a,i,t)
ȧ(a, j, t)+
+ W (a, i, t)−W (a− ε, i, t)∆a︸ ︷︷ ︸
∂aWB(a,i,t)
ȧ(a, j, t)− + λi,i′ [W (a, i′, t)−W (a, i, t)],
(.5)
with i ∈ {T, P, U}. The consumption associated with increasing, decreasing or unchanging
assets is defined as:
cF (a, i, t) = (∂aWF (a, i, t))−1, cB(a, i, t) = (∂aWB(a, i, t))−1, c0(a, i, t) = y(a, i, t)+r(t)a. (.6)
Accordingly, the savings decisions become:
ȧF (a, i, t) = y(a, i, t)− r(t)a− cF (a, i, t), ȧB(a, i, t) = y(a, i, t)− r(t)a− cB(a, i, t). (.7)
By concavity of the value function,
∂aW
F (a, i, t) < ∂aWB(a, i, t)→ ȧF (a, i, t) < ȧB(a, i, t). (.8)
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As standard, one defines 3 cases:
IB = {(a, i, t) : ȧB < 0}; IF = {(a, i, t) : 0 < ȧF }; I0 = {(a, i, t) : ȧF < 0 < ȧB},
(.9)
representing a certain decreasing in assets, a certain increasing in assets of an ambiguous
situation. Then, I implement the upwinding scheme, with the final policies as:
c(a, i, t) =1{IF }cF (a, i, t) + 1{IB}cB(a, i, t) + 1{I0}c0(a, i, t),
ȧ(a, i, t) =y(a, i, t)− r(t)a− c(a, i, t).
(.10)
Let l index to represent the iterations of the value function. In matrix form, the HJB
equation can be written as:
W l+1 −W l
∆ = u
l + (Al + Λl)W l+1 − ρW l (.11)






 , Ai =

y(1, i, t) z(1, i, t) 0 0 . . . 0
x(2, i, t) y(2, i, t) z(2, i, t) 0 . . . 0
0 x(3, i, t) y(3, i, t) z(3, i, t) . . . 0
... . . . . . . . . . . . .
...




x(a, i, t) = −[(̇a)(a,i,t)
−]
∆a
z(a, i, t) = −[(̇a)(a,i,t)
+]
∆a
y(a, i, t) = −x(a, i)− z(a, i, t).
(.12)








where Λi,i′ is a diagonal matrix with the flow probability of transitioning from i to i′ along
the diagonal, given the level of leverage of the particular assignment. Accordingly, the set
of flow probabilities are given by the functions:

ΛP,P(m,m) = −σP [ξ(m,P, t)]
ΛP,U(m,m) = σP [ξ(m,P, t)]
,

ΛT,P(m,m) = ϕ[ξ(m,P, t)]
ΛT,T(m,m) = −ϕ[ξ(m,P, t)]− σT [ξ(m,T, t)]
ΛT,U(m,m) = σT [ξ(m,T, t)]
,

ΛU,T(m,m) = θq(θ)h[ξ(m,T, t)]
ΛU,U(m,m) = −θq(θ)h[ξ(m,T, t)]
,
(.14)
with m representing the positioning in the grid of assets.
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Step 7. Stationary distribution of workers. I solve the discretized version of the
Kolmogorov forward equations as:
(Al + Λl)′g = 0. (.15)
Given this equation has infinitely many solutions, the solution is pinned down by the fact
that g is a density and thus integrate to 1. So as standard, I fix the first row of (Al + Λl)′
to be [1, 0, . . . , 0] and then rescale the density g to integrate to 1.
Step 8. Solve the firm’s problem. The discretized HJB equation for the firm is solved
through the system given by:
J l+1 − J l
∆ =z̈F (k̈)− rl(t)k̈ − w(a, j, t)− σj(ξ(m, j, t))Sj+
+ Alj − (r(t) + σ̃[ξ(m, j, t)]J l+1, j ∈ {T, P},
σ̃[ξ(m, j, t)] =

σ̃[ξ(m,P, t)] = σP [ξ(m,P, t)];
σ̃[ξ(m,T, t)] = σT [ξ(m,T, t)] + ϕ[ξ(m,P, t)].
(.16)
Step 9. Evaluate the Free Entry condition:
FE = −γ + q[θ(t)]
∑
a
J(a, T, t)g(a, U, t)
u(t) ∆a. (.17)
If FE is positive, more firms enter the market of temporary jobs and thus θ will have to
increase. If negative, more firms leave or not enter the market and thus θ will be decreased.
Accordingly, the function that adjusts the guess is given by:
θl+1 = θl + ∆θFEl, (.18)
where ∆θ regulates the adjustment of the guess.


























[g(a, T, t) + g(a, P, t)]∆a. (.20)
If ADl is positive, then the guess on r(t) is too low and r(t) should be increased. If ADl
is negative then the guess on r(t) is too high. Accordingly, I adjust it following:
r(t)l+1 = r(t)l + ∆r.ADl, (.21)
with ∆r regulating the speed of adjustment of the guess.
Step 11. Update the wages. Update wages following the results of appendix A.
Step 12. Update θ and r(t). Update θ and r(t) until there is convergence from step 6
onward.
D Algorithm of Transitional Dynamics
The algorithm to describe the transitional dynamics given the aggregate productivity shock
is standard, as described in Bardóczy [2017]. The economy starts from the stationary
equilibrium and returns to it. The algorithm iterates backwards the forward looking
variables as prices and value functions, and iterates states forwards. The fixed point
theorem algorithm is implemented over p0 and the sequences of {r(t), θ(t)}t. The algorithm
needs to guess the equity price on impact, p0 as it implies a revaluation of the assets of
the agents in the economy. In detail, the algorithm entails solving the following steps:
Step 1. Solve the stationary equilibrium. The stationary equilibrium described in
appendix C will provide the initial and terminal description of the economy.
Step 2. Set up a grid for time steps. The algorithm defines N − 1 time steps from
N time points where the economy will be evaluated. Accordingly, we have:
tn =

0, n = 1∑N−1
m=1 ∆tm n = 2, . . . , N
. (.1)
The grid is defined as a non-uniform grid, that gets wider as n increases. As standard, the
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objective is to have a dense map of points right after the initial shock, which then gets
sparser as the time elapses and consequently the transition becomes smoother towards the
stationary equilibrium.
Step 3. Define the aggregate shock process. The aggregate shock and the subsequent
transition path of productivity towards stationary equilibrium levels is given by:
zt = 1 + (z0 − 1)e−0.3t. (.2)
Step 4. Guess the path for tightness θ(t) and the interest rate r(t). The guess
for theta allows for the definition of:
θ(t)q[θ(t)] = χθ(t)1−η; q[θ(t)] = χθ(t)−η. (.3)
With the interest rate guess, the capital variables are also defined as:













Step 5. Iterate the HJB equations. The idea is to iterate the HJB equations back-
wards. So start from the terminal conditions, WN = W and JN = J , where J and W
corresponds to the HJB of the stationary equilibrium. Then, the method is analogous to
the stationary equilibrium algorithm and solves the following system:
Wn −Wn+1
∆tn
=un+1 + (An+1 + Λl)Wn − ρWn+1
Jn − Jn+1
∆ =[z̈F (k̈)− rl(t)k̈ − w(a, j, t)− σj(ξ̈j)Sj ]
n+1 + An+1j − [(r(t) + σ̃(ξ̈j)]n+1Jn, j ∈ {T, P},
σ̃[ξ̈j ]n+1 =
[σ̃(ξ̈P )]
n+1 = [σP (ξ̈P )]n+1;
[σ̃(ξ̈T )]n+1 = [σT (ξ̈T ) + ϕ(ξ̈P )]n+1.
(.5)
Step 6. Adjust wages. In the standard transitional dynamics algorithm, wages are sub-
jected to downward nominal wage rigidity. Accordingly, we have that wages are adjusted
given:1
1As in step 5 the •̈ variables refer to period n+1. For notation ease I don’t make it explicit in the
formulae as it was done for step 5 with [•]n+1.
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w̃(a, T, n+ 1) =
β
[
ρ+ ϕ(ξ̈P ) + σT (ξ̈T )
]{




+ ∂tJ(a, T, n+ 1)
}




r(n+ 1) + ϕ(ξ̈P ) + σT (ξ̈T )
]{




+ ϕ(ξ̈P )W (a, P, n+ 1)
[1− β][r(n+ 1) + ϕ(ξ̈P ) + σT (ξ̈T )]∂aW (a, P, n+ 1) + β[ρ+ ϕ(ξ̈P ) + σT (ξ̈T )][1− ∂aJ(a, T, n+ 1)]
−[ρ+ ϕ(ξ̈P )]W (a, U, n+ 1) + ∂tW (a, P, n+ 1)
}
[1− β][r(n+ 1) + ϕ(ξ̈P ) + σT (ξ̈T )]∂aW (a, P, n+ 1) + β[ρ+ ϕ(ξ̈P ) + σT (ξ̈T )][1− ∂aJ(a, T, n+ 1)]
w̃(a, P, n+ 1) =
β
[
ρ+ σP (ξ̈P )
]{




+ r(n+ 1)SP + ∂tJ(a, P, n+ 1)
}




r(n+ 1) + σP (ξ̈P )
]{




− ρW (a, U, n+ 1) + ∂tW (a, P, n+ 1)
}
[1− β][r(n+ 1) + σP (ξ̈P )]∂aW (a, P, n+ 1) + β[ρ+ σP (ξ̈P )][1− ∂aJ(a, P, n+ 1)]
.
(.6)
w(a, j, n+ 1) =

w̃(a, j, n+ 1) if w̃(a, j, n+ 1) ≥ λw(a, j, n)
w(a, j, n) if w̃(a, j, n+ 1) < λw(a, j, n)
, j ∈ {T, P}, (.7)
If in a particular exercise wages are not subjected to downward nominal wage rigidity then
it is simply a matter to relax the constraint imposed in equation (7).
Step 7. Revalue assets in the after the initial shock. Let p represent the price of
equity in the stationary equilibrium and p0 the price on impact. An agent that owns si
share of the total assets in the economy, ai = si(K + p), will have its assets updated on
impact as:
a′i = si(K + p0) = ai
[




Further, assume that agents can’t do anything about the revaluation, and thus g0(a′, i) =
g(a, i), where i = {T, P, U}. The g0 density at old grid points {ai} is found be interpo-
lation. I follow the insight of Bardóczy [2017] and interpolate directly g by resulting to
MATLAB’s pchip method, and then rescale it.
Step 8. Iterate the Kolmogorov forward equations. Given the revalued stationary
distribution, after the reassessment of prices, I iterate the Kolmogorov forward equations.
Accordingly, using the implicit method, it consists in solving:
gn+1 − gn
∆tn
= [An + Λn]′gn+1. (.9)






g(a, U, n)∆a, v(n) = θ(n)u(n). (.10)
Step 10. Evaluate the free entry condition. The set of free entry conditions along
the transitional dynamics is given by:
FEn = −γ + q[θ(t)]n
∑
a
J(a, T, n)g(a, U, n)
u(n) ∆a. (.11)
Step 11. Evaluate the asset market clearing condition. The arbitrage condition
implies that one can solve the price of equity backwards. Thus one obtains:
pn+1 − pn
∆tn
= pn(r(n)− d(n)), (.12)












z̈F (k̈)− rl(n)k̈ − w(a, P, n)
]
g(a, P, n)∆a− γv.
(.13)




















Step 12. Adjust p0 and {r(n), θ(n)}N−1n . Accordingly, adjust: (a) the price on impact
based on the no-arbitrage condition; (b) the labour market tightness based on the free
entry condition; and (c) the interest rate based on the excess demand for assets condition.
Consequently, consider:
pl+10 =∆pp0 + (1−∆p)pl0
r(n)l+1 =r(n)l + ∆rADn
θ(n)l+1 =θ(n)l + ∆FEFEn.
(.15)
The iterate from step 5 onward, until reaching convergence.
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E Details on the algorithms for policy analysis.
Algorithm for transitional dynamics under flexible wages. The algorithm to es-
timate the transitional dynamics under flexible wages is identical to the algorithm in
appendix D, with the sole exception residing in relaxing equation (7), which has no appli-
cability.
Altogether, the transitional dynamics are therefore estimated in a fully comparable way
with the downward nominal rigid wages. Paramount to this approach is the fact that the
stationary equilibrium under both scenarios is identical, as the downward nominal wage
rigidity is not binding in the equilibrium.
Algorithm for transitional dynamics under the unemployment benefit transfer
policy. This algorithm differs from the one presented in appendix D in two major ways.
First, during the implementation period of the subsidy, wages, leverage and profits are
adjusted to include the subsidy. Secondly, the algorithm needs to ensure the budget
balancing of the policy.
Notice that the discretization of the algorithm implies that the time steps are matched to
quarters. Accordingly, the subsidy is provided in the periods t ∈ [1; 5], corresponding to 4
quarters of implementation and 1 quarter of implementation lag.
The profits become:
η̃(a, P, t) =
[
z̈F (k̈)− rl(t)k̈ − (1− τub)w(a, P, t)
]
, if t ∈ [1, 5], (.16)
and the leverage of the firm becomes:
ξ(a, P, t) = rl(t)
z(a, P, t)F [k(a, P, t)]− (1− τub)w(a, P, t) , if t ∈ [1, 5]. (.17)
Accordingly, the step 5 of the standard algorithm is duly adjusted, namely the HJB
equations for the value of the job. Noteworthy, the HJB equations for the workers do
not change.









W (a, P, t)−W (a, U, t)
]
;
r(t)J(a, P, t) = z̈F (k̈)− rl(t)k̈ − (1− τub)w̃(a, P, t) + ∂aJ(a, P, t)ȧ(a, P, t)+
+ σP (ξ̈P )[−SP − J(a, P, t)] + ∂tJ(a, P, t);
ρW (a, P, t) = u(c̈) + ∂aW (a, P, t)ȧ(a, P, t) + σP (ξ̈P )
[
W (a, U, t)−W (a, P, t)
]
+ ∂tW (a, P, t)
ȧ(a, P, t) = w̃(a, P, t) + (rl − δ)a− c̈
(.18)
with the resulting permanent contract wages, relevant for step 6 defined as:
w̃(a, P, t) =
β
[
ρ+ σP (ξ̈P )
]{




+ r(t)SP + ∂tJ(a, P, t)
}




r(t) + σP (ξ̈P )
]{




− ρW (a, U, t) + ∂tW (a, P, t)
}
[1− β][r(t) + σP (ξ̈P )]∂aW (a, P, t) + β[ρ+ σP (ξ̈P )][(1− τub)− ∂aJ(a, P, t)]
, if t ∈ [1, 5].
(.19)
The temporary contract wages are unchanged.
The remainder of the steps from step 7 to step 12 are unchanged, other than for the












z̈F (k̈)− rl(n)k̈ − (1− τub)w(a, P, n)
]
g(a, P, n)∆a− γv, if t ∈ [1, 5].
(.20)
In step 12, the convergence needs to be supplemented with the balanced budget criteria.



















The convergence of the fixed point algorithm is supplemented with the balanced budget
condition as:
Bub,l =ubsav,l − ubexp,l;
τub,l+1 =τub,l + ∆ubBub,l.
(.22)
Intuitively, notice that if the policy is generating savings, then the ad-valorem rate of the
subsidy can be increased, whereas if the policy is generating deficits the rate should be
reduced.
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The algorithm iterates from step 5, with the referred changes until a convergence is reached.
Algorithm for transitional dynamics under the income tax and firm subsidy
transfer. In this policy the budget is permanently balanced, as the policy consists in
an instantaneous transfer between workers and firms. However, given this property, just
ensuring budget balance do not pin point a single calibration of the policy. For that
purpose, as presented in the text, the policy maker attempts to select the ad-valorem rate
of transfer that minimizes the disturbance in employment and unemployment flows.
Consequently, the algorithm to run this policy consists in an inner loop algorithm, which
consists in an adjusted version of the one proposed in appendix D, whereas the outer loop
consists in a minimization algorithm of the policy objective, by selecting the ad-valorem
rate of transfer.
As in every policy algorithm, the discretization of the algorithm implies that the time steps
are matched to quarters. Accordingly, the subsidy is provided in the periods t ∈ [1; 5],
corresponding to 4 quarters of implementation and 1 quarter of implementation lag. Thus,
by comparison with the algorithm in appendix D, the inner algorithm is adjusted to
incorporate the policy. The profits become:
η̃(a, P, t) =
[
z̈F (k̈)− rl(t)k̈ − (1− τ ts)w(a, P, t)
]
, if t ∈ [1, 5], (.23)
and the leverage of the firm becomes:
ξ(a, P, t) = rl(t)k(a, P, t)
z(a, P, t)F [k(a, P, t)]− (1− τ ts)w(a, P, t) , if t ∈ [1, 5]. (.24)
Accordingly, the step 5 of the standard algorithm is duly adjusted, namely the HJB
equations for the value of the job. Noteworthy, the HJB equations for the workers do
not change, even though the income of the individuals is adjusted so that:
y(a, i, t) =

(1− τ ts)w(a, P, t) + η(a, P, t) if i = P
w(a, T, t) + η(a, T, t) if i = T
b if i = U
. (.25)









W (a, P, t)−W (a, U, t)
]
;
r(t)J(a, P, t) = z̈F (k̈)− rl(t)k̈ − (1− τ ts)w̃(a, P, t) + ∂aJ(a, P, t)ȧ(a, P, t)+
+ σP (ξ̈P )[−SP − J(a, P, t)] + ∂tJ(a, P, t);
ρW (a, P, t) = u(c̈) + ∂aW (a, P, t)ȧ(a, P, t) + σP (ξ̈P )
[
W (a, U, t)−W (a, P, t)
]
+ ∂tW (a, P, t)
ȧ(a, P, t) = (1− τ ts)w̃(a, P, t) + (rl − δ)a− c̈
(.26)
with the resulting permanent contract wages, relevant for step 6 defined as:
w̃(a, P, t) =
β
[
ρ+ σP (ξ̈P )
]{




+ r(t)SP + ∂tJ(a, P, t)
}




r(t) + σP (ξ̈P )
]{




− ρW (a, U, t) + ∂tW (a, P, t)
}
[1− β][r(t) + σP (ξ̈P )](1− τ ts)∂aW (a, P, t) + β[ρ+ σP (ξ̈P )](1− τ ts)[1− ∂aJ(a, P, t)]
, if t ∈ [1, 5].
(.27)
The temporary contract wages are unchanged.
The remainder of the steps from step 7 to step 12 are unchanged, other than for the












z̈F (k̈)− rl(n)k̈ − (1− τ ts)w(a, P, n)
]
g(a, P, n)∆a− γv, if t ∈ [1, 5].
(.28)
Given these adjustments to the inner algorithm, one obtains the employment and unem-
ployment sequences for each level of τ ts. Then, resorting to the Fminsearch procedure






{∣∣∣∣eT (n) + eP (n)− esT − esP ∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣u(n)− us∣∣∣∣}dn. (.29)
where esP , esT and us correspond to the stationary equilibrium levels of employment and
unemployment.
Altogether, this last step solves the outer loop ensuring a policy that is budget balanced
by definition, and implemented with the objective to minimize employment fluctuations
over the adjustment. Intuitively, it consists in computing the inner algorithm sufficient
times to search over the grid of admissible ad-valorem rates the one that most fulfills the
objective.
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Algorithm for temporary wage flexibility transfer. This policy consists in relaxing
the downward nominal wage rigidity for the periods t ∈ [1, 5]. Accordingly, the algorithm
is analogous to the one in appendix D with the replacement of equation (7) of the appendix
D with equation (36) of the text.
Algorithm for Moratorium in cost of capital transfer. This policy consists in an
adjustment of the cost of capital. Critically, during part of the downturn, the policy
will temporarily reduce the loan size to the banking institution, providing relief in the
leverage ratio perceived by such institution. Then, in the repayment period, the policy
will increase the cost of capital to ensure the repayment of the subsidy provided. Given the
discretization implemented, the policy is implemented with a quarter of implementation
lag, and it is calibrated to consist in a 1-year subsidy, with a 5-year repayment. The
interest rate of the loan is set to ensure the budget-balance of the policy.
As the policy is budget-balanced by construction, it requires the calibration of the size of
the initial of the subsidy to be selected given the objective of the policy maker. As in the
income tax firm subsidy transfer case, I will consider the policy maker intends to minimize
the employment fluctuations over the adjustment.
Accordingly, the algorithm of this policy is as defined in appendix D with the required
changes to ensure the incorporation of the subsidy, the definition of the interest rate
associated with the repayment, and the outer loop to define the optimal size of the credit
line to ensure the minimization of employment fluctuations. The step 4 of the algorithm
is enlarged to calculate the specificity of the subsidy and repayment profits. For the
implementation period, the firms receive a flow as:
LC(a, P, t) = τmrslK(a, P )s, if t ∈ [1, 5], (.30)
where rslK(a, P )s corresponds to the cost of capital the firm was incurring in the stationary
equilibrium. By the end of the implementation period, the total amount provided for the
firm corresponds to:





with rloan corresponding to the quarterly interest rate considered to ensure the budget
balance of the policy, and the factor 4 maps into the idea that the cost of capital ease takes
place for 4 quarters. Then the loan is paid back in installments for 5 years. Accordingly,
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the installments become:










if t ∈ (5, 25].
(.32)
Notice that for t > 25 then LC(a, P, t) = 0. Given the policy details as defined, the capital
variables are unchanged, as it results from first order condition of the capital. The profit
becomes:
η̃(a, P, t) =
[
z̈F (k̈)− rl(t)k̈ + LC(a, P, t)− w(a, P, t)
]
, (.33)
and the leverage of the firm becomes:
ξ(a, P, t) = rl(t)k(a, P, t)− LC(a, P, t)
z(a, P, t)F [k(a, P, t)]− w(a, P, t) . (.34)
The guess of tightness and interest rate are as defined in step 4. Further, step 5 is
unchanged, other than for the adjustment of profits in the HJB equation of the value of
the job, and the changes in the leverage of the permanent contract jobs.
Regarding wages, the wages of the permanent contracts are adjusted to consider the exis-
tence of the credit line. Accordingly one have the relevent set of equations as:
β
[




W (a, P, t)−W (a, U, t)
]
;
r(t)J(a, P, t) = z̈F (k̈)− rl(t)k̈ + LC(a, P, t)− w̃(a, P, t) + ∂aJ(a, P, t)ȧ(a, P, t)+
+ σP (ξ̈P )[−SP − J(a, P, t)] + ∂tJ(a, P, t);
ρW (a, P, t) = u(c̈) + ∂aW (a, P, t)ȧ(a, P, t) + σP (ξ̈P )
[
W (a, U, t)−W (a, P, t)
]
+ ∂tW (a, P, t)
ȧ(a, P, t) = w̃(a, P, t) + (rl − δ)a− c̈;
(.35)
which results into permanent contract wages as:
w̃(a, P, t) =
β
[
ρ+ σP (ξ̈P )
]{




+ r(t)SP + ∂tJ(a, P, t)
}




r(t) + σP (ξ̈P )
]{




− ρW (a, U, t) + ∂tW (a, P, t)
}
[1− β][r(t) + σP (ξ̈P )]∂aW (a, P, t) + β[ρ+ σP (ξ̈P )][1− ∂aJ(a, P, t)]
.
(.36)
From steps 7 to step 11 the algorithm remains analogous to the one presented in appendix














z̈F (k̈)− rl(n)k̈ + LC(a, P, n)− w(a, P, n)
]
g(a, P, n)∆a− γv, if t ∈ [1, 5].
(.37)
Regarding step 12, one needs to enlarge the convergence adjustment conditions to include






τmrslK(a, P )se−rloantg(a, P, t)∆a, (.38)



















coorresponds to the aggregate level of repayments. Accordingly, the policy balance corre-
sponds to:
BP (rloan) = ADR(rloan)−ADT (rloan). (.40)
Given this balance, the rloan is adjusted according to:
rl+1loan = r
l
loan −∆rBP l. (.41)
Notice that when the policy results in savings, the interest rate of the policy can be
reduced, whereas when it results in expenditure, the interest rate of the policy needs to be
increased. The resulting interest rate will therefore include the impact of the employment
and unemployment flows in the revenues and expenditure of the policy.
Given these adjustments to the inner algorithm, one obtains the employment and unem-
ployment sequences for each level of τm - a measure of the magnitude of the flow subsidy
in the level of loans of the permanent job firms. Then, resorting to the Fminsearch pro-






{∣∣∣∣eT (n) + eP (n)− esT − esP ∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣u(n)− us∣∣∣∣}dn. (.42)
where esP , esT and us correspond to the stationary equilibrium levels of employment and
unemployment.
Altogether, as in the case of the income tax firm subsidy transfer, this last step solves the
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outer loop ensuring a policy that is budget balanced by definition, and implemented with
the objective to minimize employment fluctuations over the adjustment.
Algorithm for joint transfer policy. This policy combines the moratorium policy, the
income tax and firm subsidy transfer policy and the unemployment benefit transfer policy.
Accordingly, the algorithm combines the features described in the previous algorithms for
the relevant policies.
Accordingly, for the implementation period of the policy, the moratorium policy implies
the firms receive a flow as:
LC(a, P, t) = τmrslK(a, P )s, if t ∈ [1, 5], (.43)
where rslK(a, P )s corresponds to the cost of capital the firm was incurring in the stationary
equilibrium. By the end of the implementation period, the total amount of the loan
provided for the firm corresponds to:





with rloan corresponding to the quarterly interest rate considered to ensure the budget
balance of the policy, and the factor 4 maps into the idea that the cost of capital ease
takes place for 4 quarters. Then the subsidy is paid back in installments for 5 years.
Accordingly, the installments become:










if t ∈ (5, 25].
(.45)
Notice that for t > 25 then LC(a, P, t) = 0. Given the policy details as defined, the capital
variables are unchanged, as it results from first order condition of the capital.
Given the moratorium policy block, the profits also incorporate the other two policies.
Thus, the profit becomes:
η̃(a, P, t) =
[
z̈F (k̈)− rl(t)k̈ + LC(a, P, t)− (1− τub − τ ts)w(a, P, t)
]
, (.46)
and the leverage of the firm becomes:
ξ(a, P, t) = rl(t)k(a, P, t)− LC(a, P, t)
z(a, P, t)F [k(a, P, t)]− (1− τub − τ ts)w(a, P, t) . (.47)
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Regarding wages, the wages of the permanent contracts are adjusted to consider the exis-
tence of the joint policy. Accordingly one have the relevant set of equations as:
β
[




W (a, P, t)−W (a, U, t)
]
;
r(t)J(a, P, t) = z̈F (k̈)− rl(t)k̈ + LC(a, P, t)− (1− τub − τ ts)w̃(a, P, t) + ∂aJ(a, P, t)ȧ(a, P, t)+
+ σP (ξ̈P )[−SP − J(a, P, t)]
+ ∂tJ(a, P, t);
ρW (a, P, t) = u(c̈) + ∂aW (a, P, t)ȧ(a, P, t) + σP (ξ̈P )
[
W (a, U, t)−W (a, P, t)
]
+ ∂tW (a, P, t)
ȧ(a, P, t) = (1− τ ts)w̃(a, P, t) + (rl − δ)a− c̈;
(.48)
which results into permanent contract wages as:
w̃(a, P, t) =
β
[
ρ+ σP (ξ̈P )
]{




+ r(t)SP + ∂tJ(a, P, t)
}




r(t) + σP (ξ̈P )
]{




− ρW (a, U, t) + ∂tW (a, P, t)
}
[1− β][r(t) + σP (ξ̈P )](1− τ ts)∂aW (a, P, t) + β[ρ+ σP (ξ̈P )][(1− τ ts − τub)− ∂aJ(a, P, t)(1− τ ts)]
.
(.49)
From steps 7 to step 11 the algorithm remains analogous to the one presented in appendix













z̈F (k̈)− rl(n)k̈ + LC(a, P, n)− w(a, P, n)
]
g(a, P, n)∆a− γv, if t ∈ [1, 5].
(.50)
Regarding step 12, one needs to enlarge the convergence adjustment conditions to include







τmrslK(a, P )se−rloantg(a, P, t)∆a, (.51)



















Accordingly, the policy balance corresponds to:
BP (rloan) = ADR(rloan)−ADT (rloan). (.53)
Given this balance, the rloan is adjusted according to:
rl+1loan = r
l
loan −∆rBP l. (.54)
256
Notice that when the policy results in savings, the interest of the loan can be reduced,
whereas when it results in expenditure, the interest of the loan needs to be increased. The
resulting interest rate of the loan will therefore include the impact of the employment and
unemployment flows in the revenues and expenditure of the credit line.




















The convergence of the fixed point algorithm is supplemented with the balanced budget
condition as:
Bub,l =ubsav,l − ubexp,l;
τub,l+1 =τub,l + ∆ubBub,l.
(.56)
Intuitively, notice that if the policy is generating savings, then the ad-valorem rate of the
subsidy can be increased, whereas if the policy is generating deficits the rate should be
reduced.
Altogether, the convergence criteria entails the adjustment of: (a) the price on impact
based on the no-arbitrage condition; (b) the labour market tightness based on the free
entry condition; (c) the interest rate based on the excess demand for assets condition;
(d) the unemployment benefit subsididy transfer τub; and (e) the interest rate of the
moratorium, τm. Consequently, consider:
pl+10 =∆pp0 + (1−∆p)pl0,
r(n)l+1 =r(n)l + ∆rADn,
θ(n)l+1 =θ(n)l + ∆FEFEn,




The iteration of the inner loop of appendix D, from step 5 onward, with the prescribed
adjustments in this appendix, allows for the convergence of the inner loop.
The given the convergence of the inner loop algorithm, one obtains the employment and
unemployment sequences for each level of {τm, τ ts}. Then, resorting to the Fminsearch







{∣∣∣∣eT (n) + eP (n)− esT − esP ∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣u(n)− us∣∣∣∣}dn. (.58)
where esP , esT and us correspond to the stationary equilibrium levels of employment and
unemployment.
Altogether, as in the relevant isolated policies, this last step solves the outer loop ensuring
a policy that is budget balanced by definition, and implemented with the objective to
minimize employment fluctuations over the adjustment.
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